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Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation in Venezuela:
A Cross-Sectional Analysis
Betilde Rincon de Munoz
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to fill the gap in research about women in Venezuela
by investigating the determinants of their labor force participation between 1995 and
1998. The Central Office of Statistics and Information in Venezuela provides crosssectional data collected semiannually about individual, demographic, socio-economic and
geographical characteristics of individuals living in Venezuela during this period. This
study uses binomial and multinomial logit models to test a number of hypotheses. First,
the full sample of women between 15 and 60 years old is used to investigate the
importance of individual, demographic, socioeconomic, and geographical characteristics
in the labor force participation decision, also controlling for a time trend. The same
decision is also analyzed for three subsamples: married women, single women, and
women heads of household. Comparisons are made between each subsample and the full
sample, and also among the different subsamples. Next, multinomial regressions using
the same explanatory variables are performed to examine labor market behavior when
there is a three-way choice: whether to participate in the formal sector, the informal
sector or not to participate in the labor market at all. The multinomial regressions are also
performed on the three subsamples as well as on the full sample. Again comparisons are
made between each subsample and the full sample and also among the three subsamples.
vii

The results of these analyses show considerable differences in motivating factors among
the three groups. The conclusion that must be drawn from this research is that one cannot
generalize about the women’s labor force participation just by studying the behavior of
women in the aggregate. The relative importance of motivating factors depends strongly
on the specific subsample to which a woman belongs, a fact unrevealed by previous
empirical work. The more detailed analyses produced by this dissertation provide deeper
understanding of the labor force participation of Venezuelan women. This information
will make a valuable contribution to policy-makers who seek to encourage the important
economic contribution of women to this previously under-studied labor market.

viii

Chapter One
Introduction

The massive influx of Latin American women into the labor market, and their
ensuing contribution to the region's economic growth were two of the most important
developments in the Western Hemisphere in the twentieth century. These developments
took place in the context of structural changes that forced women to look for and respond
to the demands of the market in the employment sector. Indeed, for any country, the
proportion of various population groups in the labor force both affect, and reflect, the
overall rate of economic growth, the economic circumstances of those groups, and the
role of women in the society. This project examines the determinants of this increased
participation of women in the labor force in Venezuela.
Although a study of labor supply includes the level of labor force participation, as
reflected in annual hours worked, as well as on the number of individuals participating in
the labor force at a point in time, this project will deal only with labor force participation.
Since labor force participation in the U.S. and other developed countries has been studied
extensively, a brief survey of empirical evidence of these countries is included in this
project as well as that of developing countries, including those from Latin America.
The level of women's participation in the labor market in Venezuela has increased
dramatically in recent decades, from 17.5 percent to 47.2 percent between 1950 and
2000. The rise of the petroleum state and the rapidly growing economy also created
1

employment for women in the labor force. However, the economic downturn at the end
of the twentieth century impacted the overall labor market as well as the labor
participation rates of women. The first objective of this research project is to investigate
the effects of various factors on women’s decision to work during the second half of the
1990s in Venezuela. Secondly, given the increased importance of the informal sector in
the labor market, the project seeks to understand the distribution of the female labor force
among the formal and informal sectors. Finally, the differences in choosing employment
in the formal and informal sector among married, single women, and female heads of
household are investigated. The study contributes to the economic literature devoted to
analyzing labor force participation in Latin America, and specifically Venezuela. It also
provides an analysis that could serve as the basis for the formulation of emerging public
policies oriented towards women's advancement.

1.1 Venezuela in the 1990s
In order to understand Venezuelan women’s labor force participation during the
1995-1998 period, it is important to mention some relevant characteristics of the
Venezuelan population, the labor market, and the most important indicators of the
country’s economic activity.
The Venezuelan economy is mainly based on the exploitation and
commercialization of petroleum and its byproducts. For many years, the Venezuelan
people enjoyed a relatively good standard of living, as well as urbanization and
modernization, as byproducts of the extraordinarily high oil revenues. The quadrupling of
crude oil prices in 1973 spawned an oil euphoria and a spree of public and private
2

consumption unprecedented in Venezuelan history. During the 1970s, the government
established hundreds of new state-owned enterprises and decentralized agencies, as the
public sector became the primary engine for economic growth.
In addition to establishing new companies in such areas as mining,
petrochemicals, and hydroelectricity, the government also purchased private companies.
In 1975, the government nationalized the steel industry and in 1976, the oil industry was
nationalized. This tremendous influx of money allowed the public sector of the economy
to embrace an internal industrialization that substituted for previous imports of many
finished goods, capital and technologies, and provided for the construction of an
important infrastructure of highways, extensive irrigation of agricultural lands, and a
huge hydroelectric system, among others. Moreover, in the last three decades, the
economy reached some degree of diversification with the exploitation and exportation of
iron ore, petrochemical products, aluminum, cement, steel and other industrial products.
The Venezuelan government also made important advances in providing public health
and education services to the Venezuelan people.

1.2 The Venezuelan Economic Crisis: 1980-1999
In 1983 the price of oil fell, and soaring interest rates caused the national debt to
multiply. Oil revenues could no longer support the array of government subsidies, price
controls, exchange-rates losses, and the operation of more than 400 public institutions.
Widespread corruption and political patronage only exacerbated the situation. By 1989
the economy could no longer support the high rates of subsidies and the increasing

3

foreign debt burden, particularly in light of the nearly 50 percent reduction of the price of
oil during 1986.
In 1989 the government launched profound policy reforms with the support of
structural adjustment loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank.1 The purpose was to reduce the role of government in the economy, orienting
economic activities toward the free market, and stimulating foreign investment. The most
important adjustment was the massive devaluation of the national currency, the bolivar.2
In spite of these efforts, the extraordinary outflow of monetary resources from the
economy created one of the most serious financial banking crises in Venezuela in 1994.3
As a consequence, another structural adjustment program called the Venezuelan Agenda
was implemented. The final years of the 1990s were marked by great economic structural
changes that brought about a sharp decline in the standard of living. Those in the middle
and working classes faced increasing financial hardships: the poverty rate increased by
over 60 percent by the end of 1997.4 Low employment in the oil sector, lack of sustained
growth of non-oil activities, and shrinkage of the public sector, i.e. the main causes of the
contraction of the formal sector, are likely to remain unchanged for some time.

1

The document with all the economic adjustment was known as the “Big Turnaround.”

2

Other related policies sought to eliminate budget deficits by 1991 through the sales of state-owned enterprises, to
restructure the financial sector and restore positive real interest rates, to liberalize trade through tariff reduction and
exchange rate adjustment, and to abolish most subsidies and price controls. The government also aggressively pursued
debt reduction schemes with its commercial creditors in an effort to lower its foreign debt repayments.

3

The 1994 banking crisis was unprecedented in Venezuela. Very few other Latin American countries experienced a
similar situation. It was accompanied by a currency exchange control period of 21 months (1994-1996).

4

The World Bank reported that in Venezuela the poverty rate in 1981 was 17.7 percent; it reached 78 percent by the
end of 1990s.

4

1.3 The Venezuelan Population in the 1990s
The Venezuelan population was approximately 23 million people at the end of
1998.5 Despite a low overall population density (21.4 persons per square kilometer in
1987), the distribution is extremely uneven. The most striking phenomenon in the
distribution of the Venezuelan population has been the shift from a highly rural to an
overwhelmingly urban population in response to the process of economic growth and
modernization due to the development of the oil industry. Most of its population is
concentrated in the western Andean region and along the coast. Although nearly half of
the land lies south and east of the Orinoco River, that area contained only about 4 percent
of the population in the late 1980s. About 75 percent of the total population lived in only
20 percent of the national territory, mainly in the northern mountains (Caracas and
surrounding areas) and the Maracaibo lowlands. In the 1990s, the north, which is the area
of the country’s first colonial cities, agricultural estates, and urban settlements, remained
the administrative, economic, and social heartland of the country. Moreover, 40 percent
of the people live in the eight most urbanized cities of the country6 whereas the
indigenous population (1.5 percent) lives in the southern areas of Venezuela and also in
some part of the Zulian region. Finally, for the period under analysis, 1995-1998, 86
percent of the Venezuelan population lived in urban areas, as the following figure shows.

5

Census of the Republic of Venezuela, 2000.

6

Caracas, Maracaibo, Valencia, Barquisimeto, Merida , Guayana, and Cumana.

5

Figure 1 Distribution of Venezuelan Population

Source: University of Texas Library,
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/venezuela_pop_1972.jpg
1.4 Education
Although the issue of free public and compulsory education at the primary level
first arose during the independence struggle7 in 1811, the real beginning of free public

7

The ideal of free, universal education has become inextricably joined to the name of the national hero Simon Bolivar.
This ideal has since permeated Venezuelan educational policies.

6

education began in 1870 when the president of Venezuela, Antonio Guzman Blanco,
issued a decree in which he recognized compulsory elementary mass education as the
responsibility of national and local governments. At least six years of primary school
were compulsory until 1980, when the Law of Education was passed. This law
established compulsory preschool education and nine years of basic education for
children six to fourteen years of age. For those continuing their education, the system
offered two years of diversified academic, technical, and vocational study at a senior high
school, which could be followed by various types of higher education—junior college,
university, or technical institute, all paid for the government. In addition, adults were
encouraged to participate in special night classes conducted at all education levels.
Overall, Venezuela was among the most literate of the Latin American countries. The
literacy rate among Venezuelans fifteen years of age and older increased from 51.2
percent in 1950 to 91.1 percent in 1995. College education enrollment has also grown
significantly. By 1995, approximately 600,000 people were registered in more than 100
private and public colleges and universities,8 technical schools, and military institutions.
It is also important to highlight the success of the “Great Mariscal of Ayacucho,” a
scholarship program implemented in 1975. Under this program, thousands of students
have enrolled in American and European universities at both undergraduate and graduate
levels.

8

The most important public universities are the Central University of Venezuela (founded in 1725), Andres Bello
Catholic University (founded in 1953), Metropolitan University (founded in 1970) and the Simon Bolivar University
(founded in 1970) in Caracas; Los Andes University (founded in 1810) in Mérida; Zulia University (founded in 1891)
in Maracaibo; Carabobo University (founded in 1892) in Valencia; Oriente (founded in 1958) with the headquarters in
Cumana and branches in different cities of the North-Eastern region; and, the Centro-Occidental Lisandro Alvarado
University (founded in 1962) in Barquisimeto.

7

1.5 The Venezuelan Labor Market in the 1990s
The significant increase of the rate of labor market activity in the population is an
important characteristic of the economy in recent years. The total labor force
participation rate rose from 59 percent in 1994, to 69 percent in 1999. During the 1990s,
women increased their labor force participation by 13 percent while that of men increased
by only 3.2 percent.9 Labor force participation was highest among women 25 to 44 years
of age.
Another of the more significant changes that occurred in the labor market is the
increasing importance of the informal sector.10 After remaining fairly constant at around
40 percent for a decade, the percentage of workers employed in the informal sector
increased to 49 percent in 1994 and to 52 percent in 1999. This meant that the majority of
the active population was employed outside of the formal sector of the economy,11 with
all the implications and costs that implies, in terms of (a) lacking the benefits of social
security and pensions provided through formal employment, (b) lower average salary
levels, (c) depreciation of marketable skills, and (d) lost income tax revenues for the
government.
Employment in Venezuela has historically been concentrated in service activities,
specifically health, education, personal services; and trade. Employment decreased in the

9

Labor force participation of men decreased from 79.5 percent in 1950 to 69.2 percent in 1990; and, increased their
participation to 72.4 percent by 1998 (1950 National Census of 1950, OCEI, 1998).

10

Women reported as self-employed (excluding professional and technicians), employers of business with less than 5
employees, or as family workers, are assumed to be engaged in the informal sector of the labor force. This definition
follows the methodology used by the Central Office of Statistics and Information (OCEI, 1990). The increase in
employment in the informal sector was also a byproduct of the globalization process, which was a factor that helped
increase self-employment activities. Albeit important, this is beyond the scope this project.
11

The nation's 1990 labor law incorporated provisions for organized labor, collective bargaining, generous fringe
benefits, and retirement and disability pensions. Venezuela passed a national minimum wage law in 1974.
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manufacturing industry, the third-largest sector in terms of employment, in the late
1990s, exacerbated by a notable reduction of industrial activities. The agriculture sector
showed the same tendency to a lesser extent. The construction, transportation and
communications industries were the only ones that did not register significant changes in
employment.
Unemployment fluctuated based largely on the health of the oil industry which in
turn greatly impacted the productive activities of other industries. In 1978 only 4.3
percent of the labor force was unemployed, compared with the peak level of 14.5 percent
in 1984 when oil revenues fell. By 1989, the unemployment rate was 8.7 percent. In
1994, as a consequence of the implementation of the first macroeconomic adjustment, the
Big Turnaround, the unemployment rate fluctuated between 7 and 9 percent. By 1995, it
increased to levels of around 11 percent with a peak of 13 percent in 1996 as a result of
the banking crises of 1994 (INE, Annual Report, 1978-1995).
During every year of the 1990s, nominal minimum wages increased due to
progressive decreases in real wages because of inflation and currency depreciations.12
This decrease in real wages, combined with high rates of unemployment, generated losses
in household income which helps explains the increase in the labor force participation
rate of women who entered the labor force to compensate for the loss of real household
income.
Labor policies contained in the Venezuelan Agenda were designed and implemented
during the period under study (1995-1998) to mitigate the fall in real salary of those

12

Nominal minimum wages (including transportation and food bonus) in urban areas increased from 17,794.4 bolivares
per month in 1989 to 242,282.7 bolivares per month in 1998 (OIT, Panorama of Labor, 1999), an increase of 1,261.56
percent.

9

employed in the formal sector, the costs of which were transferred to the employer. This
in turn provided disincentives for employers to hire additional workers.

1.6 Venezuelan Women and the Labor Market
The labor force participation of Venezuelan women increased from 18 percent in
1950 to 31 percent in 1990, and to 43 percent by 1998 (National Census of 1950, OCEI,
1998). Factors such as accelerated economic growth, democratization of the educational
system, and the decrease in fertility rates, on one hand; and the economic and social
deterioration after the fall of the oil revenues and the financial crisis of 1994, on the
other, influenced the upward trend in women’s labor force participation (Irene Casique,
1994; Orlandina Oliviera, 1997). In fact, improved educational and job opportunities
since the establishment of democracy in 1958 have enabled more women to enter the
labor force, thus helping themselves and/or their families attain middle-class status.13 Not
surprisingly, those who moved from the lower to the middle class in Venezuela often
attributed their changed status to their education, and accordingly, many struggled to send
their children to private schools so that they could move still further up the social ladder.
The social distinction between private and public school, particularly at the secondary
level, has intensified as a result of the expansion of public education. This project aims to
investigate and interpret those changes among these women.
The results of this dissertation research, using the individual data of the

13
Most accounts describe the Venezuelan middle-class as the country’s most dynamic and heterogeneous class in terms
of social and racial origins, and as the greatest beneficiary of the process of economic development. Consisting of small
businessmen, industrialists, teachers, government workers, professionals, and managerial and technical personnel, this
class is almost entirely urban. Some professions, such as in teaching and government services, were traditionally
associated with the middle class, whereas newer technical professions have expanded the options and enhanced
mobility within this class.
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Household Sample Survey data set from 1995.1 to 1998.2, indicate that women’s labor
force participation in Venezuela during the period under study is affected by such factors
as demographic characteristics, geographical factors, and socio-economic conditions.
This study goes still further by examining women’s choices between employment
in the formal versus the informal sectors, and whether these choices are different if they
are single, married, or heads of household. My results are unique as there is no other
study of women’s labor force participation in Venezuela after the 1980s using micro data.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The theories of
allocation of time and human capital investment are summarized in Chapter Two.
Chapter Three provides a brief review of the empirical evidence on female labor force
participation in the United States, other developed countries, and Latin American
developing countries, with an emphasis on Venezuela. Chapter Four describes the
objectives of this project, the methodological approaches, the data used, and the
specifications of the models. Chapter Five presents and discusses the research results.
Finally, Chapter Six summarizes the contributions this study makes to the existing
literature, and provides a brief discussion of future research.

11

Chapter Two
The Theory of Allocation of Time and Human Capital Investment

Two complementary theoretical approaches support the study of labor force
participation of women in this project. Both focus on different aspects of the labor supply
decisions. On one hand, the neoclassical model of allocation of time deals with whether a
woman will enter the labor market by comparing the value of her time in the market to
the value she places on her time spent at home and if she decides to do so, how much
time will be spent on market work. On the other hand, the human capital investment
theory stresses the relationship between the return on the investment of acquiring
valuable skills and the time the person expects to work during his/her life. In other words,
labor participation outcomes are related to general skills acquired through education and
training [Joseph G. Altonji and Rebecca M. Blank, (1999); Francine D. Blau, Marianne
A. Ferber and Anne E. Winkler (2002)]. Indeed, those who are planning to participate in
the labor market as full-time workers are prompted to invest more in education and
training (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Moreover, the human capital model emphasizes the
role of women's preferences and the choices they may make to invest less in job-related
education and training, as well as to spend a smaller share of their adult years in the labor
force (Blau et al., 2002). Other factors include premarket discrimination, or societal
discrimination, in which various types of social pressures influence women's choices
adversely. However, such explanations are beyond the scope of this project.
12

In the following three sections, a brief description of these theoretical models and
the contribution of each to the study of the labor force participation of women is
presented.

2.1 The Neoclassical Model of Allocation of Time
Economists traditionally analyze labor supply through the use of the neoclassical
model of allocation of time14 or the model of labor-leisure choice, which is an extension
of the utility maximization problem of consumer theory. The model analyzes how
individuals make choices in deciding how they will spend a fixed amount of time. They
must decide how many hours to work, and how many hours to spend consuming a variety
of goods, ranging from computers and cars to DVDs and theater.
In the simplest model, an individual has two uses for his/her time, either working
in the labor market at a real wage rate of W per hour, or “leisure”. According to this basic
model, individuals wish to maximize their utility15 or satisfaction (U) by purchasing
goods and services (C) in the marketplace and by consuming time in leisure activities
(L).16 The amount of both consumed will depend on the individual’s market wage (W),
personal preferences, and the nonlabor income (V) that person enjoys.
The individual’s utility function will be:
U = f(C, L)

14

The theoretical treatment of the allocation of time was pioneered by Gary S. Becker (1965).

15

Jeremy Bentham (1780) coined this usage.
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(1)

C and L are “composite” goods. We must be aware that utility is, in fact, derived by spending income and time on the
consumption of a wide variety of goods and services.
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where U is an index that measures the individual’s well being, assuming people are able
to rank in order all possible situations from the least desirable to the most.17 Thus, a
higher index U means more C and/or L and more satisfaction. Moreover, C and L are
economic “goods” – that is, whatever economic quantities they represent, we assume that
more of any particular good is preferred to less.
When the individual seeks to maximize his/her utility with respect to time in the
period under analysis, he is bound by two conditions: first, he must allocate the day’s
discretionary time (T) – that is, 16 hours time, either to working for pay (H) or to leisure
(L). The other condition is related to the income he needs to buy goods and services in the
market place: Labor wages (W * H) and nonlabor income (V)18 are the only sources of the
individual’s income.
These constraints can be written as the following:
L+H=T

(2)

C = (W * H) + V

(3)

The individual’s budget constraint is represented by equation (3). It tells us that
individual’s consumption expenditures must not exceed the total income.
We can rewrite (2) and (3) as follows:
C = W (T- L) + V

(4)

17

Every individual has his own set of indifference curves (U1, U2…) reflecting his preferences. For a complete
analysis, see Walter Nicholson (1992), pp. 130-132.

18

Nonlabor income includes from property assets, stocks, and dividends. For women, it also is assumed to include the
husband’s earnings. A further assumption in this model is that the individual does not save or borrow.
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Setting up the Lagrangian expression to represent the individual’s utility
maximization problem yields
A = U (C, L) + λ {[W (T – L) + V] – C}

The first order conditions for a maximum are

∂A ∂U
=
− λ = 0 ∴ MU C = λ
∂C ∂C

(5)

MU L
∂A ∂U
=
− λW = 0 ∴
=λ
∂L ∂L
W

(6)

Equating (5) and (6), we get
MU L
=W
MU C

(7)

This expression can be interpreted as the utility-maximizing labor supply decision
principle. That is, in order to maximize utility, given the real wage, W, the individual
should choose to work that number of hours for which the marginal rate of substitution of
leisure for consumption is equal to W (Nicholson, 1992, p. 683).19 The interior solution of
the model answers the question of the number of work hours to be supplied by the
worker.
An increase in W, holding income constant, makes leisure more expensive.
Therefore, by consuming additional hours of leisure, the worker gives up more in forgone
wages, producing a negative substitution effect with respect to hours of leisure. On the
other hand, since leisure is a normal good, the income effect will be positive. That is, an
increase in the wage rate, W, will increase the consumption of leisure, L, since the person
now feels better off. Since work and leisure are mutually exclusive ways to spend one’s
19

For the graphical approach, see George Borjas (2000), p. 33.
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time, these two opposite reactions prevent the model from predicting the direction of the
change in the number of hours worked. The ambiguity cannot be solved unless one
knows the worker’s actual labor supply decision. If the substitution effect dominates, the
result will be an increase in the number of work hours supplied. On the other hand, if the
income effect dominates, the number of work hours supplied by the worker will decrease.
Empirical studies have shown that the income effect tends to dominate for men and the
substitution effect, for women.20
When nonlabor income, V, changes, there is no ambiguity since the income effect
operates alone. Thus, an increase in V will cause an increase in leisure time and a
decrease in the hours worked, and vice versa.
A corner solution of the model will occur when the individual has decided not to
participate in the labor force. Economic theory explains this case through the definition of
reservation wage, W* as the measure an individual places on his/her non-market time.
The reservation wage is the wage that would make a person indifferent between not
working and working that first hour. The value of W* is influenced by his/her tastes and
preferences, the level of nonlabor income V, factors influencing the value of one’s time at
home such as the number of children, and marital status.
This theory has been successfully used to explain women’s labor force
participation. Let us consider Figure 2, the graphical depiction of the utility-maximizing
labor supply decision of an individual that is the analytical expression of equation (7).
The value of the market goods is measured on the y-axis. The number of discretionary

20

See Thomas J. Kniesner (1976); Mary T. Coleman and John Pencavel (1993); Thomas Mroz (1987); Jeffrey Zabel
(1993); and Alice and Masao Nakamura (1994).
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hours in a day and leisure are measured on the x-axis from left to right and hours of
market work are measured from right to left. Consider the set of indifference curves of a
woman, U1, U2 and U3. The higher the level of index U, the better off she perceives
herself to be; the negative of the slope of the indifference curve is the ratio of the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income (MUL/MUC). The budget
constraint that she faces is TPM: the negative of its slope represents the market wage she
faces (W). Her utility maximizing point will be the point where the marginal rate of
substitution of the highest possible indifference curve equals her market wage (W). In this
figure, her market wage is W and her nonlabor income is V. At point P in both panels (a)
and (b) of the figure, the negative of the slope of the indifference curve at zero hours of
market work represents the reservation rate (W*). She will choose not to participate if the
reservation wage is greater than or equal to the market wage --that is, if W* ≥ W, as in
panel (a). She will be willing to participate in the labor force only if the wage rate that the
market offers her is greater than the reservation wage --that is, W>W*, as in panel (b). If
so, she will maximize her utility at point Z where the budget constraint is tangent to the
highest attainable indifference curve (U2), thus achieving the graphical equivalent of
equation (7) by spending 8 hours on market work and enjoying 8 hours of leisure time.
Her total income will be S = 8W + V.
This analysis suggests that an increase in the value of market time (W) will
produce an increase in the probability that the individual will choose to participate in the
labor force. In other words, labor force participation is positively related to the wage or
the value of market time. Conversely, factors that increase the value of non-market time
(W*) tend to lower the probability of labor force participation, ceteris paribus, i.e. labor
17

force participation is negatively related to the reservation wage or the value of nonmarket time.
Figure 2 The Labor Force Participation Decision
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Panel (a) Does not Participate in the Labor Market (Corner Solution).
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Panel (c) The Impact of Changes in Nonlabor Income V on Labor Force
Participation.

The assumption that leisure is a normal good implies that the reservation wage
W* rises (falls) as nonlabor income V increases (decreases). For those individuals out of
the labor force, a higher (lower) reservation wage makes it less (more) likely that a
person will participate in the labor market. No ambiguity is present since the income
effect operates alone. Figure 2 panel (c) depicts of the effect of a decrease in nonlabor
income from V0 to V1 on the woman’s labor force participation, when the wage rate W is
held constant. Initially her budget constraint is M0P0T. She maximizes her utility at point
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P0 since her reservation wage W0* is greater than the wage rate W, so she is out of the
labor force, as in panel (a). Her income will be V0.
If her nonlabor income decreases from V0 to V1, her budget constraint becomes
M1P1T. She will now enter the labor force because at point P1, zero hours of work, her
reservation wage W1* is less than the wage rate W. Thus, she will maximize her utility at
point P1 and provide 5 hours of work to the market. Her total income will be S = 5W +
V1. Note that she is now on indifference curve U0, with a lower level of utility than
previously.

2.1.1 The Household Production Approach

In the simplest model of labor supply, individuals decide how to allocate their
time between labor and leisure. Household time was assumed to be leisure time. It was
assumed that utility was generated by directly consuming leisure time and purchased
goods. A more complex model describes time as being allocated between market work
and household production.21 Time not spent working for pay is viewed not as something
that is directly consumed but as an input to the production of household commodities. It
is these commodities which are ultimately consumed and thus generate utility for
household members.
Analysis using this model is shown graphically in Figure 3. It is assumed that a
single mother is the only decision-maker of the household. She derives utility from the
commodity “child-rearing.” Her objective is to maximize utility for herself and her

21

The pioneering model of household production is by Becker (1965). For a brief summary of the work in this area, see
Reuben Gronau (1997).
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children. She will be deciding at the same time how much to work for pay and how to
take care of her children in a way that best satisfies her preferences.
Figure 3 The Production of Child Care
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In the graph, the value of purchased goods and services is represented on the yaxis and discretionary time in one day is represented on the x-axis. Hours spent on
household production are measured from left to right; hours spent working for pay are
measured from right to left. Curves S0 and S1, called utility isoquants, represent the
different combinations of purchased goods and services and household time that generate
the same utility. S1 represents greater utility than S0. They have negative slopes because
the inputs are substitutes in child-rearing. That is, if household time is reduced, childrearing affording equal satisfaction can be produced by increasing the purchases of goods
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or services outside the home. The convexity of the isoquants reflects the assumption that
as household time devoted to child-rearing progressively falls, it becomes increasingly
difficult to make up for it with purchased goods and services and still hold utility
constant. Moreover, along any ray emanating from the origin such as J or K, the ratio of
purchased goods and services to household time in the production of child-rearing is
constant. Finally, to complete the model, the single mother is restricted by her budget
constraint MT which reflects the combinations of purchases and household time that are
possible for her. As in the basic model of labor supply, the slope of the budget constraint
is her wage rate (W) which indicates the increased value of purchases made possible by
an additional hour of paid work.
As in the neoclassical model of allocation of time, this individual maximizes her
utility at point Z, where she works for pay 7 hours and devotes 9 hours to taking care of
her children. Note that whether household time is conceived of as an input into the
production of commodities or as leisure time, the resulting theory of labor supply is
unchanged. First, let us consider the case where there is nonlabor income (V) holding the
wage rate constant. Her budget constraint would shift to the northeast (and be parallel to
the original one). The income effect would tend to reduce labor supply to the market. She
would tend to purchase more, or higher-quality, goods and services, and she would spend
more time at home.
If her wage rate (W) were to rise, there would be income and substitution effects.
As above, the income effect tends to reduce market labor supply. The substitution effect,
i.e. the fact that the higher wage increases the cost of spending an extra hour at home,
serves to increase hours of market work. As in the neoclassical model, theory cannot tell
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us whether, if wages increase, the income or the substitution effect will dominate. The
result will depend on the shape of the utility isoquants.
2.1.2 The Tripartite Choice Model of Allocation of Time

A more complex household production model assumes more than one decision
maker in the household (husband, wife and any children old enough to work). The threeway allocation of time model of labor supply considers choices among actual leisure
time, time spent on household production, and market work. Hence there are two
substitution effects when the market wage increases: one between market and household
work and the other between market work and leisure time. It is argued that the
magnitudes of these two effects are different and that the weight of the former in one’s
overall response to a wage change is related to one’s role in household production.
Regarding substitution between market and household work, purchasing more goods or
services can easily compensate for fewer hours of household work. For example, reduced
time devoted to such household chores as cooking, cleaning, and childcare can be easily
replaced through the purchase of a microwave, prepared food, an electric dishwasher, or
the services of a babysitter. On the other hand, the substitution between market work and
leisure is more difficult since leisure activities consume time and the possibilities for
economizing on time are thus limited.22 However, those with higher wages are more
likely to engage in leisure activities that require expensive market-purchased inputs such
as skiing or playing golf. Those with lower wages are more likely to engage in more
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One definition of the difference between household production time and leisure time is that one could pay someone
else to perform household production tasks, but not to pursue leisure activities. However, with respect to the leisure
activity of travel, for example, a person with a higher market wage might fly to a vacation destination rather than
driving, thus saving some time but spending more money.
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time-intensive, less goods-intensive leisure activities such as hiking or working
crossword puzzles.
One can illustrate the difference in magnitudes of both substitution effects using
two-dimensional graphs such as shown in Figure 4 panels (a) and (b). On the y-axis we
represent the value of goods (dollars); and, on the x-axis are time spent in household
work and time spent in leisure in panel (a) and (b) respectively.
Figure 4 Large vs. Small Substitution Effect When the Wage Rate Increases
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To isolate the substitution effect associated with a higher market wage, the new
budget constraint with a steeper slope is kept tangent to the same indifference curve.
Panel (a) shows the tradeoff between the market goods and household work time that
keep utility constant, while panel (b) shows the goods-leisure tradeoff. The gradual curve
in the indifference curve in panel (a) implies that a reduction in hours of household work
can easily be compensated for by purchasing more goods. Conversely, panel (b) shows
that the sharper curve in the goods-leisure indifference curve reflects the greater difficulty
of substituting goods for leisure time without loss of utility or satisfaction.

2.2 The Human Capital Investment
2.2.1 The Human Capital Investment Model

Modeling the labor supply decisions requires not only decision factors such as the
current wages, preferences regarding household production and/or leisure, but also a
framework that incorporates labor market investment behavior into a lifetime perspective.
Many labor supply decisions require a substantial investment on the part of the worker.
An individual invests resources in himself today in order to increase his or her future
productivity and earnings. Economists refer to this behavior as investment in human
capital. The most important kind of investment in human capital is education and
training. The knowledge and skills a worker has, gained from education and training,
including the learning that experience yields, generate a certain stock of productive
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capital. The value of this productive capital depends on how much one with these skills
can earn in the labor market.23
As in any study of investment decisions, to determine whether it is worthwhile,
one must compare expenditures and receipts incurred at different periods. The investor
must be able to calculate the returns to the investment by comparing the current costs24
with the future returns or benefits. In the case of educational and training investment by
workers, the expected returns are in the form of higher future earnings, increased job
satisfaction over one’s lifetime, and a greater appreciation of non-market activities and
interests. Benefits that are received in the future are worth less to us now than an equal
amount of benefits received today.25
The basic model of human capital investment assumes that people are utility
maximizers and take a lifetime perspective when making choices about education and
training. The widely used concept of present value allows us to calculate the value of
amounts received in different time periods.
Present Value =

B1
B2
B3
BT
+
+
+ ..... +
2
3
(1 + r ) (1 + r )
(1 + r )
(1 + r ) T

(8)

where Bt is a stream of yearly benefits (B1, B2,….) over time periods (1 to T), and r is the
discount rate. Since r is positive, benefits into the future will be increasingly discounted.
In making decisions, workers compare the present value of future benefits with the costs.

23

Investment in job search and migration also increases the value of one’s human capital (Ronald G. Ehrenberg and
Robert S. Smith, 200, p. 290). However, these last two human capital investments are beyond the scope of this project.

24
The cost of an additional year of schooling includes such costs as tuition, supplies, and forgone earnings, as well as
psychic costs.
25

If people plan to consume their benefits, they prefer to consume them earlier; if people plan to invest the monetary
benefits rather than use them for consumption, they can earn interest on the investment and increase their funds in the
future.
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For example, individuals deciding about an additional year of schooling are assumed to
compare the near-term investment costs (C) with the present value of expected future
benefits. So, investment in additional schooling is attractive if the present value of future
benefits exceeds costs.
Figure 5 yields some interesting insights about the behavior and earnings of
workers. The human capital decision can be illustrated comparing marginal costs (MC)
and marginal benefits (MB).
Figure 5 The Optimal Acquisition of Human Capital
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The marginal costs, MC, of each additional unit of human capital are assumed to
be constant. The present value of the marginal benefits, MB, is shown as declining,
because each added year of schooling means fewer years over which benefits can be
recouped. The utility-maximizing amount of human capital (HC*) for any individual is
shown as that amount for which MC = MB. Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows a worker who
28

finds learning to be especially demanding, to which he attaches a higher marginal cost,
MC’. Accordingly, he will acquire a lower level of human capital, HC’. Panel (b), depicts
the case of those who expect lower benefits (MB”) in the future from additional
investment in human capital, who will acquire less human capital, HC”.
Many insights from this simple theory can be discovered by analyzing the
decision a young adult faces about whether to invest full-time in education or a training
program after leaving high school. Figure 6 illustrates, for example, a person considering
college. She or he faces a choice between two streams of earnings over her or his
lifetime. Stream A, shows the earnings stream of a high school graduate. This stream
begins immediately but does not increase very much over time. Stream B, that of a
college graduate, has negative income for the first four years, followed by a period when
the wage may be less than the high school graduate makes, but then it takes off and rises
above stream A.
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Figure 6 Alternative Earnings Streams
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Clearly, the earnings of the college graduate would have to rise above those of the
high school graduate to induce someone to invest in a college education. The gross
benefits, i.e. the difference in earnings between the two streams, must total much more
than the costs because such returns are in the future and are therefore discounted. This
graph relates to equation (8) in that T=43 (65-22) and in each year Bi represents the
difference between the earnings of a college graduate and a high-school graduate.

2.2.2 Women’s Supply of Labor

Human capital theory suggests several reasons why women might decide to
acquire smaller amounts of formal education than men. Many scholars have emphasized
the traditional roles of women within the family of which childbearing is one of the most
important. Women know that bearing children might force them to leave the labor market
30

for a while. Again, the present value equation (8) gives us the insight of the potential
behavior of women. If a woman is planning to interrupt her participation in the labor
market, her investment in additional education might no longer be profitable since her
time out of the labor market results in a reduction in benefits since T would be smaller.
Moreover, a woman may decide against investment in the types of human capital that
require sustained, high-level commitment to the labor force because the investment
depreciates rapidly during periods of work interruptions.26

26

Moreover, the human capital model helps explain gender differences in fields of specializations. For instance,
women would prefer to work as teachers of history or languages which have a slower pace of change, and avoid
working in those fields in which technological change is fast, such as engineering.
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Figure 7 illustrates the impact of these factors on the investment in formal
education by women. The total time elapsed since completing high school is represented
on the x-axis.
Figure 7 The Impact of Work Interruptions on the Education Investment Decision
of Women
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The graph depicts the case of a woman who plans to be in the labor force for a
period of 6 years after college and then to drop out for 10 years, say, for childrearing.
Assuming that she will retire at age 65, her expected work life is 33 years instead of 43
years. EF represents her earnings profile if she had decided not to go to college. If we
assume that her skills depreciate during the time spent out of the labor force, upon her
return to the labor force, her earnings (e2) will be less in real terms than she was making
when she left (e1). Consequently, after her return to the labor force she will be facing
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profile GH rather than profile CD.27 The time out of the labor force has cost her a
reduction of earnings over the remainder of her working life. In this example, the benefits
of the investment in college education, the sum of the two shaded areas, may not be large
enough to make it worthwhile. Thus, a woman with an adherence to the traditional roles
in the family is less likely to pursue college and graduate study. Anticipating time out of
the labor force, she is likely to reduce her amount of educational investment.
Other kinds of human capital investments are those made after one has started to
work, in training received at the workplace. All forms of training, whether formal training
programs, informal training under the supervision of a more experienced worker, or
general training, are costly. If the training is specific to one firm or employer, workers
and the firm share the cost.
Figure 8 Sharing of Costs and Benefits in Firm-Specific On-The-Job Training
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However, the figure shows that GH approaches CD over time, as she retools or becomes less rusty.
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Consider an individual’s decision to invest in firm-specific training. Profile JJ’
represents his productivity if he engages in the training. EE’ is the earnings profile
available to him at another firm with no training. Since firm-specific training is not
transferable, there are incentives for the worker and employer to share the costs. On the
the individual’s side, he is not willing to bear all the training costs because if were to lose
his job, all his investment would vanish. By the same token, the employer is unwilling to
bear all the costs of firm-specific training because if the individual were to quit, the firm
would lose its investment. Moreover, if the employer were to bear all the cost and
received all the benefits, the individual’s earning profile would be EE’. In this case, he
would have an incentive to quit his job when a shift in demand resulted in higher wages
or even better working conditions elsewhere.
The solution for both employer and the individual (employee) is to share the cost
of, and returns to, firm-specific training. TT’ would be the employee’s earning profile in
that case. He would be paid a wage greater than his marginal product during the training
period (from 0 to M) since his productivity is low; the employer accepts the lower current
productivity in exchange for higher output later. But after training (from M to P’) the
employee’s wage is below his post-training marginal product. Workers accept the lower
wages for the same reason that one decides to obtain formal schooling: in the expectation
of improving the present value of their lifetime earnings (Becker, 1985). In general, for
workers and employers, the increases in productivity yield higher earnings and profits,
which will be greater the longer the worker stays with the firm.
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In the case of general on-the-job training, in which employees acquire skills
usable elsewhere, the workers alone will pay the training costs. It this case the magnitude
of cost versus future benefits is the individual’s principal concern (Blau et al., 2002).
Figure 9 Investment in General On-The-Job Training Over the Life Cycle
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Figure 9 graphically depicts the life-cycle implications of human capital theory as
it applies to general on-the-job training. Let us consider a woman’s investment decision.
She will compare the experience-earnings profile she can expect if she takes a job with
no training (NN’) to the profile she can expect if she receives general training (TT’). In
this case, there are costs28 and the firm will bear the decline in output for the period of
training only if she accepts lower wages at that time, a wage below what she could obtain
elsewhere. This lower wage corresponds to her productivity to the firm during the

28

Direct costs would be the expenses for instructors or for the material used in the training. Indirect costs result when
her coworkers or the supervisor transfer their attention from daily production to training activities.
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training period. The area TNJ represents the costs of the general training during the
period OM. As she becomes more skilled, her earnings increase along with her
productivity. After the training period, they surpass what she could have earned without
training. Assuming a total OP years of labor market experience over her work life, her
gross benefits will be the area JT’L. As in the case of formal schooling, she is likely to
undertake the investment if the present value of the gross benefits exceed the costs.
Thus, the human capital model tells us that not only formal education but also onthe-job training leads to increases in productivity (Walter Oi, 1962). People who have the
ability to learn quickly (usually those who are better-educated) are those most likely to
seek out, and be presented with, training opportunities. They tend to quickly select the
ultimately highest-paying jobs where much learning is required and thus use their
abilities to the greatest advantage. Consequently, they are most likely to enjoy greater
monetary returns on their human capital investments during work lives.
According to the human capital model, women who follow traditional gender
roles such as child-rearing and home production activities will tend to acquire less
valuable on-the-job training because of their weaker attachment to the labor market
(Becker, 1985). Two important implications from the analysis of the firm-specific
training will help us to understand why women earn less than men over the work life,
and, why women are less attached to the labor market. First, as discussed above, a
relatively permanent attachment is likely to develop between the firm and the specifically
trained worker. Such workers are less likely either to quit or to be laid off their jobs than
untrained or generally trained workers. Second, because employers pay part of the costs
of firm-specific training, they will be concerned about the expected employment stability
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of workers hired into jobs where such training is important. So women expecting to
interrupt their work lives are less likely to be offered or to seek out opportunities to
engage in on-the-job training. Accordingly, they will be less likely to be attached to the
labor market and to enjoy higher earnings since they have less to lose by dropping out.
Conversely, as more women are employed in jobs with training opportunities, the
opportunity cost of work-force interruptions is increased and their labor force attachment
is further reinforced.29
As Figures 8 and 9 suggest, earnings will increase with experience for workers
who have invested in training because a worker’s productivity is augmented by such
training. Finally, the human capital model predicts that recent increases in the labor force
participation of women, especially of married women of childbearing age, will cause
dramatic changes in the acquisition of schooling and training by women since the
expected return on their investments will be greater.

29

This situation has been observed during recent decades (Blau et al., 2000).
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Chapter Three
Literature Review

An analysis of trends in labor economics throughout the world reveals that
sustained increase in women’s participation in the labor force during the last century,
particularly during its second half. This fact has stimulated considerable interest in the
economic analysis of a woman’s decision to work. The pioneering studies of Jacob
Mincer (1962) and Glen G. Cain (1966) in the United States have served as a theoretical
and empirical foundation for numerous studies of female labor force participation.
This chapter provides a brief review of the empirical evidence about female labor
force participation in the United States, in some other developed countries, and in
developing countries of Latin America, with special emphasis on Venezuela.

3.1 Women’s Labor Force Participation in the United States

Women’s labor force participation in the United States showed a tremendous
upward trend during the last century. In 1900, only 20 percent of all women worked for
pay. Less than 6 percent of all married women older than 15 were employed.30 By 1930,
the figure had risen to 26 percent for all women, but before 1940 the labor force
participation rate of married women was still only 14 percent (Dora L. Costa, 2000). In
1945, after the social and economic disruptions caused by two world wars and the Great
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Those who did work came from predominately working-class families (Costa, 2000).
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Depression, only 30 percent of all women were in the labor force. Abundant empirical
literature documents the rapid increase in the labor force participation rate of married
women after World War II. By the century’s end, the labor force participation of all
women older than 16 years old had risen to 60 percent, and among married women, to 62
percent. During the 1990s another shift occurred in the composition of the female labor
force: this time the group of single mothers with young children increased substantially
while that of married women slowed down (Blau et al., 2002).
Given the enormous social and political significance of this increase in the
percentage of women working for pay,31 especially among married women, many
scholars from various disciplines began to investigate the reasons for such behavior. In
the remainder of this section the most prominent empirical studies regarding women’s
labor force participation in the United States, particularly after World War II, are
reviewed.32
Back in 1962, Mincer analyzed the variation in labor force participation of
married women in 57 large northern standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in
1950. His original study used a single equation model of lifetime female labor supply.
His model assumes that women choose levels of market time on the basis of “permanent”
wage rates and income.33 He points out three factors that influence the timing of female
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During the twentieth century, the rising labor force participation of women increased the aggregate labor force
participation rate of 25 to 44 year-olds by 50 percent (Claudia Goldin, 1989).
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The earliest studies, those in the1950s to the mid-1970s, and historical studies, used only aggregate data or macro
data. However, the empirical analyses since the mid-1970s have used micro data. Many econometric developments of
the 1970s were stimulated by the new availability of data from household surveys, both cross-section and panel, which
contained information on relatively large numbers of individuals (Robert Moffitt, 1999).
33

He introduces the notion of differential labor supply responses to permanent and transitory wages rate and incomes,
and uses this notion to reconcile, in part, the discrepancy between time series and cross section estimates of female
labor supply functions.
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labor force participation: lifetime variation in opportunity cost due to the presence of
children, unemployment of the spouse, and general business cycle fluctuations.34 Mincer
hypothesizes that an increase in family income, ceteris paribus, has a positive effect on
leisure time, but may also indirectly affect the allocation of work time between home and
market.35 His results support his a priori expectations: wives’ wages have a strong
positive effect on labor force participation while the husbands’ incomes have a negative
but weaker effect.36 He also reports that high unemployment tends to discourage labor
force participation. From the 1919-29 decade to the 1949-59 decade, Mincer concluded
that changes in family income and in the wife’s wage account for at least 70 percent of
the increase in labor force participation of married women.37
Following Mincer’s lead, researchers began to further identify important
characteristics associated with married women’s labor supply. Several studies applied his
conceptual framework to cross-section data. The most comprehensive statistical
economic study was conducted by William G. Bowen and T. Aldrich Finegan (1969),
which consisted mainly of cross-section regressions to estimate models of the supply of

34
He develops the conceptual framework that the market wage influences not only the allocation of time between
market work and leisure, but also between work in the market and work in the home.
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The relative income elasticities of home-produced vs. market-produced goods would determine the strength of this
effect.
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June A. O’Neill (1981), using aggregate time-series data and linear equations, finds results that support Mincer’s
basic model: the positive effect of the women’s wage rates and the negative effect of family income on women’s
allocation of time to the market.
37

Glen G. Cain and Martin D. Dooley (1976) attempted to improve the specification of the model by using a threeequation system in which wives’ labor force participation, fertility, and wages are jointly determined, a formulation
based on the presumption that these variables are endogenous. The Cain-Dooley results for 1970 do not differ
substantially from those of Mincer with respect to the labor supply function. The wage and income coefficients are
mostly significant, and the point estimates of elasticities are large--around +2 and -1 for wages and husband’s income,
respectively. Thus the results support the prevailing economic hypothesis that the wage effect on labor supply will be
positive and that the income effect will be negative.
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married women in each of three decennial Census years: 1940, 1950, and 1960. They use
ordinary least squares regression techniques on data from 100 Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (SMSAs). Their model explains the labor force participation of married
women in an area in terms of four variables representing its labor market characteristics:
the unemployment rate, the wife’s expected market wage rate, the relative supply of adult
females, and the relative demand for female labor based on the industrial structure of that
area. They also include some variables to control for differences in the socio-economic
characteristics of households in the areas: median level of husband’s income, proportion
of black wives, proportion of families with young children, median educational level of
adult females, and mean level of family nonlabor income. They find that wives are
becoming less sensitive to all four of the labor market variables. The reason is that, as the
labor force of married women grew over the years, the proportion of older, more
experienced, work-oriented wives became larger. These wives exhibit less sensitivity to
the market wage level and to the rough measures of competition for available jobs.38
Many important aspects of household behavior involve choices among discrete
alternatives. Recognition of this fact in the 1970s led to the development of statistical
models appropriate to the analysis of such “quantal response” problems in cross-section

38
Weaker results are found in Judith M. Fields (1976) who makes a comparison of intercity differences in the labor
force participation rates of married women in 1970 with those of 1940, 1950, and 1960. She reports that during the tenyear period from 1960 to 1970, the married female labor force continued to grow, from 30.5 percent to 40.8 percent of
the total civilian labor force, contributing nearly half of the total increase in the labor force during the decade. Her
empirical work compares the earlier Census regressions for SMSAs reported by Bowen and Finegan (1969) with a
similar model, applied to 1970 data. She finds that the overall pattern of results indicates that by 1970 the model has
lost much of its explanatory power. The nine independent variables together explain only from 37 to 58 percent of the
variation in wives’ labor force participation rates among SMSAs. This result could reflect a real change over time in the
labor supply function, if, as Fields suggests, women were significantly changing their work role orientation.
Alternatively, it could reflect a change in the correlation matrix of the independent variables or other underlying
statistical problems.
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data.39 Yoram Ben-Porath (1973) proposes a model in which, aside from transitory
factors such as children and income variation, the timing of participation over the life
cycle is random. Assuming that all consumers work at some time during their life cycle,
regressions of participation on mean values of wages and income yield coefficients that
may be interpreted as estimates of Hicks-Slutsky substitution and income effects
(Nicholson, 1992, pp. 136-7).
A recurring discordance between estimates of substitution effects of wage rates on
labor supply obtained from cross-section analysis of data and annual hours of work data
stimulated the important research by H. Gregg Lewis (1968) who, with Ben-Porath
(1973), demonstrated that the labor force participation decision at any age is a discrete
decision and that estimates of labor force participation equations produce parameters that
are conceptually distinct from estimated parameters of hours of work functions. Both
papers ignore the focus on the life cycle that is implicit in Mincer’s work. In the LewisBen-Porath model, participation and hours of work at any age are generated from a
concave utility function defined for that age. By changing the nature of the preference
function from that implicitly utilized by Mincer, they demonstrate that participation and
hours of work equations are not as closely related as they would be if Mincer’s
assumption of perfect substitutability between leisure at different ages were accepted.
Ben-Porath and Lewis implicitly ignore all components of intertemporal substitution. The
Ben-Porath-Lewis papers were a stimulus to later work by James J. Heckman (1974) who
formulates a model of annual labor force participation, annual hours of work, and wage
rates that explicitly models the interrelationship between hours of work and labor force
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For a survey of developments in this field, see Daniel McFadden (1976)
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participation. The probability that a woman works is estimated from a common set of
parameters. His statistical procedure extends the Tobit procedure40 to a simultaneous
equations system. His methodology differs from the Tobit model in that it allows
different parameters to affect the probability that a woman works than the ones
influencing her hours of work. The method allows him to utilize an entire sample of
women, whether or not they work, to estimate the functions determining their wage rates,
probabilities of working, and hours of work. These parameters allow an estimation of the
value of time for non-working women, and the wage rates they would face in the market.
James Heckman and Robert J. Willis (1977), stimulated by Ben-Porath’s (1973)
work, apply a sophisticated methodology for the treatment of panel data to the labor force
participation of married women. Assuming that response probabilities are governed by a
beta distribution, they derive a generalization of the cross-section logit model to enable it
to deal with sequences of discrete events in panel data. Using a beta-logistic model,41
they find that the distribution of labor force participation probabilities is U-shaped,
indicating that most women have probabilities near zero or near one. Another way of
expressing this phenomenon is “persistence,” that women who participate at one age are
more likely to participate at future ages, as is found in Kim B. Clark and Lawrence H.
Summers (1982).
Late in the 1970s, James J. Heckman (1978), after reviewing the results of the
latest research on the life cycle labor supply of married women, presented the first of a
class of dynamic models of labor supply. His work attempts to merge two interpretations
40

William H. Greene, 2003, p. 764.
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They call their model a beta-logistic model since under a plausible parameterization of this distribution, they derive a
likelihood function of the conventional logit model in the case of cross-sectional data.
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of the coefficients of wage rates and unearned income derived from labor force
participation regressions. The first interpretation, which stems from Mincer’s (1962)
pioneering study and subsequent studies of Cain (1966), Marvin Kosters (1969), and
Orley Ashenfelter and himself (1974), relates to a life cycle model of labor supply and
interprets the estimated wage and income coefficients as estimates of substitution and
income effects. However, the same interpretation is given to the coefficients obtained
from hours of work regressions. The second approach considers the labor force
participation decision at a point in time as a discrete decision. In this sense, wage and
income coefficients estimated in participation equations are conceptually distinct from
those estimated in hours of work functions.42 This view ignores the fact that most
consumers have ample opportunity to substitute time and goods over the life cycle, and to
invest in human capital.43 Heckman claims that, in general, one cannot use the crosssection mean to estimate the probability of any sequence of labor force participation
decisions over the life cycle if there is any unobserved heterogeneity in the population.
Finally, the author presents a dynamic model of labor force participation that attempts to
merge these two traditions. His model can be used to interpret the interrelationship
among the various dimensions of labor supply analyzed in the literature and can also shed
some light on certain empirical findings that rigorously analyze one-period models of
labor supply.
James J. Heckman and Thomas E. MaCurdy’s (1980) study is an extension of the
Heckman (1974) analysis to a life cycle model of married women. The work described in
42

Labor force participation regressions describe “corner phenomena” and do not estimate “interior solution” HicksSlutsky income and substitution effects, although they estimate parameters of the utility function of consumers
(Heckman, 1978).
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Following this tradition are Ben-Porath (1973) and H. Gregg Lewis (1977).
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this paper also extends the dynamic analyses of labor force participation by Heckman and
Willis (1977) and Heckman (1978) to a structural dynamic model that accommodates
both hours of work and labor force participation decisions in a unified framework. The
model is a simple computed fixed-effect Tobit model suitable for analysis of panel data
which they estimate on eight years of panel data drawn from the Michigan Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics. Their empirical work refutes the implicit assumption maintained in
previous work that non-market time at one age is a perfect substitute for non-market time
at any other age. The paper considers the meaning and measurement of labor supply
responses to “permanent” and “transitory” income and wage rates in a model of decision
making under perfect certainty without credit constraints. They find empirical evidence
consistent with the permanent income hypothesis but no evidence of a labor supply
response to “transitory” income variation among married women. Their empirical results
agree with the prediction of the theory: labor supply is inversely related to lifetime wealth
measures; children affect lifetime labor supply decisions; and future values of variables
determine current labor supply decisions.
Claudia Goldin (1983a) studied married women’s labor force participation from
the perspective of their economic roles. She writes that, although change in the labor
force participation rates of married women did accelerate after World War II, many of the
preconditions for this expansion had been set decades before. The education, household
roles, the occupations of single women, and the fertility behavior of married women had
a lasting impact on their later response to economic factors. She uses a life-cycle
approach to understanding change in the economic role of married women. She produces
a matrix of cross-section and time-series labor force participation rates by marital status,
45

age, race, and national origin from 1890 to 1980 and covers cohorts born from 1816-1825
to 1946-1955. Her empirical results indicate that long-term changes in the economic role
of white married women have been the result of three sets of factors: cohort-specific
effects, primarily education and fertility; point-in-time factors, wages assumed to be
exogenous and the unemployment rate; and a time trend, which probably proxies longrun changes in the structure of the economy such as the growth of the service sector.
Goldin (1991) again studies married women’s labor force participation during the 1940s
and 1950s, focusing this time on the role of World War II in the rise of women’s
employment. She uses two retrospective surveys conducted in 1944 and in 1951, from a
study directed by Gladys L. Palmer (1954) with the assistance of the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. She finds that the 1940s were the turning point in married women’s labor force
participation, and more importantly, more than 50 percent of the women working in 1950
had been working in the 1940s. She argues that various social constraints may have
inhibited the work activities of married women prior to 1940. If the impediments to
economic change were partly ideological, then a major break with the past, such as that
affected by war, could have redefined economic roles. She concludes that the war had far
less direct influence on female labor supply than was believed.
Robert T. Michael (1985) discusses three independent inquiries into the
consequences of the rise of women’s labor force participation during the period 19501980. He uses cross-sectional differentials in female labor force participation by
characteristics including age, educational attainment, marital status, and (among married
women) the proportion with younger children. He finds that the changes in women’s
labor force participation over the three decades were not uniform in terms of age, marital
46

status, or educational composition. The new employees in the 1950s were predominantly
older, married, and relatively less educated, while in the 1970s they were younger, less
likely to be married, and far better educated. However, although the compositional shift
in the population by age, marital status, and the presence of young children seem to have
had almost no influence on overall female labor force participation, the increase in
educational attainment has contributed about one-quarter of the rise in labor force
participation. Finally, the differences in labor force participation among groups as
defined by age, marital status, presence of young children, and education are far less
pronounced in 1980 than they were in 1950.
James P. Smith and Michael P. Ward (1985) investigate the reasons for the
growth in the female labor force in America during the twentieth century. They share the
opinion of Goldin (1983.b) that the remarkable transformation of American women at
work cannot simply be viewed as a result of changes in attitudes or in labor markets that
have been taking place exclusively since World War II. On the contrary, they find that
the rise in market participation by married women occurred throughout the century and
not simply after World War II. The temporal correspondence between the rapid rise in
labor force participation and in their education, does suggest that American schools were
important in transforming the role of American women at work. They found that the
period of rapidly increasing relative female wages predates this increase in women’s
education, so other events were clearly stirring within the labor market. They argue that
the clerical sector opened up a whole new set of jobs that presumably lessened the
conflict between work and marriage. Regarding the effects of World War II on women’s
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labor force participation, the authors allow that its role has been controversial.44 They
claim that only marital status matters: being married acts as depressant on labor market
activity. They conclude that the longer-term growth in the female labor force reflects
something far more fundamental than the demographic composition of the population.
Their study also provides evidence of women’s labor behavior after World War II
using formal statistical models for the period 1950-81, when improved time-series data
were available. They disaggregated time-series data across the period. Over this 31-year
time span their observations consist of mean values of labor supply variables at each
year of age (annual hours worked by women, annual hours worked by working women
and weekly labor force participation rates), education, potential work experience, weekly
wages, and fertility rates.45 The data are arranged in the form of a set of life-cycle
histories for individual birth cohorts. They found that although the work effort of the
typical woman has risen a great deal since 1950, the amount of labor supplied by a
randomly selected working woman has scarcely changed. The discrepancies between the
two annual hours series indicate that much of the expansion in female work involved
labor force participation decisions. They find weekly labor force participation exhibits the
largest across-cohort increase in labor supply. They also find that rising real wages
accounted for 60 percent of the total growth in the female labor force; and, that half of
this wage effect in expanding labor supply was the fertility-reducing consequence of a
higher wage.
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For instance, Clark and Summers (1982) and others view this event as a catalyst that permanently altered women’s
view of their appropriate labor market roles. In contrast, as discussed above, Goldin’s (1983a) empirically based study
reports only indirect effects of the war on female labor force participation.
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For the subperiod 1967-80, they used Current Population Survey (CPS) micro files to calculate means at single years
of age. Over the subperiod 1950-66, CPS published tables on distribution of weeks worked and income.
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In similar research, Zvi Eckstein and Kenneth Wolpin (1989), using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey mature women’s cohort, estimated a structural dynamic
model of married women’s labor force participation and fertility in which wages are
stochastic and work experience or cumulative participation is endogenous.46 The basic
feature of their model is that labor market participation affects future wages, which in
turn affects future labor force participation.
Susan Elster and Mark S. Kamlet (1990) model labor force participation of
married women from a sociological perspective. They examine whether traditional
economic variables have a differential influence across social groups (defined in their
paper by broad occupational and age classifications). They also study whether “income
aspirations”47 have a differential influence across these same social groups. Data for the
study were drawn from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 and public-use microdata
sample for the Pittsburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), 1983. Results
from their logit equations indicate that individuals’ responses to particular influences
such as education, age, past marital history, fertility, and income aspirations, differ across
social groups. It follows from this that such differences influence married women’s labor
force participation behavior.
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The model is contained in the class of model that describes the life-cycle capital accumulation process with
endogenous labor supply such as Yoram Weis (1972) and Heckman (1976). It is closest in spirit to that of Weiss and
Gronau (1981).
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It is a measure of the relative income. People’s well being depends not only on the absolute level of income and
consumption but also on the individual’s aspirations. The determinants of income aspirations have been empirically
studied. The econometric results show that income aspirations increases with personal income and they are related to
the aggregate income in the community. Particularly, a higher average income in the community increases people’s
levels of aspirations; and, the estimated effect are larger for people who interact with other community members (Alois
Stutzer, 2003).
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Claudia Goldin (1994) studies the relationship between women’s labor force
participation and economic development. She explores the hypothesis of the U-shaped
female labor force function for more than one hundred countries including the United
States,48 using data from the work of many other researchers.49 She examines why the
change in the dominance of the income or the substitution effects takes place and why the
U-shape is traced out. She asserts that the rising portion of the U has dominated the
literature on female labor force participation in the United States and many developed
countries.50 The change of the function from the downward portion of the U to the rising
portion, she points out, holds the key to why women enter the labor force at higher stages
of economic development and why their social, political and legal status generally
improves with economic progress. She explains that the increase in the education of
females relative to males as educational resource constraints are relaxed, and women’s
increased ability to obtain jobs in the white-collar sector after school completion were the
main reasons for this change. She concludes that women’s increased education and their
ability to work in more prestigious occupations both increase the substitution effect and
decrease the income effect. As the substitution effect begins to swamp the income effect,
the upward portion of the U is traced out, and women’s labor force participation enters
the modern era.51
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Other researchers studying this hypothesis are John Durand (1975), George Psacharopoulos and Zafiris Tzannatos
(1989), and T. Paul Shultz (1991).
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The education data are from Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (1993), the GDP/capita (1985) data are from Robert
Summers and Alan Heston (1991), and the female labor force participation rates are from the extensive United Nations
WISTAT collection (United Nations 1992).
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Richard Layard and Jacob Mincer (1985) confirm the relationship across a variety of developed economies.
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Another relevant empirical study with pretty much similar results is Kristen Mammen and Cristina Paxon’s (2000)
study.
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3.2 Women’s Labor Force Participation in Other Developed Countries

Most developed countries experienced sizable increases in women’s labor force
participation rates since 1960, and in most countries this change was primarily a result of
the changes in the labor market activity of married women. As the body of literature
about female labor force participation in the United States has grown, the same economic
models developed for studying the United States have been used to analyze the labor
force behavior of women in other countries.
Recent trends in women’s labor force participation in the United States have also
been observed in other industrialized countries. 52 Ehrenberg and Smith (2000) examine
the trends in women’s labor force participation among women ages 25 to 54 in Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United States in 1965, 1973, 1983 and 1997.
They use data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Labor Force Statistics (Paris: OECD, various dates). They find that the fraction of
women in the labor market in all of these countries, on average, increased from half or
less in 1965 to approximately two-thirds or more in thirty years.53 Although they find
some differences in trends across countries, it is likely that common factors such as
changes in fertility, educational attainment, labor market opportunities, and social
attitudes are influencing labor supply trends in the industrialized world (Blau et al.,
2002). Constance Sorrentino (1990), points out factors explaining cross-country
differences, such as the availability and amount of family leave and whether or not it is
with pay, the availability of publicly funded day care, the design of tax policy, and
52

For a survey of trends between 1890 and 1980, see Mark Killingsworth and James Heckman (1986); for the period
1960-1980, see Mincer (1985).
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Borjas (2000) finds nearly similar results (p. 53).
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variations in wage structure.54 In the remainder of this section, I will examine some of the
most relevant empirical studies from other developed countries, roughly in alphabetic
order.
Robert G. Gregory, P. McMahon and B. Whittingham (1985) study women in the
Australian labor force. They find that increases by married women are particularly
significant: about 90% of the increase in women’s labor force participation can be
attributed to women employed part time. They note that Australian time-series equations
are subject to structural instability, and that the estimated wage coefficients are rarely
significant. They suggest that these severe difficulties arise because the female real wage
has not played a market-clearing role and there has been excess supply of female labor,
not adequately measured by the employment rate as officially defined. Consequently,
labor force participation rates do not measure points on the labor supply curve. They
conclude that to explain changes in labor force participation, emphasis has to be placed
on the demand side of the labor market, particularly the mix of full-time and part-time
jobs. They also generate cross-sectional results based on the 1976 census—a period
during which they believe job rationing was particularly important. These equations give
results similar to those of other developed countries, but fail to adequately predict the
time-series variations of labor force participation, which are also subject to structural
difficulties.
Michelle Riboud (1985) presents a comprehensive study of France. She uses
cross-sectional data to study married women’s labor force participation and attempts to
use economic analysis and methods of statistical inference to interpret the phenomenon of
54

For further discussion of cross-country trends, see Costa (2000).
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the increase in women’s labor force participation over the 1965-85 and earlier periods.
An estimation of the market wage function shows that level of education, experience and
tenure are important variables for explaining differences in wages and that women’s
withdrawal from the labor market depresses potential wage offers. Moreover, she
estimates a labor force participation equation using a logit model; and also an alternative
method of analysis obtaining Ordinary Least Squares estimates, using relative
participation (RELP)55 as an endogenous variable. Discrepancies are found in both
methods, reflecting that the effect of schooling (via wage) on labor force participation has
been rising over time. Using times-series analysis for the same period of time she shows
that changes in male and female earnings and unemployment rates explain much of the
trend in labor force participation. Finally, she uses the results of the analysis of women’s
labor force participation based on cross-sectional data to predict changes for 1965-1975
and 1975-1985; these predictions are compared with observed changes. She concludes
that the same model of decision-making based on a comparison between the value of
home time and earnings potential in the labor market explains both earlier and recent
historical trends.
Wolfgang Franz (1985) analyses female labor force participation in Germany. He
uses the Tobit procedure, which allows him to estimate labor supply functions including
both hours worked and labor force participation in a cross-section analysis based on
individual data. He found that it is necessary to distinguish among women by marital
status: while labor force participation of young single women decreased substantially,
married women have a higher labor force participation rate in the 1980s than in earlier
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years. The Tobit estimates show that labor supply increases with higher education and
with vocational education, and also if the husband is self-employed. As expected, the
income of the husband has a negative impact on the woman’s supply of labor. The
presence of children reduces labor supply: the younger the children, the more labor
supply decreases. In general, the author finds that labor force participation of married
women increases slightly until the age of 28, and then it declines monotonically. Finally,
he found foreign-born women work more than German women do.
Ben-Porath and Gronau (1985) study the trends in the labor force participation of
women in Israel during the period 1955-1980 using data from the Central Bureau of
Statistics of Israel.56 The authors report that the labor force participation of Jewish
women in Israel increased between 1955 and 1980, accelerating in the 1970s; two-fifths
of women were in the labor force by 1985.57 The sharpest rise was among mothers aged
25-44. Their main finding is that schooling accounts for most of the change in the labor
force participation rates. Moreover, the differential in participation by marital status has
sharply narrowed and the life cycle effects have been transformed: The M-shaped
age/labor force participation profile has been replaced by an inverted U with delayed
labor force entry due to prolonged schooling and more continuous participation in market
work throughout the childbearing period. Incompatibility between child rearing and
market work has been reduced by the increased availability of part-time work and
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Tapes of some of the Labor Force Surveys and the Consumer Expenditure Survey came from the data archives of the
Faculty of Social Sciences.
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This figure was roughly the same as in such diverse countries as Germany, France, and Singapore. However, at the
time this was lower than labor force participation in the Scandinavian and Eastern European countries (55-60 percent),
the United States, Japan, (43-47 percent) and, surprisingly, Portugal (46 percent). Labor force participation in Israel
was, however, higher than is some of the smaller or South European countries where it was less than 30 percent in
Ireland, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) (Ben-Porath, 1973, table 2).
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increased reliance on day-care services. They find that the increased employment of
women is concentrated in the service industries, mostly in the public sectors, and is
accompanied by some decline in the relative wage of highly educated women. Children
(and particularly preschool children) are the strongest deterrent to a mother’s labor force
participation, which effect does not seem to weaken over the period.
Daniela del Boca (1988) finds that the Italian pattern of the female labor force
participation shows a mild U-shape: women’s labor force participation rates fell as the
size of the agricultural sector declined and then rose as women’s educational levels rose
and as the service sector and manufacturing industries that employed women became
more important.58 Ugo Colombino and Bianca De Stavola (1985) attempt to develop a
behavioral model of female labor supply in Italy. The model of labor force participation
is estimated with cohort data and takes into account not only variables changing during
each cohort’s life cycle but also invariant factors summarized by cohort fixed effects. In a
second stage these effects are regressed over a set of indicators that are meant to reflect
variables unchanging over the cohort’s life cycle and conditioning factors at the early
stages of the working life. The results suggest that the flat female participation rate
profile (from both a time-series and a cross-section perspective) is presumably produced
by economic incentive effects that counterbalance each other.59 However, with the recent
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Costa (2000) reports that Italy stands out as having the consistently lowest labor force participation rate for women.
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The authors found the following main factors: 1) a negative trend captured by the coefficients of cohort and
(cohort)2; 2) a very powerful positive female wage effect; 3) an equally (if not more) powerful negative male wage
effect; and 4) significant positive interactions, between cohort and age and between cohort and presence of children <
6.

55

rise in cohort-specific earning power, they identify a decrease in the work-disincentive
effects of aging and of children under 6.
Haruo Shimada and Yoshio Higuchi (1985) study Japan. Their work reviews
statistical data centering on female labor force participation and household behavior,
using a common format for international comparison, and estimates income and wage
elasticities from female labor supply equations. They suggest that analysis of the
aggregate female labor force is misleading because it mixes heterogeneous groups with
sharply different behavioral patterns. They find that the pattern for total female labor
force participation is stagnation,60 a distinct contrast to many advanced economies (e.g.,
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, and Germany) where
the labor force participation of women rose sharply during that period.61 However, the
postwar increase of female wage and salary workers as a percentage of the female
population has been sharp and exhibits a steadily rising trend, more or less comparable to
that in the United States and European countries in recent decades. Although the
historical sequence of events in Japan does not seem to fit the sequence of changes
logically anticipated by the human capital theory, the compounding influences of social
and institutional factors that affect the behavior of households must be taken into account.
Clearly, in the United States and countries with a similar distribution of the labor force by
employment status, the labor force participation decision may be treated as the choice “to
work or not to work.” However, if individuals regard the decision to enter the labor force
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Labor force participation rates for all women went down slightly from around 57 percent in the mid-1960s to a low
of around 52 percent in the mid-1970s; it increased somewhat afterward to reach 56 percent in 1981. A similar pattern
occurred for married women, although lower by approximately 10 percentage points.
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The Japanese pattern is also curious in that the trend was reversed around the mid-1970s when the Japanese economy
suffered the depressing effect of the first oil crisis.
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as an employee as being distinct from the choice to enter the labor force as a family
worker, then economic models of labor force participation, which treat these choices as
identical, will incorporate a specification bias (M. Anne Hill, 1983).
M. Anne Hill (1989) produces another suggestive paper that takes into account
the “informal sector”62 of Japan. The presence of an informal sector of the labor market
allows women to engage in economic activities—by producing goods at home for sale in
the market, working on a family farm, or working in a small family-run business—while
simultaneously caring for children and performing other home-related duties. Thus
choices of women may be viewed as trichotomous rather than dichotomous: women may
choose to work in the formal sector of the labor market (as an employee), in the informal
sector, or they may choose not to work. Accordingly, Hill estimates a trichotomous labor
force participation model for a sample of employees, family workers, and nonparticipants
from the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. A 1975 survey of married women (with husband
present) between the ages of 20 and 59 is the database used for the empirical analysis.
She found that education and market experience were significantly associated with a
greater probability of working in the formal sector. In contrast she found that husband’s
income and the number of young children were significantly associated with a greater
probability of being out of the labor force. Variables such as experience and the presence
of young children increased the probability of being employed in the informal sector.63
Another country with low labor force participation rates for women is Spain.
Feliciano Hernandez Iglesias and Michelle Riboud (1985) describe trends in labor force
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She assumes that women reported as self-employed or as family workers are engaged in the informal sector of the
labor force following Adam Jaffe and K. Azumi (1960).
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My dissertation research will draw heavily on the work of Shimada and Higuchi (1985), and Hill (1989).
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participation of Spanish women since 1900. They estimate earnings functions and labor
force participation models using a 1979 survey of married women. A model including the
average experience of married women as an endogenous variable produces estimates that
fit times series data. Their findings suggest an increasing effect of education on labor
force participation, which confirm Schultz’s (1991) hypothesis of increasing returns to
various quality components of the labor force in developed economies.
Finally, Sweden stands out as special case among the developed countries. Costa
(2000) reports that Sweden had the highest labor force participation rates of women of
any country before dipping in the 1990s. Sweden has actively encouraged paid female
labor force participation and promoted pronatalism since the 1930s. Moreover, the
Swedish system of taxation provides substantial incentives for dual earner couples, and
subsidized child-care in Sweden reduces the negative effect of children on women’s
earnings (Siv Gustafsson and Frank Stafford, 1992). Sweden’s recent decline in labor
force participation seems to be primarily related to its recession of the early 1990s: the
same percentage point decline in labor force participation since then has been observed
among men as well as among women (Costa, 2000). Siv Gustafsson and Roger Jacobson
(1985) perform an empirical study about trends in female labor force participation in
Sweden. They estimate the parameters of labor force participation equations using
individual cross-section data from the three standard-of-living surveys done in 1968,
1974, and 1981. Their main findings are that the labor force participation of married
women increased from 49.1 percent to 83.5 percent during the decades of the 1960s and
the 1970s: and that increases in their own wages, have been by far the most important
explanatory factor. Women’s real wages have increased relative to their husbands’ after58

tax earnings both as a result of the introduction of compulsory individual taxation in
1971, and of dramatically decreased sex differentials in pay partly associated with
increased female education.

3.3 Women’s Labor Force Participation in Latin American Countries

Unlike in the United States and other developed countries, very little empirical
work in economics has been done about women’s labor force participation in Latin
America. However, disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and psychology have
contributed to a body of literature about Latin American women. Under the auspices of
the World Bank in Washington D.C., George Psacharopoulos and Zafiris Tzannatos
(1992) published a collection of studies evaluating women's employment and pay in this
region64 during the decade of the 1980s. They use the empirical results obtained for each
of the countries’ studies to draw conclusions about the general characteristics and trends
in women's labor force participation in the region. Similar techniques65 and comparable
specifications are used for all the countries, to allow for an easier comparison of the
results.
Latin American women overall had a low rate of participation in the labor market,
averaging only 24 percent in the 1950s. However, it increased to 33 percent by the 1980s.
Most of these women were between the ages of 20 and 50 years old. As to the underlying
factors that help explain the increase in women’s labor participation in the region, the
authors conclude that it can be attributed to the economic crisis of the 1950s and 1960s
64

The countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Workers in these countries account for approximately 90
percent of the total labor force in the region both in the 1950s and the 1980s.
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Most analysis is conducted using probit and logit regressions.
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which resulted in a more efficient use of female labor than has traditionally been the case,
and the expanding employment of women in the public sector. After analyzing the results
of individual studies, the authors found that most agree that the probability of a woman
working for pay is greater (1) as they enter adulthood and up to the age of 40 to 45 years
(after controlling for fertility); (2) if they reside in urban areas; (3) the higher their
education level; (4) the more general (rather than technical/vocational) their education;
(5) the lower their family responsibilities (in terms of young children present in the
household); (6) if they live in a female-headed household; and (7) the lower other income
and family wealth. The remainder of this section will summarize empirical findings of
individual countries in alphabetical order.
Ying Chu Ng (1992) examines the determinants of female labor force
participation in Argentina. The author uses data drawn from the 1985 Buenos Aires
Household Survey that was conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC).
Aside from personal characteristics, family composition, and educational attainment,
economic factors related to the availability of income such as wealth, household income,
and household production demands are also important. The Argentine labor market is
characterized by cyclical periods in which labor is either scarce or relatively abundant
because, on one hand, there are substantial fluctuations in terms of domestic and foreign
migration, and on the other, the fact that unemployment and underemployment rates
remain relatively low regardless of whether there is an excess or scarcity of labor
suggests that there may be a strong “added worker” effect operating.66 Ng finds that
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This effect predicts that the labor force of secondary workers, women and/or teenaged children, has a countercyclical
trend, that is, it moves in the opposite direction of the business cycle: During recessions the labor force participation of
this group of people will rise, and it will fall during expansions. Jairo A. Riveros and Carlos E. Sanchez (1990) provide
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important factors determining women’s propensity to work are marital status and
presence of children. It is common for married women to withdraw from the labor force
during childbearing and when their children are young. The highest probability of female
labor force participation is found among women ages 25 to 29. Thus, as the youngest
cohorts age, she predicts much higher levels of labor force participation in the future.
Katherine Scott (1992) studies female labor force participation in Bolivia. She
uses data from the second round of the 1989 Integrated Household Survey (SIH), a biannual survey carried out by the National Statistical Institute of Bolivia (INE). The
results reveal that 44 percent of the sample of women work for pay.67 However, the
definition of “employed women” used in the study may underestimate the real female
work force because unpaid workers in a family business are not counted. In general,
women who have lower levels of education than men are more heavily concentrated in
the informal sector (World Bank, 1989).68 Probit estimates of the labor force participation
function shows the greatest likelihood of working for pay among women ages 35 to 44
but the probability declines among older women. Unmarried women and heads of
household are more likely to work than are married women. Women high school
students are less likely to participate in the labor market than those who are not. In
contrast, attending, or having completed a technical school, teacher’s college, or
university degree has a highly significant, positive effect on the probability of labor force
evidence that this is the case. They report substantial increases in female labor force participation rates, particularly
among women aged 35 to 49 years, during the economic crisis of the early 1980s.
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Women’s labor force participation was estimated at 35 percent in 1987, up from the 1976 level of 20 percent (World
Bank, 1989).
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There are some legal regulations that restrict women’s participation in the formal sector of the labor market: they are
not allowed to work at night, they are not allowed to work more than 40 hours per week, and the labor code bars
women from carrying out jobs considered to be dangerous, unhealthy or hard labor (World Bank, 1989).
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participation. Pregnancy has the expected negative impact: women who were pregnant in
a given year had a lower probability of participating in the labor market than women who
had not been pregnant. She also reports that language skills also have a significant impact
on labor force participation: bilingual69 women participate at a higher rate than women
who speak only Spanish.
Jill Tiefenthaler (1992) uses a multi-sector model of female labor force
participation to study the effects of economic and social adjustment programs on the
well-being of Brazilian women, comparing women’s economic opportunities in 1980
with those in 1989. The National Statistical Service collected the data for this study from
70,777 Brazilian households. The author considers it important to distinguish between the
formal and the large informal sector in analyzing the Brazilian labor market.70 Her model
considers those who do not work for pay as not participating in the labor market. The
formal sector is defined as all individuals who work for a wage while the informal sector
is made up of the self-employed. Results from estimating the three-sector labor force
participation equation reinforce many of her hypotheses: the important determinants are
those variables that influence the market wage, variables that affect the reservation wage,
and proxies for the costs of employment across sectors.71
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Aymara and Spanish.
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She reports that the importance of accounting for the large informal sector in many developing countries was
recognized over 40 years ago by Jaffe and Azumi (1960). They observed that women engaged in informal or “cottageindustry” work had higher fertility rates than women who worked in the formal sector. Results from several more
recent studies, using more rigorous empirical analysis, have supported Jaffe and Azumi’s supposition that women’s
costs of labor force participation are not equivalent across sectors. See Hill (1983, 1989), S. K. Smith (1984), David
Blau (1984).
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Morton Stelcner et al. (1992), who also studied the Brazilian multi-sectoral labor market, show that education is
perhaps the most important determinant of labor force status and earnings. Moreover, it plays an important role in
“sorting” individuals among alternative labor force activities.
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Indermit A. Gill (1992) studies female labor force participation in Chile using
data from the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) of Chilean households
conducted in 1987. In general, Chile is a relatively developed labor market. However,
women constitute only about 28 percent of the labor force. Female labor force
participation is less than half that of males. The author investigates why, in the face of the
rapid equalization of education levels across sexes, female labor force participation rates
have not increased to levels observed in industrialized countries. The results of probit
estimates for the labor force participation of women aged 14 to 65 years are as follows:
higher degrees are positively associated with the probability of labor force participation;
the age profile of female labor force participation is an inverted U-shape; married and
cohabiting women are less likely to work for pay than are those who are single or
separated; being head of household is positively correlated with the probability of labor
force participation; higher household income (total income of other members of the
household) increases the likelihood of working for pay (a somewhat puzzling result).
The case of Colombia has been studied by Eduardo Velez and Carolyn Winter
(1992). Women’s labor force participation increased from 19 percent in 1951 to 39
percent in 1985.72 The authors attempt to identify factors that influence a woman's
decision to participate in the labor market using data from the 1988 National Household
Survey conducted by the Statistics Administrative Department (DANE) in the largest
Colombian cities. They estimate a probit model in which the probability that a woman
will participate is estimated based on her parental status, age, education level, the size of
the household in which she lives, and her status as head of household or otherwise. The
72

ILO (1990).
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probit coefficients show that the probability of participating increases steadily with each
additional level of completed education. A larger household has a positive, although
small, effect on a woman's decision to work for pay. By contrast, being head of
household has a substantial positive impact. As in many other studies, the presence of
young children is shown to reduce the probability that a woman will work for pay.73 In
Colombia, however, even women with young children continue to be heavily represented
in the informal sector.
Hongyu Yang (1992) studies female labor force participation in Costa Rica. The
author finds the major factors that influence women’s labor market activity are
educational attainment, marital status, fertility, other household income, and age.
Education has a powerful positive effect on the probability of female labor force
participation: more educated women are more likely to participate in the market and are
more likely to be employed. Using the results of probit estimates for female labor force
participation, the author predicts the probability of labor force participation for each
characteristic holding other characteristics constant at their means. The author found that
high school graduates have the highest probability, 54.2 percent. Married women are less
likely to participate than unmarried women, 17.7 percent versus 40.4 percent. The more
children a woman has, the less likely she is to participate in the labor market. A female
head of household has a higher likelihood of participating, 34.1 percent, compared to
22.7 percent probability for a woman who is not head of household. Finally, women who
live in rural areas are less likely to participate in market activities.
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Thierry Magnac (1992), using samples drawn from urban household surveys between 1980 and 1985, finds similar
effects.
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There are two empirical papers about female labor force participation in Ecuador.
The earlier analysis was undertaken by Mary Finn and Carol L. Jusenius (1975) using
data for 1966. They find rather low rates of labor force participation among urban
women, around 25 percent, with the highest rates among women who had completed
college (89 percent). On the other hand, single women were more likely to work in the
labor market, but earned substantially less than working wives, who also tended to be
older and better educated. George Jakubson and George Psacharopoulos (1992) use data
from the 1987 Ecuador Household Survey that was conducted in urban households in the
three largest cities, Quito, Cuenca and Guayaquil, to study the increase in female labor
force participation which their estimates show had increased to 50 percent.74 They also
found that more educated women are more likely to participate in the market and more
likely to be employed; marital status and being head of household are the most important
social determinants of both labor force participation and employment: i.e., wives with
working husbands are much less likely to participate in the labor market than female
heads of household. Women with young children are also less likely to work for pay.
Mary Arends (1992) examines female labor force participation in Guatemala.
This country has the lowest rate of literacy in Latin America, and there is a large
schooling gap between men and women. About 40 percent of its population is
Amerindians, many of whom do not speak Spanish, and who have little access to social
services or to formal labor markets. About half the work force is employed in agriculture,
much of it at the subsistence level. The data source is the 1989 National Socio74

The World Bank (1989) reports labor force participation rates among all women in Ecuador have continued to rise,
except among females aged 12 to 19 years who are remaining in school longer. Labor force participation rates have
been particularly high among women between ages 25 and 34 years, and have increased across all marital status
categories. Married women increased their labor force participation from 16.8 percent to 21.1 percent between 1974
and 1982. The World Bank also reports that 61 percent of female heads of household were in the labor force in 1987.
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Demographic Survey (ENSD), carried out by the Statistical National Institute. Results
from probit equations estimation are that schooling level is an important determinant of
labor force participation; that number of children and marital status have the expected
negative and significant impact on participation; that participation peaks between the
ages of 30 and 34, dips for women aged 35 to 39, and then rises again; that being head of
household increases the probability of participation, as does living in Guatemala province
and living in an urban area; that a woman from an indigenous group is less likely to
participate in the labor market; and that household income has a positive effect on
participation, as Gill (1992) reported for Chile.
Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. Carolyn Winter and
Thomas H. Gindling (1992) use probit equations to investigate the factors that influence a
woman’s decision to enter the formal labor market or the informal sector in this country.
The data used in their analysis come from the 1989 national survey, the Honduras
Household Permanent Survey of Multiple Purposes (EPHPM). It is assumed that the
decision to work and the decision regarding which economic sector to enter (formal or
informal) are made simultaneously. Their results are as follows: 1) Holding all other
variables at their mean values, the probability of participation increases substantially with
each additional level of education completed. However, women with college degrees
actually have a lower probability of participation than women with completed secondary
education.75 2) Women’s labor force participation rates by age group show the familiar
inverse U-shape. Women’s labor force participation peaks between ages 35 and 45 and
then declines. 3) Having children aged six years or less reduces the probability that a
75

This may reflect, in part, the high levels of unemployment among individuals with college degrees since some may
become discouraged and leave the labor force.
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woman will work. 4) Women are much more likely to participate in the labor market if
they live in urban areas.
Diane Steels (1992) analyses women’s labor force participation in Mexico. She
focuses on factors that have been shown in previous studies to influence the decision to
enter the workforce such as age, education level, presence of young children, marital
status, and household wealth. The probit coefficients show that probability of
participation in the labor market decreases as women become older although it remains
relatively high even at older ages. Her analysis shows that with increased levels of
education, women are more likely to participate in the labor market. Steels’ study shows
that women in Mexico are actually more likely to participate when there are children in
the household, unlike most studies which indicate that the presence of at least pre-school
aged children reduces the probability of labor force participation. Finally, living in an
urban area increases the probability of a woman's participation in the labor market.
Female labor force participation in Panama is studied by Mary Arends (1992).
Her empirical study uses data taken from the Household-Man Power Survey of August
1989 by the Office of Statistics and Census of Panama (DEC). The author comes to the
following conclusions from her results: the likelihood of women working for pay
increases with higher education levels from 10 percent for those with no education to 48
percent for those with over 4 years of university education; women with children under 6
years of age are less likely to be in the work force: the probability of labor force
participation drops from 27 percent for those with no children under 6 years of age to 18
percent for women with three children in that age group; labor force participation peaks
between 35 and 39 years of age; those living in an urban area are 12 percent more likely
67

to work than those living in a rural area; the probability of working increases from 20
percent to 57 percent if the woman is head of household; and additional workers in the
household increases the probability of working.
Shahidur Khandker (1992) studies women's labor market participation in Peru
where it increased from 34 to 43 percent between 1970 and 1985 in urban areas. He uses
the probit estimates to predict the effect of changing certain characteristics holding other
characteristics constant at their mean. He finds that women with university rather than
secondary or post-secondary diplomas have substantially higher labor force participation,
and that single women participate in the labor force more than married women (14.9
percent versus 5.52 percent, respectively). Finally, the predicted participation rate for
women is the highest in Lima (15 percent) followed by other urban areas (9 percent) and
rural areas (6 percent).
Mary Arends (1992) also studies women’s labor force participation in Uruguay.
She uses data drawn from the 1989 Household National Survey conducted by the General
Administration of Statistics and the Census (DGEC), and finds that the female labor force
participation rate is 52 percent. Arends presents the results of a simulation testing for
each characteristic while holding all other characteristics at the value of their sample
means. She finds that education plays a key role in predicting whether a female works.
For example, the likelihood ranges from 28 percent for women with some primary
education to 54 percent for women with a college degree. Arends finds that labor force
participation is higher at all ages than in other Latin American countries. Labor force
participation is lower at ages 14 to 19 than at other ages, which is to be expected given
Uruguay's high enrollment rates in secondary education. The number of children also has
68

a significant negative effect on labor force participation. Being head of household
increases the probability that a woman will work for pay from 34 percent to 65 percent.
The number of employed persons in the household has a significant, positive effect on the
probability that a female will be working.76 The coefficient on household income is
negative, as expected, but small. Lastly, living in Montevideo has a small positive effect
on the decision to work.

3.4 Women’s Labor Force Participation in Venezuela

According to information published by the Central Office for Statistics and
Information (OCEI) in Venezuela, women’s labor force participation has increased since
the 1950s, when the rate stayed between 18 percent and 19 percent. By 1971, it had
increased to 23 percent. The 1990 Population Censuses show that women’s labor force
participation had increased to 30.5 percent. Finally, the Household Sample Survey reports
that their labor force participation rate reached 43 percent by 1998.
There are only a few studies about women’s labor force participation in
Venezuela. In a descriptive study, Maria Beatriz Orlando and Genny Zuniga (2000)
analyze women in the Venezuelan labor market, focusing on their labor force
participation and their income. They use aggregate data from the National Census since
1950. Their results show that Venezuela is similar to other Latin American countries
where older women, “cohabitors”77 and those with the lowest level of education
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The explanation for the sign is not immediately obvious. It may show a kind of family “work ethic” with members
preferring to work outside the home (Arends, 1992).
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“Cohabitors” refers to a specific group of Venezuelan women who formerly lived with a partner but who have been
abandoned or have decided to separate.
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increased their labor force participation, as a strategy to cope with reduced family
income. Leonardo Ledezma, Maria Beatriz Orlando and Genny Zuniga (2003) report on
the determinants of labor force participation of women in Venezuela for the period 19802000. Among the factors that influence Venezuelan women’s labor force participation,
the authors point out, are income level, education, and the development of political and
social institutions. Age is also important: the highest labor force participation, 46
percent, is observed for those between the ages of 30 and 39.78
Two empirical papers investigate the labor market behavior of Venezuelan
women: Cox and Psacharopoulos (1992) and Winter (1992). Both studies use the same
data source, the Household Survey data, for 1987 and 1989, respectively, and the same
methodology. Both studies estimate a probit equation for a sample of working and nonworking women. Not surprisingly, results of the papers are quite similar: education has
powerful effects on labor force participation as the human capital literature suggests. The
probit coefficients show that the probability rises steadily with each successive level of
education. Cox and Psacharopoulos find that living in a rural area reduces the probability
of participating in the labor force by 13 percent, considerable more than Winter, who
finds only a 6 percent difference.
Other results are related to specific variables used by each of the researchers. Cox
and Psacharopoulos find that being a wife or partner reduces the probability of labor
force participation by 22 percent, implying that family responsibilities compete for time
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Ledesma, Orlando and Zuniga (2003) also claim that the labor force participation of rural women has traditionally
been reported at levels much lower than they really are because women consider some of their economic activities part
of their domestic chores. However, it is clear that women have been participating in the labor force in greater numbers.
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spent in the market.79 Being head of household raises the probability by 23 percent. An
increase in the income of other family members equivalent to 15 US$ per month reduces
the probability of working by 4 percentage points. Winter finds that being a mother of
young children significantly increases the probability that a woman will withdraw from
the labor force. And, finally, age is also an important factor. The probability of women
working increases steadily starting in the mid-twenties and peaks between the ages of 41
and 45. Low labor market participation rates among women in their early twenties are
consistent with the high enrollment of women in this age group in higher education (44
percent). Moreover, many in their early twenties may be having babies.

3.5 The Contribution of My Dissertation Research

Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992) collected a series of empirical studies of
many Latin American countries. However, none of them attempt to advance the
theoretical understanding of issues pertaining to women’s time allocation between home
and market work. These studies take analytical approaches used during the 1980s to
investigate women’s status in the Latin American labor markets, that is —women’s
employment and pay. Almost all the studies attempt to explain why Latin American
women have lower rates of both labor force participation and pay, compared to men.
They assume that there are no innate differences between the sexes that justify the
observed gender differences. Thus, basically these papers study gender discrimination in
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This is only a partial explanation. Clearly, having a partner’s income raises the reservation wage.
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the labor market using the human capital framework.80 The studies of all the countries
use similar techniques and specifications in order to facilitate a comparison of the results,
to find whether there are common patterns and factors at work in the region with respect
employment and pay of women.
This project is aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the labor force
participation of Venezuelan women during the 1990s, based not only on human capital
theory, but also on the theory of allocation of time between home and market work. The
more recent data presented in this study will overcome some of the most serious
difficulties that Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos faced regarding the quality and coverage
of the micro data collected by household surveys in the region during the 1980s.
The descriptive study of Ledezma, Orlando and Zuniga (2003), despite the
report’s title, is based on previous data from the 1990 census collected by the Central
Office of Statistics and Information (OCEI). The empirical works of Cox and
Psacharopoulos (1992), as well as Winter (1992), use micro data from 1987 and 1989,
respectively. Thus, my project will greatly expand the rather small and now-outdated
literature by investigating factors influencing female labor force participation in the
decade of the 1990s. There will be a significant improvement in both the quality and
quantity of data to be used in this study of Venezuelan women. For instance, the two
empirical studies of Venezuela use a binary choice model to estimate the impact of the
factors that influence women’s labor force participation. However, in neither study are
the unemployed properly identified: Cox and Psacharopoulos’ (1992) definition is not
strictly comparable with the official one, which, as in most countries, counts both the
80

Gender discrimination is beyond the scope of this study. However, their findings about the determinants of women’s
labor force participation are pertinent.
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unemployed and the employed as members of the labor force. Winter (1992), on the other
hand, is unable to determine whether individuals are unemployed or employed in the
informal sector. This is a serious issue, since a large informal sector exists in Venezuela.
Consequently, in both studies, the authors include as participants in the labor market only
actively working individuals, identified by their positive responses to questions
concerning employment status: weekly hours worked and monthly income. The data
available for the last years of the 1990s provide information to properly identify
the formal and informal sector, thus allowing me to apply the methodology used
by Hill (1989), to take into account the informal sector.81 Choices for Venezuelan women
are: working for pay in the formal sector, being self-employed or working in family
businesses in the informal sector, or being out of the labor force entirely. Thus, by
applying methods of analysis not previously used to new data, this dissertation will offer
a greatly-improved, in-depth, and up-to-date investigation into the labor participation
decisions of women in Venezuela.
In Chapter Four the specific hypotheses to be tested and the estimation procedures
are presented more formally.

81
Shimada and Higuchi (1985) also used the same method to study female labor force participation and household
behavior in Japan.
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Chapter Four
Research Design

This present analysis represents several distinct advances in the study of the labor
force participation of women in Venezuela. First, improved data will be used to update
previous empirical work on this topic and to overcome serious shortcomings of previous
studies. The two empirical papers about Venezuelan women’s labor market behavior by
Cox and Psacharopoulos (1992) and Winter (1992) described in Chapter Three
approached the labor force participation decision of Venezuelan women as dichotomous:
“working” and “not working.” The second advance of this study is that a trichotomous
decision is considered, adding the option of participating in the informal sector. Finally,
the labor force behaviors of different demographic groups of women are analyzed
separately. In this chapter the data and methodology that will be used to analyze women's
labor force participation in Venezuela between 1995 and 1998 will be discussed. The
chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 describes in detail the objectives and
hypotheses of this project. Section 4.2 describes the data sources to be used. Section 4.3
describes the methodology and estimation methods, and Section 4.4 describes the
specification of the models and the description of variables involved in the analysis.
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4.1 Objectives and Hypotheses

This study will provide an empirical update on labor force participation among
Venezuelan women. This effort will help close the existing chronological gap in the
literature by examining their labor force participation throughout the 1995-1998 period.
In this chapter the hypotheses are summarized more formally. An introduction to
the methodology used is also included. In Chapters 2 and 3, we have discussed the
economic theory behind women’s labor force participation and a review of the literature,
in which age, education, family income, and other factors were discussed in terms of how
they affected women’s labor force participation. The empirical tests in this study are
based on the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis No. 1: Venezuelan women’s labor force participation has increased

during the last decades of the last century, particularly during the period 1995-1998.
Factors such as age, education, marital status, urban residence, geographic location,
headship of the household, socio-economic status, nonlabor income, and time influence
their decision to work or not to work.
Hypothesis No. 2: Venezuelan women have increased their participation in the

informal sector during the last decade of the last century. Factors influencing their
decision to work in the informal sector are the same as those impacting their decision to
work in the formal sector during this period.
Two additional hypotheses will be tested using the subsamples of married women,
single women, and women heads of household.
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Hypothesis No. 3a: Demographic, geographic, and socio-economic factors

influence the labor force participation decision of married women, single women, and
women heads of household in the same manner.
Hypothesis No. 3b: The factors considered in this study affect Venezuelan

women’s decision to work in the formal or informal sector similarly, whether they are
married, single and/or heads of household.

4.2 Data Base

This study utilizes micro data from the Household Sampling Survey (EHM) of the
Central Bureau for Statistics and Information (OCEI), the agency of the Venezuelan
government that collects data and generates official statistics. This is a biannual,
nationwide survey that measures the characteristics of the Venezuelan labor market as
well as other demographic issues such as family composition, housing quality, access to
public services and poverty status. The survey is conducted using multi-stage sampling;
the sample is rotated to avoid refusal while maintaining consistency and representation.
Five surveys will combine to produce pooled cross-sectional data: the first semester of
1995, and both semesters of 1997 and 1998. For purposes of this study the sample is
restricted to woman between 15 and 60 years of age for whom all the specified variables
are available.
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4.3 Methodology

A description of research methodology follows.

4.3.1 Binomial Logit Model

To test Hypothesis No. 1 and Hypothesis No. 3a, the study models the binary
choice that a woman is in the labor force (Y=1) or is not (Y=0) during the period. A set
of factors such as age, education, marital status, head of household, socio-economic
status, urban residence, geographic areas, nonlabor income, and survey time gathered in a
vector X explain the decision, so that
Prob(Y=1|x) = F (x,ß)

(1)

Prob(Y=0|x)= 1-F (x,ß)

(2)

The logit model uses the logistic distribution Λ (.)
e x 'β
= Λ ( x' β )
Prob(Y=1|x)=
1 + e x 'β

(3)

The probability model is a regression:

E[ y / x] = 0[1 − F ( x' β )] + 1[ F ( x' β )] = F ( x' β )

(4)

Since the parameters of the model are not marginal effects, in the logit model,

∂E[ y / x]
= Λ ( x ' β )[1 − Λ ( x ' β )]β
∂x

(5)

To interpret the estimated model82, it is useful to calculate these values at the means of
the regressors or other pertinent values.83 The appropriate marginal effect for a binary
independent variable would be

82

The method of the maximum likelihood is applied to estimate this model’s parameters as in the multinomial logit
model explained below.
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Marginal effect=Prob[Y=1| x(d ), d = 1] − Pr[Y = 1 | x(d ), d = 0] ,

(6)

Where x (d) denotes the means of all the other variables in the model.

4.3.2 Multinomial Logit Model

In order to analyze labor force behavior of Venezuelan women (Hypothesis No.
2), and then to compare their behavior among the three groups (Hypothesis No. 3b), the
study follows Hill (1983) in using Daniel McFadden’s (1974) model for discrete choice:
the multinomial logit model.84
The model is the standard one-period static labor supply framework in which each
woman may select among three mutually exclusive choices: working in the formal sector
as a paid employee (indexed p), working in the informal sector85 (indexed f), and not
working for pay (indexed n).86 The preferences are defined by a utility function whose
arguments are the Hicksian composite of all goods, non-market time, and vector of
exogenous variables that affect labor force decisions. Rational decision-making is
reflected in the maximization of utility subject to time and budget constraints. In other
words, the woman compares the maximum utility attainable given each participation
alternative and selects that alternative which yields the highest utility.
83
To compute the marginal effects, one can evaluate the expressions at the sample means of the data or evaluate the
marginal effects at every observation and use the sample average of the individual marginal effects.
84
The labor force participation decision is modeled most appropriately within a life-cycle context, especially if there is
heterogeneity across individuals with regard to the propensity to work in either labor market sector. (See Ben-Porath,
1973 and Heckman, 1978.) Unfortunately, in Latin American countries including Venezuela the panel data required to
estimate a life-cycle model are not available.
85
Both Cox and Psacharopoulos (1992) and Winter (1992) report the importance of the informal sector in the
Venezuelan labor force.
86

This specification does not allow for the possibility of working concurrently in more than one sector. However, the
data include no information on multiple job holding and each person reports only one current employment status.

78

Formally, let Vji be the maximum utility attainable for individual i if she chooses
participation status j = p, f, n, and suppose that this indirect utility function can be
decomposed into a non-stochastic component (S) and a stochastic component ( ε ):
Vji = Sji + ε ji ,

(7)

Where Sji is a function of observed variables and ε ji is a function of unobserved
variables. The probability that the ith woman selects the jth labor force participation status
is then given by
Ρij = Pr[V ji > Vki for k ≠ j , k = p, f , n] ,

(8)

or, substituting in from (4-8),
Pji = Pr[ S ij − S ki > ε ki − ε ji for k ≠ j , k = p, f , n] ,

(9)

If the stochastic components have independent and identical Weibull
distribution,87 then the difference between the errors ( ε ki - ε ji ) has a logistic distribution
and the choice model is multinomial logit (McFadden, 1974).88
To estimate the model, it is necessary to specify a functional form of the nonstochastic component of the indirect utility function S ji . This component is approximated
in linear form ( S ji = β j' X i ), yielding an empirical specification of the form
Pji =

87

exp( β 'j X i )
exp( β p' X i ) + exp( β 'j X i ) + exp( β n' X i )

,

(10)

The Weibull distribution has a unimodal bell shape roughly similar to the normal distribution.

88

For a complete description and discussions of the multinomial logit model, see McFadden (1974) and Domencich
and McFadden (1975)
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where X i is a vector of independent variables explaining labor force participation and

β j is the parameter vector.

4.3.3 Estimation Method of Maximum Likelihood

For n alternatives in the multinomial logit model, only n-1 distinct parameter
vectors may be identified. This linear dependence requires the normalization of the
parameters, i.e. that

∑β

j

= 0,

(11)

For a comparison among the empirical results, it is useful to calculate the partial
derivatives of the dependent variables, the probability of entering the paid labor force
( Pp ) and the probability of engaging in family work or self-employment ( Pf ) , with
respect to each independent variable. The partial derivatives are
∂Pj
∂X

= Pj (1 − Pj )

∂S j
∂X

− Pj Pk

∂S k
∂S
− Pj Pn n ,
∂X
∂X

j, k = p, f, j ≠ k.

(12)

The econometric model is specified so that ∂S j / ∂ ln Wk = 0 if j ≠ k . Therefore,
the effect of the wage in each sector operates through the effect on the conditional
indirect utility in that sector. For example,

∂Pf
∂ ln W p

= − Pf Pp

∂S p
∂ ln W p

.

Estimated standard errors of these derivatives may be calculated in a
straightforward manner using the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters.
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McFadden (1974) suggests several measures of goodness-of-fit for the
multinomial logit model. Among them is a likelihood ratio statistic:
∧

∧

− 2[ L( β 0 ) − L( β )],

(13)

which, under the null hypothesis that all parameters equal zero, is asymptotically
distributed as a chi-square variate with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of
∧

estimated parameters. L(·) is the log likelihood evaluated at β , the maximum likelihood
∧

estimate of the parameter vector and β 0 , a vector of zeros. An analog to the R2 in a
conventional regression is McFadden (1974) likelihood ratio index,
∧

R = 1−
2

L( β )
∧

L( β 0 )

= LRI

(14)

4.4 Specification of the Models

In order to test the three hypotheses, two models for discrete choice are described
in this section: 1) the two-way choice model or binary logit model and 2) the three-way
choice or multinomial logit model. Both models use the same set of variables but since
they are testing different hypotheses, the expected signs may be different. A general
description of the variables follows.

4.4.1 Dependent Variable

Women’s labor force participation (WLFP) is a dummy variable which takes two
values for the two-way choice model: 0 = not in the labor force, and 1 = in the labor
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force. It takes on three values for the three-way choice model: 0= not in the labor force,
1=participating in the informal sector, and 2=participating in the formal sector.89

4.4.2 Independent Variables: Description and Motivation

Three main categories of variables explain women’s labor force participation: 1)
individual and demographic factors:90 age, education,91 and marital status; 2) geographic
location factors: urban residence and region; and, 3) socio-economic condition factors:
head of household, socio-economic status, nonlabor income, interaction terms (nonlabor
income * survey dates), and survey dates.
Individual and demographic factors:

Age
Numerous empirical analyses have pointed out that the probabilities of
labor force participation of women differ by age. In this study, age is entered in
the labor force participation function as a series of five dummy variables in 10year ranges: 15 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, and 51 to 60.
Education
The effects of education reflect both non-pecuniary factors, such as “tastes” for
market work versus work at home, and pecuniary ones such as potential market earnings.
Changes of cultural values in Latin America and women’s attitudes toward working for

89

What truly determines the difference between workers of the formal and the informal sectors is the compliance with
laws regulating market work. See more detailed definitions of the formal and the informal sector in Appendix A.

90
Although important, the presence of children is not used in this project since the individual data do not have
indicators linking children and mothers.
91

Age and education level dummy variables are included in the labor force participation equations as proxies for
offered wages.
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pay brought an increase in formal education for women, and consequently opportunities
for better jobs. This variable is entered as a series of five dummy variables for the highest
level of education completed, or if a student is currently enrolled at the level: primary
education, secondary education, technical education and college.
Marital status
In general, married women have the burden of the domestic chores which limits
their participation in the labor market. Moreover, the earnings of husbands and partners
constitute nonlabor income for these women, which reduce their likelihood of
participating in the labor market. A set of dummy variables represents five categories of
marital status: single, married, divorced, widowed and “cohabitors.” Women currently
cohabitating, i.e. with a partner present, are included with married women. The divorced
group includes women who are separated from their husbands. The separate dummy
variable “cohabitor” refers to a specific group of Venezuelan women who formerly lived
with a partner but who have been abandoned or have decided to separate.
Geographic location factors:

Urban
The dummy variable for urban residence reflects a mix of demand side and taste
or preference effects, which are likely to work in the same direction. An urban area may
provide more jobs opportunities and better environment for a woman to perform market
work. The variable takes the value of one if a women lives in an urban area, and zero
otherwise.92

92

Definitions of urban and rural areas are found in Appendix A.
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Region
The division of the Venezuelan territory into regions organizes states according to
their prevalent economic activities and availability of resources. There are nine regions:
Capital, Central, Central-Western, Zulian, Andean, Plains, North-Eastern, Insular and
Guayana. Since there are different mixes of economic activities, population growth and
densities and migration patterns by regions, the likelihood of women’s labor force
participation may also differ by regions. A dummy variable for every region in the labor
force participation equation is included.93
Figure 10 Geographic Areas in Venezuela

Regions of Venezuela: Zulian (red), Guayana (pink), Central (blue), Central-Western
(orange), Insular (purple), Andean (green), North-Eastern (light green), Plains (yellow).
Source: Perry-Castaneda Library. Map Collection. The University of Texas at Austin.
http//www.lib.utexas.edu/maps
93
The Guayana region was dropped from this analysis because recent development activities do not allow for reliable
data collection. Detailed information about the regions are found in Appendix A.
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Socio-economic conditions factors:

Heads of household
Many women in Venezuela are heads of household with a large number of
dependents and with few wage earners. Being head of household suggests the woman
needs to work to support the household94 and indicates the presence of children. This
group includes women in all marital status categories. This dummy variable takes on a
value of 1 if a woman is head of household and a value of 0 otherwise.
Socio-economic status
These dummy variables are derived from an index calculated by the Modified
Graffar method (Hernan Mendez Castellano and Maria Cristina de Mendez, 1994).95 This
index defines socio-economic classes based on specific living conditions of families.
There are five classes: high, medium high, average, relative poverty, and critical poverty.
For purposes of this analysis the lowest two classes are combined.
Nonlabor income
Nonlabor income is a continuous variable that enters in the labor force
participation equations to capture the effects of wealth on the likelihood of working. The
Venezuelan currency is the Bolivar. However, for purposes of this study, nonlabor
income is converted into U.S. dollars per month. Although in many studies the husband’s
income is considered nonlabor income for the wife, it is not included here, nor is the
income of other family members.

94

As mentioned in footnote 90, one important limitation of this study is the difficulty of identifying women with
children. A growing group of single women with children has been identified lately, a trend also observed in
developed countries.
95

A detailed description of the Graffar-Mendez Castellano method is found in Appendix A.
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Survey date
Five dummy variables are used to control for the time when the survey was taken,
to capture the influence of short-term variation in economic activity.
Interaction terms
These continuous variables capture the impact of the combined effects of two
variables: nonlabor income variable and survey dates. Four interaction variables are
considered: nonlabor income * 1997-1, nonlabor income * 1997-2, nonlabor income *
1998-1, and nonlabor income * 1998-2. These variables allow nonlabor income have
differing impacts for the different surveys.

4.4.3 Testing Hypothesis No. 1

Using the two-way choice model, the full sample of women will be used to
regress the labor force participation equation on individual or demographic factors,
geographic factors, and socio-economic conditions.
Regressors’ expected signs
Individual and demographic factors:

Age
The youngest group 15 to 20 years of age is the omitted category. Women of
these ages are probably students and consequently they are more likely to be out of the
labor force. Empirical evidence also suggests that the oldest women are more likely to be
out of the labor force. I expect that the coefficients on the dummy variables for other age
groups will be positive indicating a greater probability of participation in the labor force
than the youngest group. Moreover, according to the National Census (1991), Venezuelan
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women ages 30-39 showed the highest labor force participation rate. Therefore, I expect
the highest probabilities of participating in the labor market for women between 30 to 50
years of age.
Education
The omitted category in the labor force participation equation is the group of
women with no education. We anticipate that the coefficients on all the other education
variables will have positive signs and that there will be larger coefficients for higher
levels of education.
Marital status
In this study, the omitted category is single women. We expect that the coefficient
on the dummy variable indicating a woman is married will be negative since her husband
or partner provides the income needed to support the household. We also expect negative
coefficients on the dummies variable for divorced and widowed women because usually
they receive some kind of legal child support and inheritance, respectively. We expect no
significant differences in the coefficient on the dummy variable for “cohabitors”
compared to single women.
Geographic location factors:

Urban
Positive coefficients are expected on this variable, reflecting a greater likelihood
of market work for women living in urban areas compared to those living in rural areas.
Region
The omitted category is the North-Eastern region which is characterized by low
population density, agricultural and oil production activities. Therefore, I expect that the
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coefficients on the dummy variables representing residence in areas such as the Capital,
Central-Western, Zulian and Andean regions with greater populations and with more
industrial and service activities will be positive and significant, indicating higher
probabilities of women’s participation in the labor force. A priori it is not clear what
signs to expect on the coefficients on the dummy variables representing the other regions.
Variables indicating socio-economic conditions:

Heads of household
The study expects the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that a woman
is head of household to be positive and significant, indicating a higher likelihood of labor
force participation.
Socio-economic status
It has been suggested that those in the lowest socio-economic status are less likely
to work than those in higher classes due to negative attitudes toward work and lack of
ambition. Since the omitted category is poverty, we may anticipate positive and
successively higher probabilities of participating in the labor force as women achieve
higher socio-economic status.
Nonlabor income
According to the neoclassical theory of labor, higher amounts of nonlabor income
are associated with higher reservation wage and a lower the probability of participation.
Thus, a negative sign on the coefficient for nonlabor income is expected.
Survey date
This study of women’s labor force participation corresponds to the period after
the financial crisis of 1994 and the further application of the macroeconomic adjustment
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program of the Venezuelan Agenda. Since the omitted category is the 1995 survey, we
anticipate that the coefficients of the other dummy variables will be positive indicating a
greater need of women to supplement lost income due to the economic crisis.
Interaction terms
These terms are entered in the labor force participation equation to allow the
effect of nonlabor income to differ between survey dates. It is not clear a priori what the
signs the coefficients of these variables will be.

4.4.4 Testing Hypothesis No. 2

This study relies heavily on Hill’s (1984) paper in which she emphasized the
necessity of considering a third choice with respect to labor force participation, working
in the informal sector, in countries such as Japan. Using data from a survey of married
women, she found that education and market experience were significantly associated
with a greater probability of working in the formal sector. In contrast, she found that
husband’s income was significantly associated with a greater probability of being out of
the labor force. The number of small children increased the probability of being
employed in the informal sector or out of the labor force.
I will use the three-way choice model on the sample of women between the ages
15 to 60 to test the second hypothesis about women’s decisions to work in the formal or
informal sector. The informal sector became more important during the period under
analysis because of the deteriorating economic conditions and the shrinkage of the
industrial sector, which caused a loss of employment in the formal sector.
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Regressors’ expected signs

This trichotomous model attempts to explain women’s decision to work in both
the formal and the informal market sectors. The predicted signs for the same group of
regressors are discussed below.
Individual and demographic factors:

Age
As with Hypothesis No. 1, empirical evidence suggests that the youngest and the
oldest women are more likely to be out of the labor force. The omitted category is the
youngest group, those 15 to 20 years old. I expect that the coefficients on the dummy
variables indicating women between 20 and 50 years of age will be positive and
significant indicating a greater probability of participating in the labor force than women
15 to 20 years in both the formal and informal sector. However, a priori it is not clear
which age groups will be more likely or less likely to work in either sector, compared to
the youngest women.
Education
According to human capital theory, education is positively related to labor force
participation. I believe it also plays an important role in whether working woman will
choose the formal or informal sector. Since the omitted category is women with no
education, I expect that higher schooling attainments are associated with higher
probabilities of participating in the formal sector compared to women no education.
However, an increased likelihood of being employed in the formal sector may mean a
negative likelihood of being employed in the informal sector.
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Marital status
The omitted category is the single women. As with Hypothesis No.1, we expect
that the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating a woman is married will be
negative indicating that she will be less likely to participate in either the formal or
informal sector. We also expect negative coefficients on the dummy variables for
divorced and widowed women because they usually receive some kind of legal child
support and inheritance, respectively. However, it is not clear, a priori their preferences to
work in the formal or informal sector. With respect to the “cohabitors,” the coefficient on
this dummy variable is not expected to be significant from that of single women.
Geographic location factors:

Urban
Guy Standing (1982) reported that in Latin America young single women moved
to the towns and cities to take better and higher-paying jobs, or to have access to job
training. Consequently, we expect that the coefficients on the dummy variable for urban
residence will be positive and higher for women’s labor force participation in the formal
sector than in the informal sector since there are more job opportunities in those areas
than in rural areas.
Region
Orlando (2001) suggests that, in general, formal and informal workers in
Venezuela are concentrated in different economic activities according to the level of
capital, technology and scale required. Formal workers are employed mainly in the public
sector, in manufacturing, and in intermediate activities (wholesale, financial and
insurance services, real estate, communications and transportation). Informal workers are
91

mainly employed in retail commerce, services for the community and agriculture. In
general, there is not a clear-cut separation of activities to be performed by workers of the
formal and informal sector. The omitted category is the North-Eastern region which is
characterized by low population density, agricultural and oil production activities.
However, signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the dummy variables of the other
seven regions will depend on the capacity of the region to generate jobs and the special
characteristics of their economies in the period under analysis. I expect that women living
in the most industrialized regions of the country will be more likely to participate in the
formal sector; and, women living in agricultural and rural areas are more likely to
participate in the informal sector.96
In the Capital region where the predominant activities are those of the public
sector, industry, commerce and finance, I expect that the coefficients will be positive in
the formal sector but negative in the informal sector. The Central region is the most
important industrial center in the country. Commercial activities have also taken
important role as an economic activity in this region. I expect that the coefficient on the
dummy variable will show a positive probability of participating in the formal sector
compared to the North-Eastern region because the formal sector dominates this region.
The Plains region has a long agricultural tradition compared to the others. Therefore we
expect a positive coefficient on this dummy variable in the informal sector estimation and
a negative coefficient for the formal sector, compared to the North-Eastern region
because the informal sector dominates this region. In the Zulian region beside the
agricultural and oil production activities, commercial activities and a large underground
96

Appendix A contains detailed description of each region.
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economy associated with drug trafficking, alcohol, cigarettes and other contraband goods
play key roles in the economy. Thus, we expect that the coefficients on this dummy
variable will be positive in both labor markets although higher for the informal sector. In
the Andean region economic activities are concentrated mainly around agriculture and
tourism. So I expect positive signs for the coefficients on this dummy variable indicating
that women are more likely to participate in the informal sector. In the Insular region, the
predominant activities are fishing, commerce, and tourism. It is expected that the
coefficients on this dummy variable will be positive in the informal sector compared to
the North-Eastern region. Finally, in the Central-Western region where agriculture, and
oil refining are the principal economic activities, it is anticipated that the expected signs
of the coefficients on this dummy variable will be positive for both labor markets
compared to the North-Eastern region because of generally greater economic activity.
Socio-economic conditions factors:

Heads of household
Female heads of household need to work for pay to support their family’s
dependents. I expected that the coefficients on this dummy variable will be positive
indicating that women are more likely to participate in both labor markets. Given the
inability of the Venezuelan economy to supply enough jobs in the period under study, we
expect that coefficient will be higher in the informal sector than in the formal one.
Socio-economic status
The omitted category is poverty. We expect that the coefficients on the other
dummy variables will be positive, indicating a greater likelihood of participating in both
labor markets as women achieve higher status in the socio-economic structure.
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Nonlabor income
According to the neoclassical theory of labor, the higher the amount of the
nonlabor income, the higher the reservation wage and the lower the probability of labor
force participation. Therefore, I expect negative signs for this variable indicating that
women are less likely to participate in both sectors.
Survey date
The period under study was characterized by high rates of inflation, successive
depreciations of the bolivar with respect to the American dollar, and, in general,
employment suffered as a result of the implementation of the Venezuelan Agenda. Since
the omitted category is 1995, I expect that the coefficients on the dummy variables for the
surveys conducted in 1997 and 1998 will be positive, indicating that women are more
likely to participate in both labor markets compared to their behavior in 1995. Moreover,
given the structural disequilibrium of the labor market, I expect that those coefficients
will be higher in the informal sector than those for the formal sector for all periods.
Interaction terms
This interaction variable is designed to capture the combined effects of nonlabor
income and survey dates. I expect to find that the higher value of the combined
interaction of nonlabor income and the survey date, the lower women’s labor force
participation will be in both market sectors.

4.4.5 Testing Hypothesis No. 3a

The binomial logit model is used to examine the decision to participate in the
labor force during the 1995-1998 period of three subsamples: married women, single
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women, and women heads of household. To test this hypothesis the three subsamples are
regressed on the same set of variables as described in section 4.4.3. It is assumed that
factors considered in this study affect each subsample in the same manner regardless of
the group to which they belong. Consequently, the predicted signs for the subsamples are
the same as those for the sample as a whole. However, in keeping with the predictions for
the marital status dummy variables, on the variables where positive coefficients were
predicted for the whole sample, we might expect to see smaller values for married
women than for the other two groups because it is assumed that wives have spousal
income. Moreover, we also expect that women heads of household will show larger
values for the same variables since they need to support their dependents.

4.4.6 Testing Hypothesis No. 3b

The multinomial logit model is again used to analyze the decision about whether
to work in the formal or informal sector of the labor market or be out of the labor force
for subsamples of married women, single women, and women heads of household. For
each of the three subsamples, the three labor force participation decision options are
regressed on the same set of variables as described in section 4.4.4. The predicted signs
for the coefficients of the regressors of the three subsamples are the same as those for the
sample as a whole, since it is assumed those factors affected Venezuelan women from
these three groups in the same manner.
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Chapter Five
Research Results

The results of the testing of the three hypotheses about Venezuelan women’s
labor force participation are presented in this chapter.
The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section describes the samples
used for the statistical analyses. The second section presents the empirical results of the
binomial and the multinomial logit models.

5.1 Description of the Samples Used for the Regression Equations

Table 1 shows the means and proportions of the variables for the main sample, i.e.
women aged 15 to 60 years old, and for the subsamples: married women, single women
and women heads of household. All variables were tested for the significance of
differences between the means and proportions of married and single women.97 The
results indicate significant differences at a 1 percent level or greater for nearly all
variables.
The results from the entire sample indicate that the largest proportion of women
(27 percent) is between 21 and 30 years of age. The largest proportion of married women
(32 percent) is between 31 and 40 years old, whereas the majority of single women (45

97

Tests of differences in proportions and means between women heads of households and the other two subsamples
were not performed because of some coincidences of observations among them. For instance, a woman head of
household may be either married or single.
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percent) are in the youngest age group, 15 to 20 years of age. The largest percentage of
women heads of household (36 percent) is between the ages of 41 and 50.
When we compare the subsamples, we find that as expected, there are more 15 to
20 year-old women among single women than among married women or heads of
household. There are also significantly more single women aged 21 to 30 (31 percent).
Among married women, the largest percentage is between the ages of 31 to 40 (32
percent), greater than among single women (13 percent), and greater than among heads of
household (27 percent). The results also indicate that there is a significantly greater
number of women heads of household between the ages of 41 to 60 than among the other
subsamples.
Table 1 also shows that less than half of all women have more than a primary
education. Twenty-three percent have completed secondary or high school education and
still fewer (11 percent) have graduated from college. Those who have completed a
technical education represent only 4 percent of the sample. Two-thirds of the married
subsample has no more than a primary education. Single women have the most
education: 26 percent have a high school education; 7 percent have a technical education;
and 15 percent have a college education. Women heads of household have the highest
proportion of women with no education, 11 percent.
Half of the total group of women is married, 38 percent are single, and 13 percent
are heads of household. Among women heads of household, 36 percent are divorced and
32 percent are single. Eighty-eight percent of women in the sample live in urban areas.
With respect to geographic location, the largest proportion of women lives in the Capital
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region (24 percent). The smallest proportions are found in the Insular and the Plains
regions, 1 and 3 percent, respectively.98
For the sample as a whole, 68 percent of women are of high and medium high
socio-economic status, 38 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Similar proportions are
observed in each of the subsamples. Finally, mean nonlabor income (which does not
include the income of other family members) is extremely small. Indeed, 92.4 percent of
the sample has none at all.
Table 1 also summarizes main differences in percentages of women working in
the formal or informal sector, and not working in the labor market at all. A larger
percentage of single women are out of the labor force than among any of the other
subsamples (45 percent). This group also has the lowest percentage of women working in
the informal sector of any of the other subsamples (12 percent), most likely because so
many of this group are young and still in school. Heads of household have the largest
percentage in the labor force, over 87 percent. Of these, most (56 percent) work in the
formal sector. Finally, 67 percent of married women participate in the labor market. In
general, more women from all three subsamples work in the formal sector than in the
informal sector, twice as many among married women and heads of household, and more
than three times as many among single women.99
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See Appendix A for more details about the characteristics and locations of the administrative regions in Venezuela.

99

These results contradict what the current literature suggests, i.e. that in Latin American countries, women’s
participation in the informal sector is greater than in the formal sector (CEPAL, 1999).
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Table 1

Description of Samples Used for Regression Equations
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Variable1
Age groups
15 to 20
21 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
51 to 60
Education
No education
Primary
Secondary
Technical
College
Marital status
Married
Cohabitors
Widows
Divorced
Single
Urban residence
Regions
Andean
Capital
Central
Central-Western
Insular
North-Eastern
Plains
Zulian
Head of household
Socio-economic status
High
Medium High
Average
Poverty
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income *
1997-1
Nonlabor income *
1997-2
Nonlabor income *
1998-1
Nonlabor income *
1998-2
Survey date
1995-1st half
1997-1st half
1997-2nd half
1998-1st half
1998-2nd half
N

1
a
c

All Women 15-60 Married Women

Single Women

Women Heads of
Household

.210
.273
.241
.179
.101

.064
.265
.323
.236
.113

.454a
.310a
.131a
.070a
.044a

.011
.091
.265
.358
.275

.055
.561
.227
.044
.113

.060
.615
.204
.031
.090

.041a
.483a
.264a
.065a
.147a

.114
.604
.158
.024
.099

.496
.012
.023
.087
.382
.877

.141
.035
.139
.362
.323
.889

.869

.883a

.115
.239
.127
.185
.012
.093
.027
.202
.132

.115
.233
.131
.181
.013
.093
.029
.205
.037

.118a
.241a
.127a
.197a
.010a
.093
.025a
.190a
.112a

.379
.303
.171
.147
0.06
(0.001)

.365
.297
.178
.160
0.03
(0.001)

.390a
.307a
.166a
.137a
0.05a
(0.001)

391
295
164
149
0 25
(0.004)

0.010
(0.0004)
0.010
(0.0004)
0.010
(0.0004)
0.011
(0.0004)

0.004
(0.0003)
0.005
(0.0004)
0.005
(0.0004)
0.006
(0.0005)

0.008a
(0.0005)
0.008a
(0.0005)
0.008a
(0.0005)
0.008a
(0.0005)

0.040
(0.002)
0.046
(0.002)
0.044
(0.002)
0.047
(0.002)

.236
.221
.173
.186
.184

.242
.216
.174
.184
.184

.239a
.227a
.167a
.185
.183

211
217
181
.197
.194

86,199

42,791

32,906

11,365d

119
263
116
182
.010
.090
.032
189

45.3
44.8
42.2
55.7
Formal sector (%)
18.9
22.1
12.4
31.5
Informal sector (%)
For exact definitions of variables see Appendix A.
Significantly different from married women at 1% level. b Significantly different from married women at 5% level.
Significantly different from married women at 10% level. d Includes women of all categories of marital status.
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5.2 Determinants of Women Labor Force Participation in Venezuela

Regression results are reported in four different sub-sections in accordance with
the hypothesis being tested.

5.2.1 Results of the Testing of Hypothesis No. 1

In this section, the determinants of women’s labor force participation
and their decision whether to work or not to work are discussed. There are
86,199 observations of which 64.2 percent are in the labor market.
Tables 2 and 3 depict the results of the logistic regression using the sample of
women between 15 and 60 years old.100 Due to the nonlinear nature of the model, the
discussion of the results focuses on the marginal probabilities of the variables instead of
on their coefficients. The most important factors determining Venezuelan women’s
propensity to participate in the labor force are the individual characteristics of age,
education and marital status. However, interesting insights can also be drawn from the
results of the other variables.
Examining first the age variables, we find that, as expected, women between 21 to
60 years old are more likely to participate than are the youngest women; among those,
women 31-40 years old are most likely with a marginal probability of 28.1 percent,
followed by women 41 to 50 years old with 25.2 percent.101 Consistent with the general
theory of human capital investment literature, the results show that education has a
powerful impact on labor force participation, and that the probability of participation
100

Similar results were found using a binomial probit model. See Tables B-1 and B-2 in Appendix B.
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The lower labor force participation rate among women in their fifties is consistent with the empirical evidence of
retirement from the labor force by women of this age group.
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increases with a greater educational attainment. There are very similar marginal
probabilities of participation, 21 to 23 percent, for women who have completed
secondary, technical and college education, compared to women with no education.
Marital status also influences a woman’s decision to participate in the labor force since
all dummy variables’ coefficients are statistically significant. Contrary to what was
expected, married and divorced women are more likely to participate in the labor market
than single women. Cohabitors’ marginal probability of labor force participation,
unexpectedly, is positive and significant. They are 13.3 percent more likely than single
women to participate in the labor market. Widows are 4 percent less likely to participate
in the labor market. Finally, the marginal probability of participation for divorced women
(16 percent) exhibits the largest difference from the single group of women, four times as
large as that of married women.102 Women living in urban areas are 3 percent more
likely to be in the labor market than rural residents. As for the geographic areas of
Venezuela, as expected, marginal effects of these dummy variables are positive and
significantly different from the North-Eastern area, except for the Insular region. The
highest marginal probabilities of labor force participation are found for women living in
the Andean, Central, and Central-Western regions with 8.1, 6.6, and 6.2 percentages
respectively. The Capital region has the smallest marginal probability with 2.4 percent.
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The presence of children is a constraint on the participation of married women. Unfortunately, the data used in this
project does not have this variable available.
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Table 2
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Coefficients
Sample: All Women 15-60
Va
aria
able

Coefficients

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
1.218***
31 to 40
1.573***
41 to 50
1.406***
51 to 60
0.773***
Educationb
Primary
0.671***
Secondary
1.089***
Technical
1.392***
College
1.234***
Marital status
Married
0.198***
Cohabitors
0.698***
Widows
-0.184***
Divorced
0.870***
0.143***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.387***
Capital
0.111***
Central
0.314***
Central-Western
0.290***
Insular
0.022
Plains
0.124**
Zulian
0.186***
1.381***
Head of household
Socio-economic status
High
0.085***
Medium High
-0.017
Average
-0.0001
-0.144***
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.037
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.012
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.119
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.167*
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.094***
1997-2nd half
0.254***
1998-1st half
0.374***
1998-2nd half
0.455***
-2.077***
Constant
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

0.021
0.025
0.025
0.033

56.77
63.52
50.74
23.88

0.034
0.038
0.053
0.042

19.48
28.70
26.07
29.10

0.019
0.085
0.060
0.040
0.025

10.19
8.18
-3.06
21.80
5.83

0.034
0.030
0.033
0.031
0.073
0.053
0.031
0.036

11.26
3.69
9.37
9.38
0.30
2.33
6.02
38.19

0.025
0.026
0.028
0.045

3.38
-0.66
-0.00
-3.20

0.093
0.091
0.094
0.094

0.40
0.14
1.26
1.78

0.023
0.027
0.027
0.027
0.054
86,199
97,140***
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4.04
9.46
14.11
17.00
-38.74

Table 3
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Marginal Effects
Sample: All Women 15-60
Variable

Marginal Effects

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.237***
31 to 40
0.281***
41 to 50
0.252***
51 to 60
0.150***
Educationb
Primary
0.149***
Secondary
0.211***
Technical
0.227***
College
0.219***
Marital statusc
Married
0.044***
Cohabitors
0.133***
Widows
-0.042***
Divorced
0.164***
0.032***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.081***
Capital
0.024***
Central
0.066***
Central-Western
0.062***
Insular
0.005
Plains
0.027**
Zulian
0.040***
0.241***
Head of household
Socio-economic statuse
High
0.019***
Medium High
-0.004
Average
-0.000
-0.032***
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.008
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.003
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.026
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.037*
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.020***
1997-2nd half
0.054***
1998-1st half
0.079***
1998-2nd half
0.095***
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

0.004
0.004
0.004
0.005

64.64
78.50
64.54
27.89

0.008
0.006
0.006
0.006

19.49
33.68
39.76
38.58

0.004
0.014
0.014
0.006
0.006

10.20
9.83
-2.99
26.74
5.73

0.007
0.007
0.007
0.006
0.016
0.011
0.007
0.005

12.00
3.73
9.84
9.73
0.30
2.38
6.15
52.75

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.010

3.38
-0.66
-0.00
-3.20

0.021
0.020
0.021
0.021

0.40
0.14
1.26
1.78

0.005
0.006
0.005
0.005
86,199
97,140***

4.08
9.77
14.79
18.06

As expected, women heads of household are more likely to participate in the labor
market with a marginal probability of 24 percent. Contrary to what was expected, women
103

of medium high and average status are not more likely to participate in the labor market
than are women of poverty status. Women of high status are only 2 percent more likely to
participate in the labor market. The reason for these unexpected outcomes may be either
that the impact of education overwhelms the variables103 or that the variables used to
construct the socio-economic index are not sufficient proxies of wealth.104 As predicted
by neoclassical theory, nonlabor income has a negative impact on labor force
participation. An additional dollar of nonlabor income per month is predicted to reduce
labor force participation by 3 percent. However, when this variable is interacted with the
survey dates, the net marginal probability of nonlabor income for the second survey of
1998 becomes positive, but very small, 0.5 percent. Finally, as expected, the marginal
probabilities of the dummies for the survey dates are increasingly positive, and
significantly different from 1995-1, ranging from 2 to 10 percent in the last period. This
behavior might be explained by women’s need to preserve the real income of the family
during this period, when the economic crisis deepened due to successive periods of
inflation and the devaluation of the bolívar.
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However, the correlations between education and the socio-economic variables are not high enough to preclude
including both sets of variables.
104

Javier Parra (2004) asserts that most studies of socio-economic status in Venezuela use measures and definitions
that are not exhaustive, and do not apply well to the current characteristics of the Venezuelan economy. According to
the author, it is imperative that more research be conducted in this area to allow for comparative analyses of the living
conditions of people and to contribute to an understanding of ways to overcome the economic difficulties faced by the
majority of the population. Better measures will facilitate decision-making on social policies and income redistribution.

104

5.2.2 Results of the Testing of Hypothesis No. 2

The full sample contains 86,199 observations. Forty-five percent of the women
work in the formal sector and 19 percent work in the informal sector.105 The dependent
variable in the labor force participation equation is a trichotomous variable, which takes
the value of zero if the woman is out of the labor market, one if she works in the informal
sector, and two if she works in the formal sector. A logit function is used for the
estimations. The regressors measure personal and demographic characteristics of the
individual women, as well as geographic factors and socio-economic conditions. As
discussed in the previous section, because coefficients are more difficult to interpret
given the nonlinear nature of the model, the discussion in this section will focus on the
marginal effects. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the coefficients and marginal effects from
the multinomial logit regression using the entire sample of women 15 to 60 years of
age.106 In terms of individual and demographic factors, the results indicate that women in
all age groups are significantly more likely to participate in the labor market than women
15 to 20 years old. However, the pattern is different in the informal and formal sectors. In
the informal sector, the participation of women in the labor force increases with age with
the highest marginal effects for the two oldest groups, 41 to 50, and 51 to 60 years of age,
with 12 and 11 percent, respectively. In the formal sector, however, the peak marginal
impact for age is for the two youngest groups of 21 to 30, and 31 to 40 years of age with
marginal probabilities of 19 and 18 percent, respectively. As expected, women 51 to 60
years old are only 4 percent more likely to work in the formal sector compared to the
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See Table B-6 in the Appendix B for details.
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Similar results using a multinomial probit model were found. See Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B for the results.
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youngest women. However, contrary to what was expected, women 51 to 60 years old are
just about as likely to work in the informal sector as women 31 to 50 years old. This is
probably because women of those ages do not receive the retirement benefits which are
available to women who have worked in the formal sector. Finally, for all age groups
except for the oldest, the marginal impacts of age on labor force participation are greater
in the formal sector than in the informal one.
With respect to education, as expected, all the dummy variables exhibit positive
marginal probabilities of labor force participation in the formal sector, but generally
negative, much smaller effects in the informal sector. The exception is women with only
primary education who are slightly more likely to participate in the informal sector than
are women with no education. As the level of education increases, women become more
and more likely to participate in the formal sector with marginal effects ranging from 15
to 34 percent. Women with technical and college degrees exhibit the highest marginal
probabilities of participation, 34 percent and 32 percent, respectively. These two groups
are also the least likely to participate in the informal sector. This is probably due to the
fact that employment in the formal sector is considered more desirable because of higher
wages and fringe benefits.

106

Table 4
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Formal Sector
Sample: All Women 15-60
Variable

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
1.246***
31 to 40
1.522***
41 to 50
1.307***
51 to 60
0.621***
Educationb
Primary
0.792***
Secondary
1.361***
Technical
1.725***
College
1.554***
Marital statusc
Married
0.109***
Cohabitors
0.726***
Widows
-0.223***
Divorced
0.881***
0.176***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.375***
Capital
0.189***
Central
0.266***
Central-Western
0.327***
Insular
0.115
Plains
0.091
Zulian
0.013
1.292***
Head of household
Socio-economic statuse
High
0.066***
Medium High
0.005
Average
0.012
-0.151***
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.029
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.054
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.190**
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.235***
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.073***
1997-2nd half
0.243***
1998-1st half
0.321***
1998-2nd half
0.357***
-2.506***
Constant
N
86,199
%
of total
-2 * log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.023
0.026
0.030
0.036

0.192 ***
0.182***
0.133***
0.036***

0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008

0.040
0.043
0.057
0.047

0.150***
0.278***
0.335***
0.315***

0.009
0.008
0.008
0.008

0.021
0.088
0.065
0.041
0.026

-0.012***
0.111***
-0.047***
0.122***
0.039***

0.005
0.017
0.013
0.007
0.006

0.036
0.032
0.036
0.033
0.077
0.057
0.033
0.038

0.053***
0.058***
0.024***
0.064***
0.050***
0.003
-0.047***
0.126***

0.008
0.007
0.008
0.007
0.017
0.013
0.007
0.007

0.027
0.028
0.030
0.048

0.005
0.008
0.005
-0.028***

0.006
0.006
0.007
0.010

0.099
0.094
0.098
0.098

0.002
0.022
0.053***
0.058***

0.020
0.020
0.020
0.020

0.025
0.028
0.028
0.028
0.059

0.004
0.033***
0.031***
0.019***

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006

39,036
45.3
160,147.98***
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Table 5
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Informal Sector
Sample: All Women 15-60
Variable

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
1.119***
31 to 40
1.701***
41 to 50
1.611***
51 to 60
1.051***
Educationb
Primary
0.528***
Secondary
0.523***
Technical
0.496***
College
0.466***
Marital statusc
Married
0.444***
Cohabitors
0.645***
Widows
-0.095
Divorced
0.880***
0.051
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.416***
Capital
-0.123***
Central
0.430***
Central-Western
0.195***
Insular
-0.266**
Plains
0.206***
Zulian
0.521***
1.583***
Head of household
Socio-economic statuse
High
0.129***
Medium High
-0.074**
Average
-0.025
-0.109*
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.058
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.096
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
-0.067
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.004
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.152***
1997-2nd half
0.291***
1998-1st half
0.510***
1998-2nd half
0.693***
-3.296***
Constant
N
86,199
% of total
-2 * log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.031
0.033
0.037
0.043

0.047***
0.110***
0.122***
0.113***

0.004
0.005
0.006
0.008

0.042
0.048
0.075
0.055

0.011*
-0.053***
-0.093***
-0.081***

0.004
0.006
0.006
0.005

0.027
0.107
0.071
0.048
0.034

0.057***
0.025*
0.005
0.047***
-0.008

0.004
0.014
0.009
0.006
0.005

0.046
0.042
0.045
0.042
0.109
0.071
0.041
0.042

0.029***
-0.034***
0.043***
-0.0008
-0.045***
0.024**
0.084***
0.119***

0.007
0.005
0.007
0.006
0.012
0.010
0.006
0.006

0.330
0.350
0.038
0.058

0.014***
-0.011***
-0.005
-0.003

0.004
0.004
0.005
0.007

0.116
0.116
0.118
0.112

0.006
-0.019
-0.027*
-0.020

0.014
0.014
0.014
0.013

0.032
0.037
0.036
0.036
0.072

0.017***
0.022***
0.050***
0.078***
16,303
18.91
160,147.98***
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0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005

Marital status affects women’s labor force participation in various ways. As
expected, compared to single women, being married has a small negative impact on labor
force participation in the formal sector. However, contrary to what was expected, we
found that married women are 6 percent more likely to participate in the informal sector
than single women. Cohabitating women also show unexpected behavior. Their marginal
probabilities of labor force participation are positive and significant in both sectors
although the marginal effect is higher in the formal sector (11 percent) than in the
informal sector (3 percent). Widows, as expected, are less likely than single women to
participate in the formal sector but, unexpectedly, their labor market behavior is not
significantly different from that of single women in the informal sector. Moreover,
contrary to what was expected, divorced women are more likely than single women to
participate in both sectors but the marginal probability is considerably higher in the
formal sector (12 percent) than in the informal sector (5 percent). The highest marginal
impacts of marital status on labor force participation are for divorced women in the
formal sector and for married women in the informal sector with 12 and 6 percent,
respectively. Finally, in general, all the effects of marital status are considerably larger in
the formal sector.
In terms of the impact of geographical factors on labor force participation, as
expected, women living in urban areas have a significantly positive marginal effect of
participating in the formal sector. However, there are no significant differences between
women living in rural areas and those living in urban areas with respect to being
employed in the informal sector. As for the geographic areas, as expected, in most
regions the marginal probabilities of labor force participation are statistically significantly
109

different from those of women living in the North-Eastern region. The exceptions are for
the Plains region in the formal sector and the Central-Western region in the informal
sector. The signs were almost all expected, except for the Insular region in the formal
sector. Women from the Central, Zulian, Andean and the Plains regions are more likely
to participate in the informal sector than women from the North-Eastern region. The
Zulian region exhibits the highest marginal probability of 8 percent and the Plains region
the lowest, with 2 percent. On the other hand, women living in the Capital and Insular
regions are less likely to participate in the informal sector with marginal effects of 3
percent and 5 percent, respectively. In the formal sector, women in almost all regions are
significantly more likely to participate in the labor market than women from the NorthEastern region. The Capital and the Central-Western regions exhibit the highest marginal
effects of labor force participation of approximately 6 percent. However, women in the
Zulian region are 5 percent less likely to participate in the formal sector. The Central
region shows the smallest significant difference from the North-Eastern region with a
marginal effect of only 2 percent.107
Women heads of household, as expected, are significantly more likely to
participate in both the informal and formal sectors; the marginal effects are almost
identical with 13 percent for the formal sector and 12 percent for the informal sector.
With respect to socio-economic status, contrary to what was expected, we find no
significant impact of these variables on the marginal probabilities of participating in the
formal sector. However, in the informal sector the pattern is different: women of the
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For detailed information about women’s sector-employment by regions, see Table B.5 in Appendix B.
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highest status are slightly more likely to participate, and those of medium high status are
slightly less likely to participate than are women of poverty status.
The nonlabor income variable shows the expected negative marginal effect on
labor force participation only in the formal sector. Labor force participation is reduced by
3 percent for every additional dollar of nonlabor income per month.108 When this variable
is interacted with the survey dates, the net marginal probabilities become positive and
significantly different from 1995-1 for the two survey periods in 1998.109 The only
significant marginal effect in the informal sector is for the first survey of 1998. At that
time, an additional dollar of nonlabor income per month is predicted to reduce labor force
participation by 3 percent.
Expected but interesting results are observed for the dummy variables associated
with the survey dates. In the informal sector, we see marginal probabilities of
participation increasing from 2 percent to 8 percent between the first survey of 1997 to
the second survey of 1998. Conversely, in the formal sector, the marginal effects decrease
slightly over these periods. All the probabilities of participation in the informal sector are
positive and increasingly greater than the probabilities of participating in the formal
sector. This increasing participation of women in the informal labor market through the
successive years is related to the level of economic activity during the period of this
analysis.110 In addition, the ability of the formal sector to provide jobs decreased due to
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This result seems like a very strong effect, but mean nonlabor income is only 6 cents per month.
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The same reasons pointed out for the results in the first hypothesis apply here, with net marginal effects of around 3
percent in the formal sector.
110
During this period the remedial policy entitled the Venezuelan Agenda was still being implemented. Miguel A.
Santos (2003) asserts that its implementation had an immediate negative effect on the GDP per capita of –2.3%. The
Venezuelan Agenda was accompanied by a small negative effect on the GDP in 1996 (0.2%), and positive effect in
1997 (6.1%) although there was some improvement of the oil activity due to the increase in oil prices and due to
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the costs associated with providing these jobs, i.e. contracting costs, health and retirement
benefits, etc.

5.2.3 Results of the Testing of Hypothesis No. 3a

In this section the determinants of labor force participation of married, single, and
women heads of household are discussed.

5.2.3.1 Results for Married Women

The subsample of married women includes 42,791 observations of which 67
percent participate in the labor market. Tables 6 and 7 show the coefficients and marginal
effects from the binomial logit regression for this group. The most important factors
affecting Venezuelan married women’s decision to participate in the labor market are
age, education, being heads of household, and the survey date. Many of these results are
similar to those of the full sample of women but there are some differences. For example
Table 7 shows no significant difference between the propensity to participate of women
51 to 60 years old and that of the youngest group. However, in the full sample, the
marginal effect of that age group is positive and highly significant at 15 percent.
The highest marginal probability of participation is among those married women 31 to 40
years old, and the lowest probability is among women 21 to 30 years old, prime child-

subsequent investment in this sector. Since the oil industry is a capital-intensive activity, this recovery was not able to
reduce the rates of unemployment in relation to the pre-adjustment period (second half of 1995). On the contrary, the
employment rate registered a sustained decrease from 1996 until the end of 1999. The unemployment rate of 10.2%
before the launching of the Venezuelan Agenda increased still further. During the seven periods of this study (first half
of 1996 to the first half of 1999), a total of 742,139 jobs were eliminated, 667,221 in the formal sector of the economy,
and 73,262 in the informal sector. During these three years, there was also a change in the composition of the
population employed in the informal sector, which increased from 48% of total employment in the second half of 1995
to 51% in the first half of 1999 (Santos 2003).
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bearing years. But even women in this age group are 7 percent more likely to participate
in the labor market than are the youngest women.
With respect to education, we found that the probabilities of labor force
participation for all levels of education are positive, increasing with the level of
education, and significantly different from the group of married women with no
education. The largest probability is shown for married women with a college degree,
with 28 percent, which is 6 percentage points higher than the marginal probability for
same group of women in the full sample. The lowest marginal probability of labor force
participation is found to be for married women with a primary education, who are still 10
percent more likely to participate in the labor force than those with no education.
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Table 6
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Coefficients
Subsample: Married Women
Variable

Coefficients

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.351***
31 to 40
0.697***
41 to 50
0.515***
51 to 60
-0.031
Educationb
Primary
0.472***
Secondary
1.106***
Technical
1.672***
College
1.916***
0.181***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.412***
Capital
-0.037
Central
0.324***
Central-Western
0.303***
Insular
0.141
Plains
0.083
Zulian
0.048
1.060***
Head of household
Socio-economic status
High
0.110***
Medium High
-0.031
Average
0.018
-0.136*
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.859***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.485***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.547
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.553***
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.101***
1997-2nd half
0.302***
1998-1st half
0.445***
1998-2nd half
0.551***
-1.030***
Constant
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.
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0.035
0.034
0.038
0.044

10.14
20.34
13.71
-0.71

0.044
0.050
0.090
0.067
0.033

10.66
21.90
18.55
28.67
5.51

0.048
0.041
0.046
0.043
0.099
0.071
0.042
0.071

8.64
-0.90
7.01
7.06
1.43
1.17
1.13
14.97

0.034
0.035
0.038
0.078

3.20
-0.88
0.48
-1.74

0.211
0.183
0.182
0.174

4.08
2.65
3.01
3.19

0.031
0.037
0.037
0.037
0.072
42,791
50,386.58***

3.23
8.26
12.18
14.90
-14.22

Table 7
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Marginal Effects
Subsample: Married Women
Va
aria
able

Marginal Effects

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.073***
31 to 40
0.142***
41 to 50
0.104***
51 to 60
-0.007
Educationb
Primary
0.103***
Secondary
0.204***
Technical
0.241***
College
0.276***
0.040***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.083***
Capital
-0.008
Central
0.066***
Central-Western
0.062***
Insular
0.030
Plains
0.018
Zulian
0.010
0.180***
Head of household
Socio-economic statuse
High
0.023***
Medium High
-0.007
Average
-0.004
-0.029*
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.184***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.104***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.117***
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.119***
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.021***
1997-2nd half
0.062***
1998-1st half
0.090***
1998-2nd half
0.110***
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

0.007
0.007
0.007
0.009

10.52
21.70
14.63
-0.70

0.010
0.008
0.007
0.005
0.007

10.52
26.34
33.27
50.40
5.39

0.009
0.009
0.009
0.008
0.020
0.015
0.009
0.009

9.31
-0.90
7.41
7.37
1.47
1.19
1.14
20.53

0.007
0.007
0.008
0.017

3.22
-0.88
0.48
-1.74

0.045
0.039
0.039
0.037

4.08
2.65
3.01
3.19

0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
42,791
50,386.58***

3.27
8.63
13.03
16.25

We find that married women living in urban areas have a slightly higher marginal
probability of participation than the full sample of women. Although almost all regional
dummy variables’ marginal probabilities for the full sample of women are significant and
positive, we find that marginal effects for married women are significantly different from
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the North-Eastern region only for the Central, Central-Western, and the Andean regions,
all of which are quite similar, varying only from 6 to 8 percent for the Central-Western
and the Andean regions, respectively.
Married women heads of household are 18 percent more likely to participate in
the labor market than married women who are not. This is 6 percentage points lower than
for the full sample of women. Results for the socio-economic status variables are similar
to that of the full sample of women: only married women of the highest status are more
likely to participate in the labor market than those of lowest status. Nonlabor income
shows a negative marginal probability similar to that of the whole sample. However,
when we interact the latter variable with the survey date (the interaction term variable)
for the subsample of married women, the net probabilities of participating in the labor
market are all significantly and, (inexplicably) strongly positive compared to 1995-1, for
all periods. (For the whole sample, the interaction terms were generally not significant.)
An additional dollar of nonlabor income per month is predicted to increase married
women’s labor force participation from 7.5 to 15.5 percentage points during the entire
period. Finally, survey date variables for married women exhibit positive and increasing
marginal probabilities ranging from 2 to 11 percent significantly different from the 19951 period. These marginal effects are generally stronger than those of the full sample of
women. The main reason for these stronger effects is the increases in the unemployment
rate, which affected the husbands’ income in the period under study, forcing married
women to increase their participation in the labor force to compensate for the loss of
family income.
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5.2.3.2 Results for Single Women

The subsample of single women contains 32,906 observations of whom 55
percent are in the labor market. Tables 8 and 9 show the coefficients and marginal effects
from the binomial logit regression using this subsample. Many of the marginal
probabilities are similar to those we found for the full sample of women. However, in
general, the effects are much stronger. With respect to the age variable, all age groups are
more likely to participate in the labor force than those ages 15-20. The marginal
probabilities range from 32 percent for the oldest women, to 42 percent for those between
31 and 40 years old. Women with all levels of education are significantly more likely to
participate in the labor force than are those with none. The highest marginal probability is
for those with a technical education, 32 percent; the lowest is among those with a college
education, at 26 percent.
Single women living in urban areas are 3 percent more likely to participate in the
labor market than are those living in rural areas, a result similar to that from the full
sample. As for the marginal effects of regional variables, we see positive marginal
probabilities for all regions, similar to those found for the full sample, although
considerably stronger. For instance, single women living in the Andean region are 11
percent more likely to participate in the labor force than those in the North-Eastern
region, versus 8 percent for the whole sample.
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Table 8
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Coefficients
Subsample: Single Women
Va
aria
able

Coefficients

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
1.821***
31 to 40
2.480***
41 to 50
2.629***
51 to 60
1.778***
Educationb
Primary
1.499***
Secondary
1.607***
Technical
1.694***
College
1.206***
0.117***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.484***
Capital
0.351***
Central
0.418***
Central-Western
0.347***
Insular
0.063
Plains
0.359***
Zulian
0.526***
1.523***
Head of household
Socio-economic status
High
0.043
Medium High
-0.026
Average
-0.019
-0.257***
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.592***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.079
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.229
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.256
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.091**
1997-2nd half
0.145***
1998-1st half
0.254***
1998-2nd half
0.330***
-3.055 ***
Constant
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.
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0.031
0.049
0.073
0.080

59.60
50.12
36.16
22.10

0.073
0.076
0.088
0.079
0.042

20.63
21.21
19.16
15.36
2.75

0.058
0.051
0.057
0.052
0.137
0.093
0.053
0.070

8.40
6.84
7.40
6.66
0.46
3.86
9.92
21.87

0.043
0.045
0.049
0.081

1.02
-0.58
-0.40
-3.17

0.177
0.169
0.185
0.187

-3.34
0.47
1.24
1.37

0.039
0.045
0.044
0.044
0.100
32,906
35,458.24***

2.33
3.20
5.75
7.45
-30.40

Table 9
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Marginal Effects
Subsample: Single Women
Va
aria
able

Marginal Effects

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.389***
31 to 40
0.423***
41 to 50
0.406***
51 to 60
0.322***
Educationb
Primary
0.349***
Secondary
0.344***
Technical
0.318***
College
0.258***
0.029***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.113***
Capital
0.084***
Central
0.099***
Central-Western
0.083***
Insular
0.015
Plains
0.084**
Zulian
0.123***
0.304***
Head of household
Socio-economic statuse
High
0.011
Medium High
-0.006
Average
-0.005
-0.063***
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.144***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.019
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.056
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.062
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.022**
1997-2nd half
0.035***
1998-1st half
0.061***
1998-2nd half
0.079***
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

0.005
0.005
0.005
0.009

71.34
86.04
75.51
35.59

0.015
0.013
0.011
0.014
0.010

22.63
26.03
29.60
18.75
2.73

0.013
0.012
0.013
0.012
0.033
0.021
0.012
0.010

8.87
7.00
7.73
6.84
0.46
4.04
10.42
30.75

0.010
0.011
0.012
0.020

1.02
-0.58
-0.40
-3.17

0.043
0.041
0.045
0.045

-3.34
0.47
1.24
1.37

0.009
0.011
0.010
0.010
32,906
35,458.24***

2.34
3.23
5.85
7.65

Socio-economic status has no significant impact on labor force participation for
this group. The impact of nonlabor income is twice as large for single women as for the
sample as a whole. However in this regression the interaction term between nonlabor
income and the period 1997-1 is significant and has the expected negative sign. An
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additional dollar of nonlabor income per month is predicted to reduce labor force
participation by 21 percent relative to first half of 1995. The coefficient on the interaction
term for the second half of 1998 is not significantly in this regression, in contrast to the
results for the whole sample. Regarding the survey date dummy variables, as expected,
the marginal probabilities are increasingly positive, and significantly different from 19951 ranging from 2 to 8 percent in the last period. These results are similar to those for the
whole sample.

5.2.3.3 Results for Women Heads of Household

Finally, the subsample of women heads of household consists of 11,365
observations of which 87 percent are in the labor market. Tables 10 and 11 display the
coefficients and marginal effects from the binomial logit regression using this subsample.
As noted earlier, this group has the highest rate of labor force participation of any
of the subsamples. We see a number of differences in the marginal effects of the marital
status variables, urban residence, regions, socio-economic status, interactions terms, and
the survey date, compared to the full sample of women.
Age variables again show positive marginal probabilities of labor force
participation compared to the youngest women. However, the group 41 to 50 years old
exhibits the highest marginal probability: they are 16 percent more likely to be in the
labor force whereas those of 31 to 40 years old have the highest marginal probability for
the full sample of women.
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Table 10
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Coefficients
Subsample: Women Heads of Household
Va
aria
able

Coefficients

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
1.644***
31 to 40
2.295***
41 to 50
2.092***
51 to 60
1.247***
Educationb
Primary
0.727***
Secondary
1.554***
Technical
1.948***
College
1.673***
Marital status
Married
-0.740***
Cohabitors
0.036
Widows
-0.833***
Divorced
0.124
0.013
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.147
Capital
-0.089
Central
0.198
Central-Western
0.098
Insular
-0.401
Plains
-0.263
Zulian
-0.044
Socio-economic status
High
-0.049
Medium High
-0.189*
Average
-0.155
-0.191**
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.542***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.410***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
-0.493***
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
-0.347**
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.018
1997-2nd half
0.196*
1998-1st half
0.367***
1998-2nd half
0.444***
-0.333
Constant
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

121

0.215
0.205
0.201
0.200

7.65
11.18
10.42
6.23

0.079
0.128
0.328
0.163

9.17
12.12
5.95
10.24

0.090
0.171
0.083
0.085
0.094

-8.25
0.21
-10.08
1.46
0.14

0.132
0.116
0.135
0.120
0.279
0.178
0.118

1.12
-0.77
1.47
0.82
-1.44
-1.48
-0.37

0.099
0.100
0.109
0.082

-0.50
-1.89
-1.42
-2.32

0.149
0.144
0.156
0.149

-3.63
-2.84
-3.17
-2.33

0.098
0.113
0.114
0.116
0.258
11,365
7,634.36***

0.18
1.73
3.22
3.83
-1.29

Table 11
Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Marginal Effects
Subsample: Women Heads of Household
Variable

Marginal Effects

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.087***
31 to 40
0.145***
41 to 50
0.157***
51 to 60
0.089***
Educationb
Primary
0.068***
Secondary
0.092***
Technical
0.085***
College
0.089***
Marital statusc
Married
-0.080***
Cohabitors
0.031
Widows
-0.093***
Divorced
0.011
0.001
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.012
Capital
-0.008
Central
0.016
Central-Western
0.008
Insular
-0.041
Plains
-0.025
Zulian
-0.004
Socio-economic statuse
High
-0.004
Medium High
-0.017*
Average
-0.014
-0.017**
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.047***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.036***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
-0.043***
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
-0.030**
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.002
1997-2nd half
0.016*
1998-1st half
0.029***
1998-2nd half
0.035***
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

0.007
0.010
0.014
0.012

12.96
13.85
11.03
7.38

0.008
0.005
0.006
0.005

8.46
17.80
14.47
17.58

0.012
0.015
0.011
0.007
0.008

-6.88
0.21
-8.17
1.49
0.14

0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.033
0.018
0.011

1.17
-0.75
1.56
0.84
-1.24
-1.34
-0.37

0.009
0.009
0.010
0.007

-0.49
-1.83
-1.37
-2.32

0.013
0.013
0.014
0.013

-3.63
-2.85
-3.17
-2.33

0.008
0.009
0.008
0.008
11,365
7,634.36***

0.19
1.83
3.53
4.28

Turning to the education variables, we see considerably smaller effects than the
whole sample. The highest marginal effects are for secondary education, technical
education, and college degrees, all approximately 9 percent. For the sample as a whole,
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the marginal effects for technical education and college education were both around 22
percent.
With respect to marital status, married and widowed heads of household are 8 and
9 percent, respectively, less likely to participate in the labor market than are single heads
of household. Cohabitors and divorced heads of household are not statistically different
from single heads of household, in contrast to the results from the full sample of women,
where they were significantly more likely to participate in the labor market.
Examining next geographical factors, we find that for women heads of household,
living in an urban area has no impact on labor force participation, in contrast to the full
sample for whom living in an urban area has a positive and significant effect. As for the
region variables, none of the marginal probabilities are significant. This contrast sharply
with the numerous regional differences found for the full sample of women.
Among the socio-economic status variables, only the marginal probability for
medium high status is significant, the negative sign indicates that women in this
group are less likely to participate in the labor force than heads of household classified as
being in poverty. These results differ considerably from those from the full sample of
women where we found a significant marginal probability only for women with high
status, indicating that they are 2 percent more likely to participate in the labor market.
The nonlabor income variable shows a negative marginal probability of 2 percent, similar
to the result obtained from the full sample of women. When we interact the nonlabor
income variable with the survey date, we find significant negative marginal probabilities
for all the periods under study, with the highest net effect on labor participation for the
first half of 1997 and the first half of 1998. For these periods, an additional dollar of
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nonlabor income per month decreases the likelihood of labor participation of women
heads of household by 6 percent. In contrast, the marginal effects of the interaction terms
in the full sample are not significantly different from the first half of 1995, except for the
second half of 1998 when there is a net positive effect on labor participation of 0.5
percent.
Finally, with respect to the survey dates, three of the four marginal probabilities
are positive and increasing with successive periods, a pattern similar to that of the full
sample.

5.2.3.4 Comparisons Among the Three Subsamples

Tables 7, 9, and 11 show the results of the binomial regressions for married
women, single women, and women heads of household.
Regarding age, we find similar results among the three subsamples although the
marginal effects are stronger for single women. As for education, the relative marginal
effects are similar for the three subsamples, but the magnitudes are considerably less for
women heads of household. For example, the marginal effect of having a secondary
education is 34 percent for single women, but only 9 percent for women heads of
household.
With respect to geographic factors, urban residence has a positive impact on the
labor force participation of married and single women but not of women heads of
household. As for the region dummy variables, we found considerable differences in
marginal probabilities of labor force participation for the three subsamples. Only for
single women did we find positive and significant probabilities of labor force
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participation for all regions, except for the insular region (which is not significant for any
of the three subsamples), compared to the North-Eastern region. None of the marginal
probabilities for the regional dummy variables are significant for women heads of
household.
Regarding the socio-economic status variables, we find positive marginal
probabilities for married women with high socio-economic status but negative marginal
probabilities for women heads of household compared to women living in poverty. The
marginal effects of the interaction term variables are positive and significant for married
women, but negative and significant for women heads of household. For single women,
only one of the interaction terms had a significant negative impact, for the period of
1997-1. Finally, turning to the survey date variables, we find all three subsamples of
women showing positive, significant, and increasing probabilities of participation in the
labor force compared to the 1995-1 period. Again, the Venezuelan economic crisis during
this period explains these impacts on the labor force participation.

5.2.4

Results of the Testing of Hypothesis No. 3b

In this section, regression results for married women, single women, and women
heads of household are discussed. In this case, the women’s decisions are whether to
work in the formal sector, the informal sector, or to be out of the labor force entirely.

5.2.4.1 Results for Married Women

The subsample of married women includes 42,791 observations of which 45
percent work in the formal sector, and 22 percent work in the informal sector. Tables 12
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and 13 show the coefficients and marginal effects from the multinomial logit regression
for married women.111
Married women in all age groups are significantly more likely to work in the
informal sector than are those 15 to 20 years old, as are those 21 to 50, in the formal
sector. Those 51 to 60 are 10 percent less likely and those 21-30 are more likely to be
employed in the formal sector. Older married women are more likely to work in the
informal sector with marginal probabilities fairly constant at around 10 percent for all age
groups. In the formal sector, we see the highest probabilities of participating for the two
youngest groups (at approximately 5 percent). In general, the marginal effects of age are
smaller in both regressions than for the full sample. The greatest differences show up in
the formal sector where the marginal effects are less than one third the size as the
corresponding effects for the whole sample among women 40 and younger, and become
non-significant or negative for the older age groups.
As for education, nearly all the marginal probabilities of labor force participation
in both markets are significantly different from those with no education. These results are
similar to those obtained for the full sample of women, except that women with only a
primary education are no longer more likely to work in the informal sector than are
women with no education. As in the whole sample, more education makes it more likely
that married women will participate in the formal sector and less likely to work in the
informal sector. The marginal effects of having a college or a technical degree are
somewhat stronger among married women with respect to the formal sector than among
the full sample.
111

This group is comprised of cohabitating women (in the American sense of the term) and women whose husbands are
living in the same household.
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The results show that living in an urban area has a positive, significant impact on
being employed in the formal sector but not in the informal sector, as
for the whole sample. Geographic region does have an important impact on the labor
market behavior of married women. For instance, those in the Capital and
Insular regions are 4 to 5 percent less likely to participate in the informal sector than
those in the North-Eastern region. Conversely, married women in the Zulian and Central
regions exhibit the highest marginal probabilities of participating in the informal sector
with 9 and 6 percent, respectively. In the formal sector, married women living in the
Capital, Andean, and Central-Western regions are more likely to be employed, with
marginal probabilities of 3, 5 and 7 percentages, respectively. Finally, married women
from the Zulian region are the most likely to work in the informal sector, and the least
likely to be employed in the formal sector. These results are similar to those obtained
from the full sample, except that in the formal sector the marginal probabilities of living
in the Central and Insular regions are not significant.
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Table 12
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Formal Sector
Subsample: Married Women
Variable

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
0.354***
31 to 40
0.599***
41 to 50
0.365***
51 to 60
-0.258***
Educationb
Primary
0.551***
Secondary
1.381***
Technical
2.041***
College
2.296***
0.208***
Urban residence
Regionsc
Andean
0.405***
Capital
0.042
Central
0.242***
Central-Western
0.354***
Insular
0.263***
Plains
0.026
Zulian
-0.184***
1.041***
Head of household
Socio-Economic statusd
High
0.065*
Medium-High
-0.012
Average
0.022
-0.1026
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.914***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.596***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.671***
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.690***
Survey datee
1997-1st half
0.068**
1997-2nd half
0.279***
1998-1st half
0.392***
1998-2nd half
0.450***
-1.469***
Constant
N
%
-2 * log likelihood
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
d=omitted category is poverty.
e=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.037
0.037
0.041
0.049

0.052***
0.048***
0.001
-0.100***

0.008
0.008
0.009
0.011

0.052
0.058
0.095
0.073
0.036

0.098***
0.270***
0.363***
0.388***
0.039***

0.012
0.012
0.013
0.010
0.008

0.052
0.045
0.050
0.046
0.105
0.079
0.047
0.075

0.053***
0.031***
0.006
0.066***
0.082
-0.014
-0.086***
0.114***

0.011
0.010
0.011
0.010
0.023
0.017
0.010
0.013

0.037
0.038
0.041
0.085

-0.003
0.004
0.005
-0.005

0.008
0.008
0.009
0.020

0.222
0.193
0.191
0.182

0.148***
0.127***
0.139***
0.143***

0.044
0.041
0.039
0.037

0.034
0.040
0.039
0.040
0.081

-0.001
0.030***
0.035***
0.026

0.008
0.009
0.009
0.009

19,161
44.8
84,714.50***
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Table 13
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Informal Sector
Subsample: Married Women
Variable

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
0.334***
31 to 40
0.895***
41 to 50
0.795***
51 to 60
0.350***
Educationb
Primary
0.384***
Secondary
0.590***
Technical
0.776***
College
1.053***
0.122***
Urban residence
Regionsc
Andean
0.425***
Capital
-0.211***
Central
0.475***
Central-Western
0.204***
Insular
-0.163
Plains
0.192**
Zulian
0.385***
1.085***
Head of household
Socio-Economic statusd
High
0.185***
Medium-High
-0.072
Average
0.010
-0.201*
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.774***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.205
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.263
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.280
Survey datee
1997-1st half
0.171***
1997-2nd half
0.356***
1998-1st half
0.549***
1998-2nd half
0.732***
-2.146***
Constant
N
%
-2 * log likelihood
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c= omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
d=omitted category is poverty.
e=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.046
0.045
0.049
0.057

0.021***
0.096***
0.107***
0.095***

0.007
0.007
0.009
0.011

0.055
0.064
0.097
0.083
0.044

0.012
-0.055***
-0.111***
-0.101***
0.0007

0.009
0.009
0.010
0.008
0.007

0.061
0.055
0.059
0.056
0.140
0.091
0.054
0.080

0.031***
-0.040***
0.061***
-0.002
-0.052***
0.032**
0.092***
0.068***

0.010
0.008
0.019
0.009
0.018
0.015
0.010
0.012

0.043
0.045
0.048
0.114

0.026***
-0.011*
-0.0005
-0.024

0.007
0.007
0.007
0.019

0.260
0.249
0.237
0.219

0.041
-0.025
-0.023
-0.022

0.036
0.037
0.034
0.031

0.042
0.048
0.047
0.047
0.094

0.023***
0.033***
0.056***
0.084***

0.007
0.008
0.008
0.008

9,474
22.1
84,714.50***

Married heads of household are significantly more likely to participate in both
markets, although the marginal effect is considerably stronger in the formal sector with
11 percent compared to 7 percent. The magnitude of the marginal effect in this case is
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virtually identical to that of the whole sample in the formal sector but considerably
smaller in the informal sector.
As for the whole sample, socio-economic status has no significant effect on the
probability of married women participating in the formal sector. Also similar to the whole
sample, high status married women are more likely to participate in the informal sector
but those of medium-high status are less likely to do so. Although all of these marginal
effects are small, the positive effect for high-status women is slightly larger for married
women than for the sample as a whole.
Unexpectedly, nonlabor income by itself is not statistically significant for married
women in either sector. However, for the interaction terms between the survey date and
nonlabor income, contrary to our expectations, we see positive marginal effects on labor
force participation for the formal sector. An additional dollar of nonlabor income per
month is predicted to increase the likelihood of being employed in the formal sector by
13 to 15 percent. The interaction variables have no impact on women’s labor force
participation in the informal sector. Compared to the whole sample, the marginal effects
of nonlabor income for married women have become significant for all 4 variables,
compared with only the latest two we saw in Table 4. Moreover, the coefficients are more
than twice as large. In any case, the signs of the coefficients and marginal effects are
counter to the predictions of economic theory and require additional explanation.
Examining finally the survey date variables, we find that the likelihood of
participating in the informal sector is positive and increasing throughout. By the second
half of 1998, married women are 8 percent more likely to work in the informal sector.
The magnitudes of these effects are similar to those of the whole sample. However,
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probabilities of being employed in the formal sector are positive and significant only for
the second half of 1997 and for the first half of 1998 at which times they were around 3
percent more likely to participate, marginal effects very similar to those of the entire
sample. The main difference we see is that for married women the dummy variable for
the last period is no longer significant.

5.2.4.2 Results for Single Women

The subsample of single women contains 32,906 observations of which 42
percent work in the formal sector, and 12 percent work in the informal sector. Tables 14
and 15 show the results from the multinomial logit regression for this group. The tables
illustrate that the marginal effects are, in general, significantly different from the omitted
categories of the age, education, urban residence and head of household dummy variables
in both markets. The impact of age on labor force participation is stronger in the formal
sector where marginal probabilities ranging from 21 to 33 percent, compared to the
informal sector where they range from 7 to 12 percent. However, in the formal sector the
lowest marginal effect on labor force participation is among those 51 to 60 years old,
while in the informal sector the lowest probability is found for the youngest age group.
Compared to the whole sample, the marginal probabilities of the age variables on
participation in the formal sector are much higher, while for informal sector are almost
identical.
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Table 14
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Formal Sector
Subsample: Single Women
Variable

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
1.846***
31 to 40
2.451***
41 to 50
2.570***
51 to 60
1.688***
Educationb
Primary
1.649***
Secondary
1.865***
Technical
1.996 ***
College
1.585***
0.154***
Urban residence
Regionsc
Andean
0.496***
Capital
0.427***
Central
0.409***
Central-Western
0.381***
Insular
0.115
Plains
0.392***
Zulian
0.432***
1.475***
Head of household
Socio-Economic statusd
High
0.042
Medium-High
-0.001
Average
-0.001
-0.256***
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.646***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.010
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.274
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.260
Survey datee
1997-1st half
0.091**
1997-2nd half
0.160***
1998-1st half
0.209***
1998-2nd half
0.251***
-3.524***
Constant
N
%
-2 * log likelihood
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
d=omitted category is poverty.
e=omitted category is the1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.032
0.051
0.075
0.084

0.326***
0.318***
0.289***
0.211***

0.007
0.009
0.012
0.012

0.065
0.083
0.095
0.070
0.045

0.325***
0.381***
0.389***
0.319***
0.040***

0.016
0.015
0.013
0.016
0.010

0.060
0.054
0.059
0.055
0.143
0.097
0.056
0.086

0.096***
0.106***
0.073***
0.082***
0.036
0.083***
0.054***
0.179***

0.014
0.012
0.014
0.012
0.034
0.022
0.013
0.012

0.045
0.047
0.052
0.084

0.008
0.006
0.004
-0.051***

0.010
0.011
0.012
0.018

0.189
0.176
0.189
0.192

-0.135***
0.015
0.065
0.052

0.042
0.038
0.040
0.041

0.041
0.047
0.046
0.046
0.108

0.017*
0.035***
0.026***
0.023**

0.009
0.011
0.010

13,882
42.2
53,647.16***

132

0.010

Table 15
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Informal Sector
Subsample: Single Women
Variables

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
1.706***
31 to 40
2.597***
41 to 50
2.800***
51 to 60
1.988***
Educationb
Primary
1.263***
Secondary
0.949***
Technical
0.768***
College
0.507***
-0.038
Urban residence
Regionsc
Andean
0.447***
Capital
0.012
Central
0.458***
Central-Western
0.226***
Insular
-0.148
Plains
0.244*
Zulian
0.811***
1.816***
Head of household
Socio-Economic statusd
High
0.51
Medium-High
-0.110
Average
-0.77
-0.238**
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.457**
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
0.318
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
-0.058
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.198
Survey datee
1997-1st half
0.095
1997-2nd half
0.092
1998-1st half
0.433***
1998-2nd half
0.621***
–4.092***
Constant
N
%
-2 * log likelihood
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
d=omitted category is poverty.
e=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.049
0.064
0.088
0.099

0.065***
0.110***
0.122***
0.113***

0.005
0.008
0.011
0.014

0.048
0.080
0.126
0.105
0.064

0.040***
-0.019***
-0.053***
-0.039***
-0.012*

0.008
0.008
0.008
0.008
0.007

0.086
0.080
0.085
0.079
0.241
0.144
0.078
0.079

0.018**
-0.022***
0.026***
0.002
-0.020
0.003
0.069***
0.124***

0.009
0.007
0.009
0.008
0.020
0.014
0.010
0.009

0.062
0.067
0.073
0.107

0.003
-0.011*
-0.008
-0.011

0.006
0.006
0.007
0.010

0.229
0.215
0.244
0.226

-0.013
0.033*
-0.009
-0.007

0.021
0.019
0.021
0.019

0.061
0.072
0.067
0.066
0.140

0.005
0.0008
0.036***
0.057***

0.006
0.007
0.007
0.008

4,078
12.4
53,647.16***

Turning to the education variables, we see similar strong positive marginal effects
of education in the formal sector, ranging from 32 to 39 percent, compared to those with
no education. In the informal sector, as in the two previous regressions, negative marginal
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probabilities were found, except for those with only a primary education, who were 4
percent more likely to participate. These negative effects are greater for higher levels of
education. For both sectors, the most significant effects are observed amongst single
women with a technical education, who are 39 percent more likely to be employed in the
formal sector and 5 percent less likely to work in the informal sector. In the formal sector
the positive marginal effects are generally stronger than those observed for the sample as
a whole whereas in the informal sector the negative marginal effects are weaker.
Single women living in urban areas are 4 percent more likely to be employed in
the formal sector, an almost identical result as that found for the whole sample. They are
1 percent less likely to work in the informal sector than are those living in rural areas. In
most geographic areas of Venezuela, single women are 5 to 11 percent more likely to
participate in the formal sector than in the North-Eastern region. The highest marginal
probability of 11 percent is found for those from the Capital region; the lowest
probability of 5 percent is exhibit by those from the Zulian region. For the whole sample,
women from the latter region are less likely to participate in the formal sector compared
to women living in the North-Eastern region while the marginal effect for single women
is positive.
Examining in more detail the informal sector, we find that, as expected, single
women living in the Capital region are less likely to participate than those women living
in the North-Eastern region. Positive and significant marginal probabilities of labor force
participation were observed among those from the Central, the Andean and the Zulian
regions with 3, 2, and 7 percent, respectively. These differences can be attributed to the
varying availability of resources and economic activities that exist in each region.
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Compared to the full sample, in general the marginal effects of region for single women
are larger in the formal sector but smaller and less significant in the informal sector.
Single women heads of household are significantly more likely to participate in
both sectors although the likelihood is higher in the formal sector with 18 percent
compared to 12 percent found in the informal sector, virtually the same pattern as in the
full sample. Also as in the full sample, socio-economic status has virtually no impact on
labor force participation in the formal sector.112 However, in the informal sector, single
women with medium-high socio-economic status show negative marginal probabilities of
participation indicating that they are less likely to participate than those living in poverty.
This unexpected result is also similar to that found for the full sample. The effect of
nonlabor income is negative, as expected, in the formal sector, but is not statistically
significant in the informal sector, as with the full sample. However, the negative effect is
nearly twice as large for single women. When we examine the interaction terms, in the
formal sector we find that only for the first half of 1997 is the variable significant. The
net effect of nonlabor income is particularly strong for this period: an additional dollar of
nonlabor income per month is predicted to reduce labor force participation 19 percent. In
contrast, for the whole sample, only the interaction terms for the last two periods (1998-1
and 1998-2) are significant (but positive). In the informal sector, the interaction terms are
generally insignificant as in the full sample.
Finally, the survey date variable shows greater marginal probabilities of
participating in the formal sector for single women after 1995. The highest marginal

112

Free education in Venezuela might explain this behavior. In other words, higher education allows women to have
access to employment in the formal sector regardless of socio-economic status. The so-called democratization of
education facilitated the entrance of women into the labor force.
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effect occurs during the second half of 1997 with 4 percent. This is generally the same
pattern observed for the whole sample. In the informal sector, the effects of time are
smaller and less significant than for the full sample with significant positive marginal
effects only for the last two periods of 1998, at 4 and 6 percent, respectively.

5.2.4.3 Results for Women Heads of Household

The final subsample of women heads of household accounts for 11,365
observations of which 55.7 percent work in the formal sector, and 31.5 percent, in the
informal sector.113 Tables 16 and 17 show the coefficients and marginal probabilities
from the multinomial logit regression for women heads of household.
There are considerable differences between the results for this subsample and the
results for the full sample. For example, this study finds that heads of household over 20
are no more likely to participate in either sector than are younger women. This lack of
significance may be due to the extremely small percentage of heads of household 20 and
younger.114

113

Table B.6 in Appendix B provides aggregate information from the three subsamples.

114

The results would doubtless be different if the omitted category were changed, but it was left the same as in the
previous regressions to facilitate comparisons between results for the three subsamples.
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Table 16
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Formal Sector
Subsample: Women Heads of Household
Variable

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
1.661***
31 to 40
2.303***
41 to 50
2.080***
51 to 60
1.204***
Educationb
Primary
0.947***
Secondary
1.974***
Technical
2.376***
College
2.148***
Marital Statusc
Married
-0.809***
Cohabitors
0.031
Widows
-0.944***
Divorced
-0.027
0.130
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.147
Capital
0.048
Central
0.220
Central-Western
0.188
Insular
-0.216
Plains
-0.309
Zulian
-0.309***
Socio-Economic statuse
High
-0.087
Medium High
-0.164
Average
-0.184
-0.213***
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.581***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.374***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
–0.379***
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
-0.312**
Survey datef
1997-1st half
-0.005
1997-2nd half
0.216*
1998-1st half
0.312***
1998-2nd half
-0.338***
-0.927***
Constant
N
%
-2 * log likelihood
***, (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.231
0.221
0.217
0.217

0.057
0.086
0.081
0.021

0.057
0.055
0.054
0.056

0.088
0.134
0.332
0.168

0.140***
0.263***
0.262***
0.296***

0.016
0.015
0.023
0.015

0.073
0.180
0.092
0.084
0.099

-0.075***
0.009
-0.102***
-0.005
0.060***

0.016
0.027
0.016
0.012
0.016

0.137
0.121
0.140
0.125
0.291
0.188
0.125

0.008
0.070***
0.019
0.051***
0.066
-0.040
-0.123***

0.021
0.018
0.021
0.019
0.050
0.032
0.020

0.103
0.104
0.114
0.087

-0.024
0.0002
-0.025
-0.022

0.016
0.016
0.018
0.015

0.160
0.151
0.151
0.157

-0.052*
-0.002
0.038
0.002

0.031
0.028
0.030
0.027

0.102
0.117
0.118
0.120
0.200

-0.009
0.016
-0.014
-0.037**

0.017
0.018
0.018
0.018

6,330
55.7
19,929.12***
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Table 17
Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Informal Sector
Subsample: Women Heads of Household
Variables

Coefficients

Age groupsa
21 to 30
1.663***
31 to 40
2.352***
41 to 50
2.192***
51 to 60
1.385***
Educationb
Primary
0.500***
Secondary
0.930***
Technical
1.249***
College
0.836***
Marital Statusc
Married
-0.707***
Cohabitors
-0.009
Widows
-0.748***
Divorced
0.060**
-0.145
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.149
Capital
-0.325***
Central
0.033
Central-Western
-0.033
Insular
-0.713**
Plains
-0.194
Zulian
0.244**
Socio-Economic statuse
High
0.016
Medium High
-0.218**
Average
-0.110
-0.159*
Nonlabor income (US$/month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
-0.482***
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.479***
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
-0.699***
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
-0.398**
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.053
1997-2nd half
0.194
1998-1st half
0.471***
1998-2nd half
0.614***
-1.057***
Constant
N
%
-2 * log likelihood
***, (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is the 1995-1 period.

Standard
Deviations
0.278
0.268
0.264
0.264

Marginal Effects
0.033
0.065
0.082
0.073

Standard
Deviations
0.058
0.055
0.054
0.056

0.087
0.139
0.349
0.178

-0.064***
-0.165***
-0.172 ***
-0.201***

0.015
0.014
0.022
0.014

0.102
0.188
0.096
0.088
0.102

-0.011
-0.008
0.002
0.008
-0.058***

0.015
0.025
0.015
0.011
0.016

0.143
0.128
0.146
0.131
0.332
0.195
0.127

0.005
-0.077***
-0.002
-0.041**
-0.104***
0.014
0.115***

0.020
0.017
0.020
0.018
0.043
0.030
0.020

0.107
0.109
0.118
0.093

0.020
-0.017
0.010
0.005

0.015
0.015
0.017
0.015

0.171
0.169
0.182
0.165

0.003
-0.035
-0.082***
-0.029

0.030
0.028
0.029
0.026

0.107
0.124
0.124
0.125
0.317

0.011
0.002
0.045***
0.073***

0.016
0.017
0.017
0.018

3,579
31.5
19,929.12***
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The education variables exhibit strong positive marginal probabilities in the
formal sector, and strong negative impacts in the informal sector.115 The marginal
probabilities of participation increase in magnitude with the level of education in both
sectors. For instance, a woman head of household with a college education has the
highest marginal probability of participating, 30 percent in the formal sector, and -20
percent in the informal sector. In the formal sector, the marginal impacts of education are
slightly larger in this subsample than in the full sample. In the informal sector, the
negative impacts are considerably larger for this group.
Married and widowed heads of household are 8 and 10 percent, respectively, less
likely to participate in the formal sector than single heads of household, similar results as
for the full sample but with larger magnitudes for this subsample. However, unlike the
full sample, cohabitors and divorced heads of household are not significantly more likely
to participate in the formal sector than single heads of household.
Also unlike in the full sample, for heads of household marital status is not
significantly related to participation in the informal sector. This result may be due to the
extremely small percentage of single heads of household working in the informal sector
(3 percent).116
Living in an urban area increases the likelihood that a woman head of household
will be employed in the formal sector by 6 percent, and decreases the probability of

115

Thus their incentive to acquire more education, as it allows them to earn more competitive wages. This
is not the topic of this study but it is important to mention it.

116

Only 117 single heads of household participate in the informal sector from a total of 3,670 single
women heads of household working in both sectors.
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working in the informal sector by the same amount, larger and more significant impacts
than for the whole sample.
Turning to the regional variables, we find positive marginal probabilities of
participation in the formal sector for women heads of household living in the Capital and
Central-Western regions, indicating that they are more likely to participate than those
living in the North-Eastern region. In contrast, women heads of household living in the
Zulian region are 12 percent less likely to work in the formal sector. As we compare
these results to those from the full sample of women, we find that fewer regions from the
subsample are significant but the signs and magnitudes of these coefficients are generally
consistent with those of the larger sample. As for the informal sector, on the other hand,
women living in the Zulian region are 12 percent more likely to work in the informal
sector, and those from the Capital, the Central-Western and Insular regions are less likely
to do so, with marginal probabilities of –8, -4, and –10 percent, respectively. Although
results from the full sample show statistical significance for more of the region variables,
the coefficients for these four regions are larger and more significant in this subsample.
As in the full sample, socio-economic status for women heads of household is not
significantly related to labor force participation in the formal sector. However, unlike in
the full sample, neither does socio-economic status impact participation in the informal
sector.
Nonlabor income by itself does not impact participation in either sector for this
subsample, unlike the full sample where it has the expected negative influence on being
employed in the formal sector.
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Examining nonlabor income interacted with the survey date, negative probability
of participation in the formal sector is found for women heads of household only for the
first half of 1997, indicating that an additional dollar of nonlabor income per month
variable decreases the probability of participation by 5 percent. These results differ
considerably from those for the full sample where it is interaction terms for 1998 that are
significant in the formal sector. Women heads of household show a negative marginal
probability of participation in the informal sector only in the first half of 1998, indicating
that an additional dollar of nonlabor income per month decreases the probability of
participation by 8 percent compared to 1995. This result is similar to that for the full
sample except the impact is over twice as larger for women heads of household.
Turning to the survey date variables, we see that women heads of household are 4
percent less likely to participate in the formal sector for the second half of 1998 than
during the first half of 1995. This contrasts with results from the full sample that show
positive marginal probabilities of participation in the formal sector after the second half
of 1997. As for the informal sector, women heads of household are 5 to 7 percent more
likely to participate in 1998-1 and 1998-2 than in 1995-1. The coefficients are slightly
smaller and generally less significant than those for the same variables for the full
sample. As discussed earlier, the reason for these outcomes is likely the increases in the
unemployment rate during those time periods and the inability of the formal sector to
absorb labor.
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5.2.4.4 Comparisons Among the Three Subsamples

Tables 12, 14, and 16 show the results of the multinomial regressions for the labor
market behavior of married, single, and women heads of household in the formal sector.
These results show that among both married and single women age generally has
a strong impact on their participation in this sector, although the marginal effects of the
latter group are considerably stronger than in the former. For instance, single women 3140 are 32 percent more likely to participate in this sector, whereas married women of the
same ages are only 5 percent more likely to do so. Among both subsamples those of all
ages are more likely to be participate than the youngest women except for married
women 51 to 60 who are 10 percent less likely to do so.117
Turning to the education variables, women from all three subsamples are more
likely to work in the formal sector than those with no education, with marginal
probabilities increasing with the level of education. Married women with a college
education and single women with a technical education exhibit the highest marginal
effects on participation. In general, education has a somewhat smaller impact on
participation in the formal sector among women heads of household than among the other
two groups.
Living in an urban area has similar effects for all three subsamples with marginal
probabilities varying only from 4 to 6 percent. As for the geographic areas, living in the
Insular region has no significant impact on participation in the formal sector for any of
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As discussed in the previous section, the age variables may not be significant for heads of household
because the sample size of the omitted category is so small: only 1 percent of heads of household are under
21 years old.
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the subsamples. As for the other regions, we see generally the largest marginal effects
among single women: those in all regions are 5 to 11 percent more likely to participate
than single women living in the North-Eastern region. Fewer of the marginal effects are
significant among married women and women heads of household but among both of
these groups we see a significant negative effect for living in the Zulian region.
Ceteris paribus, socio-economic status has no impact on the labor force
participation in the formal sector for women of any of the three subsamples.
To see the full effect of nonlabor income we need to examine the net effect of the
nonlabor income variable plus the interaction terms. Nonlabor income has the expected
negative impact generally only among single women, one that is particularly strong in the
first half of 1997. Unexpectedly, it has a strong positive impact among married women.118
Finally, the survey date variable has positive and significant marginal effects on
the participation of single women for all periods, indicating greater participation than in
1995. The results for the other subsamples are mixed and less consistent.
Tables 13, 15, and 17 show the results of the multinomial regressions for married,
single, and women heads of household with respect to their participation in the informal
sector. As in the formal sector, age has a significant impact only for the subsample of
single and married women. However, unlike in the formal sector, the marginal effects of
age are generally quite similar for the two groups.
Education has a strong impact on labor force participation in this sector as well as
in the formal sector. However, unlike in the formal sector, the impact is generally
negative. These marginal effects are considerably stronger among heads of household: a
118
This result may be caused by the atypical nature of households with any nonlabor income, only 7 percent
of the whole sample. Recall that spouse’s income is not included in this variable.

143

woman head of household with a college degree is 20 percent less likely to participate in
the informal sector whereas a single woman with the same education is only 4 percent
less likely to do so.
Single women and women heads of household living in urban areas are
significantly less likely to participate in the informal sector than are those living in rural
areas. This effect is considerably stronger for the latter group.
As for the geographic areas, we see some similarities in the results for all three
subsamples. For example, women living in the Capital and Insular regions are less likely
to participate in the informal sector, and those living in the Zulian region are significantly
more likely to do so. Although there is considerable variability in the levels of
significance of the results for the other dummy variables, women living in the Central,
Andean and Plains regions seem more likely to participate in this sector and those in the
Central-Western region, less likely to do so. More of the regional dummy variables are
significant for married women than for women in the other subsamples, probably since
this group is more likely to be place-bound. In general the marginal effects are largest
among women heads of household and smallest among single women.
Socio-economic status (as measured by this survey) seems to have no consistent
impact on participation in the informal sector for any of the subsamples. High status
married women are slightly more likely to be employed in the informal sector than those
of poverty status. However, both single and married women of medium high status are
slightly less likely to do so. Nonlabor income (either alone or interacted with the survey
date) also has no consistent impact on participation in the informal sector.
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Finally, marginal probabilities associated with dates of the survey are all positive
generally significant, and increasing with time for all three subsamples. These effects are
particularly pronounced among married women.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions

This chapter summarizes the main findings regarding the determinants of female
labor force participation in Venezuela during the second half of 1990s. Limitations and
opportunities for future research are also discussed.

6.1 Main Findings

This dissertation is the first attempt to investigate the labor behavior of
Venezuelan women at the end of the last century using micro data from 1995-1998. The
decision to participate or not to participate in the labor market is studied for the whole
sample of women 15-60 years old and also for subsamples of married women, single
women and women heads of household. Labor force participation in the formal and
informal sectors is also analyzed using the same groups.
The main findings drawn from this study are summarized below, organized by the
explanatory variables:

6.1.1 Age

Age is one of the most important determinants of labor force participation of
women. With respect to the simplest decision of whether to work or to be out of the labor
market, as expected, the results indicate that women of all ages are significantly more
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likely to participate in the labor market than are women 15 to 20 years old. Women 31 to
40 years old show the highest marginal probability, 28 percent. In general, married and
single women follow the same pattern although the marginal effects are much stronger in
the latter group. For example, the marginal probability associated with the 31-40 year age
group is three times higher (42 percent versus 14 percent). In contrast, among women
heads of household, those 41 to 50 years old are the ones exhibiting the highest marginal
probability of participation. We also note some differences between the full sample of
women and women from the three subsamples with respect to the lowest probability of
participation. For the whole sample, women 51 to 60 years old are the ones with the
lowest marginal probability, only 15 percent more likely to participate than those 15-20
years old. We see the same pattern among single women and women heads of household;
for married women the marginal probability is insignificant. As before, the impact is
considerably larger for single women, with a marginal probability of 32 percent
compared with only 9 percent for women heads of household.
When women face a three-way choice, to participate in the formal sector, to
participate in the informal sector, or to be out of the labor market, age impacts women’s
labor force participation in the formal and informal sectors differently. The impact of age
on labor force participation is generally greater in the formal sector than in the informal
sector. A number of other differences can be seen. For example, for the full sample,
participation in the informal sector increases with age whereas those 21 to 40 are most
likely to participate in the formal sector. Turning to the subsamples, the results show that
among married women, the marginal effects of age are smaller in both sectors than in the
full sample. The greatest differences are found in the formal sector where the marginal
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effects are less than one third the size of the corresponding effects for the whole sample
among women 21 to 40 years old, and become insignificant or negative for the older
groups. However, in the informal sector, married women over 30 years old are
significantly more likely to participate than the youngest women, with generally larger
marginal effects than in the formal sector. In contrast, the impact of age on the
participation of single women is stronger in the formal sector than in the informal sector
and stronger than for the sample as a whole.
Contrary to what was expected, women heads of household over 20 are no more
likely to participate in either sector than are younger women. The extremely small
percentage of women heads of household 20 years old and younger doubtless explains
this lack of significance.

6.1.2 Education

In general, consistent with the theory of human capital investment literature, the
results of this study show that education has a strong impact on women’s decision to
participate in the labor market. Examining first the two-way choice, we find that the
marginal probabilities are positive and generally increasing with greater educational
attainment both for the whole sample and for the three subsamples. However, there are
some interesting differences. In general, the highest marginal probabilities are found for
women with a technical or a college education (22-23 percent). Examining next the
subsamples, we find that among married women the highest marginal effect (28 percent)
is clearly for those with a college degree. Among single women, the highest probabilities
are for those with only a primary or secondary education, with 34-35 percent marginal
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probabilities. It is noteworthy that education exerts considerably smaller effects on
women heads of household than among women from the other subsamples. Among this
group the highest marginal probabilities are only 9 percent for those with secondary,
technical and college educations.
When women face a three-way decision, the education variables exhibit positive
marginal probabilities of labor force participation in the formal sector ranging from 15 to
34 percent, generally increasing with level of education. In contrast, for levels of
education higher than primary we find negative effects in the informal sector ranging
from 5 to 9 percent with the largest marginal effects associated with the highest level of
education. For the sample as a whole, both the largest positive and largest negative
marginal probabilities are found for women with technical degrees in the formal and
informal sector, respectively. Considering next the results of the three subsamples, we
find similar patterns in the formal and informal sectors as for the full sample: women
from all three subsamples are more (less) likely to participate in the formal (informal)
sector than those with no education, with marginal probabilities increasing in magnitude
with the level of education. For example, married women exhibit positive and increasing
significant probabilities of participation in the formal sector with the highest marginal
probability of 39 percent for those with a college degree, higher than the 32 percent for
the whole sample. In the informal sector, the highest negative effects are found among
married women with technical and college educations with marginal probabilities of 1011 percent, slightly larger effects than we find for the whole sample. Among single
women in the formal sector the marginal effects of education are larger than among the
full sample. The greatest difference is for those with a primary education where the
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marginal effect is 33 percent compared to 15 percent for the whole sample. The general
negative impacts of education upon participation in the informal sector are smaller among
single women than among the whole sample. However, single women with only a
primary education are three times as likely to work in the informal sector as was true for
the whole sample. Finally, for women heads of household in the formal sector the
marginal probabilities associated with education are somewhat smaller than those of the
full sample. In the informal sector, magnitudes of the marginal effects are all negative
and considerably larger for this subsample than for the whole sample.
Comparing the results among the three subsamples, single women with technical
degrees and married women with college degrees exhibit the highest marginal
probabilities of participation in the formal sector with 39 percent each. These two groups
are also among those least likely to participate in the informal sector. In general,
education has a somewhat smaller impact on participation in the formal sector among
women heads of household than among women of the other two groups. In the informal
sector, on the other hand, the negative impacts are considerably larger for this group. For
instance, a woman head of household with a college degree is 20 percent less likely to
participate in the informal sector whereas a single woman with the same education is only
4 percent less likely to do so.

6.1.3 Marital Status

Considering first the impact of the marital status variable on women’s decision to
participate in the labor market for the full sample of women, we see results that are
contrary to what expected. For instance, ceteris paribus, married and divorced women are
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more likely to participate in the labor market than single women with marginal
probabilities of 4 and 16 percent, respectively, and cohabitors’ marginal probability of
labor force participation is positive and significant (13 percent). However, some results
are as expected: widows are less likely to participate in the labor market (-4 percent).
Examining the subsample of heads of household, we see that married and widowed heads
of household are less likely to participate in the labor market than are single heads of
household with marginal probabilities of 8 and 9 percent, respectively. Cohabitors and
divorced heads of household are not statistically different from single heads of
household, in contrast to the results from the full sample of women, where they were
significantly more likely to participate in the labor market.
Considering next the three-way choice of women to participate in the formal
sector, informal sector, or not to participate at all, we find that being married or widowed
has a small negative impact on participation in the formal sector with marginal
probabilities of -1 percent and -5 percent, respectively. However, married women are
more likely to participate in the informal sector than are single women. Cohabitating
women are more likely than single women to participate in both sectors, although the
marginal effect is higher in the formal sector (11 percent versus 3 percent). Widows, as
expected, are less likely than single women to participate in the formal sector but,
unexpectedly, their labor market behavior is not significantly different from that of single
women in the informal sector. Divorced women are also more likely than single women
to participate in both sectors but the marginal probability is considerably higher in the
formal sector (12 percent versus 5 percent). The highest marginal impacts of marital
status on labor force participation are for divorced women in the formal sector where they
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are 12 percent more likely to participate than single women. The effects of marital status
are generally considerably larger in the formal than in the informal sector.
Finally, with respect to the head of household subsample, married and widowed
heads of household are less likely to participate in the formal sector than single heads of
household, similar results as for the full sample but with larger magnitudes for this
subsample. However, unlike in the full sample, cohabitors and divorced heads of
household are not significantly more likely to participate in the formal sector than single
heads of household. Also unlike in the full sample, for heads of household marital status
is not significantly related to participation in the informal sector. This result may be due
to the extremely small percentage of single heads of household (the omitted category)
working in the informal sector.

6.1.4 Urban Residence

Living in an urban area increases the likelihood that women as a whole participate
in the labor market by 3 percent. Results for married and single women show similar
marginal probabilities, but for women heads of household this variable has no significant
effect.
Regarding the decision to participate in the formal or in the informal sector, we
find considerable differences between the sectors. The marginal effect of living in an
urban area on participation in the formal sector is positive for the full sample (4 percent),
whereas the variable has no significant impact in the informal sector. When we compare
these results to those from the subsamples, we find similar positive marginal probabilities
of participation in the formal sector with the highest one among women heads of
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household at 6 percent. However, there is considerable disparity among the subsamples
with respect to participation in the informal sector. Single women and women heads of
household living in urban areas are significantly less likely to participate in the informal
sector than are those living in rural areas. This effect is considerably stronger for the
latter group and definitively contrary to what was found in the full sample. However as in
the full sample, the variable is not significant for the subsample of married women.

6.1.5 Regions

We find considerable differences among regions that can be attributed to the
varying availability of resources and economic activities that exist in each region. In
general, for all women, as expected, almost all of the marginal effects of these dummy
variables are positive and significantly different from the North-Eastern area. The highest
marginal probabilities of labor force participation are found for women living in the
Andean, Central, and Central-Western regions. The Capital region has the smallest
marginal probability. As for the three subsamples, we also find considerable differences.
Only among single women did we find positive and significant probabilities of labor
force participation for all regions, except for the Insular region (which is not significant
for any of the three subsamples), compared to the North-Eastern region. None of the
marginal probabilities for the regional dummy variables are significant for women heads
of household. This contrasts sharply with the numerous regional differences found for the
full sample of women. Probably women who are heads of household have little choice
about working, regardless of where they live.
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For the whole sample facing a three-way choice decision, those living in all
regions except for the Zulian and Plains regions are more likely to be employed in the
formal sector than those living in the North-Eastern region. Only the Zulian region are
women less likely to be employed in the formal sector. As for the informal sector,
positive significant marginal probabilities are found for women living in the Central,
Zulian, Andean and the Plains regions. Those in the Zulian region are 8 percent more
likely to be employed in this sector; those in the Plains region are only 2 percent more
likely. Negative marginal effects are found for women living in the Capital and the
Insular regions.
Comparing results of each subsample to those from the full sample, the marginal
effects of region on participation in the formal sector are almost all significant, all larger
than in the full sample, and all positive, even in the Zulian region. Among married
women fewer of the regional variables are significant than in the full sample, but the
signs are generally consistent. Only three of the marginal probabilities for women heads
of household are significant, but their signs are consistent with those of the whole sample.
However, heads of household living in the Zulian region are considerably less likely to be
employed in the formal sector than for the sample as a whole, -12 percent compared to -5
percent.
As for the marginal probabilities of participation in the informal sector, for
married women we find generally similar but larger marginal effects than the results from
the full sample. For women heads of household, only 4 out of the 7 regional marginal
probabilities are significant but the signs are consistent with those of the full sample. In
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general, the marginal effects for this subsample are stronger than those from the whole
sample.
Turning next to a comparison of results from the subsamples, in the formal sector,
we see generally the largest marginal effects among single women, all positive effects
varying from 5 to 11 percent. Fewer of the marginal effects are significant among
married women and women heads of household but among both of these groups we see a
significant negative effect associated with living in the Zulian region.
As for the impact of region on the decision to participate in the informal sector,
we also see some similarities in the results for all three subsamples. For example, women
living in the Capital and Insular regions are less likely to participate in the informal sector
and those living in the Zulian region are significantly more likely to do so. Although
there is considerable variability in the levels of significance of the results for the other
variables, women living in the Central, Andean and Plains regions seem more likely to
participate in this sector and those in the Central-Western region, less likely to do so.
More of the regional dummy variables are significant for married women than for women
in the other subsamples, probably since this group is more likely to be place-bound. In
general the marginal effects are largest among women heads of household and smallest
among single women.

6.1.6 Heads of Household

Our analysis of the whole sample indicates that women heads of household are 24
percent more likely to participate in the labor force than are those who are not. As
expected, we find significant results for the subsamples as well, but with widely disparate
155

magnitudes: a marginal probability of 30 percent for single women but only 18 percent
for married women.
With respect to the three-way choice model, we find that all women heads of
household are significantly more likely to participate in both sectors, with marginal
probabilities of 11-12 percent. In the subsamples of both married and single women,
being head of household has a similar effect, although the marginal effect is considerably
stronger in the formal sector, 11 percent for married heads of household and 18 percent
for single heads of household. For married heads of household the magnitude of the
marginal effect is virtually identical to that of the whole sample in the formal sector but
considerably smaller in the informal sector. For single heads of household the marginal
effect in the formal sector is very close to that of the whole sample, but considerably
larger in the formal sector.

6.1.7 Socio-economic Status

Considering first the decision of women whether to participate in the labor market
or not, we don’t find much impact for socio-economic status. The only significant
marginal effect is for women of high socio-economic status who are 2 percent more
likely to participate than women living in poverty. Results for the three subsamples are
not consistent: married women exhibit results nearly identical to those of the full sample,
women heads of household of medium high status are 2 percent less likely to participate,
but the set of variables has no significant impact on the labor force participation of single
women.
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With respect to the three-way choice, this variable has no impact on participation
in the formal sector either for the whole sample or for any of the subsamples. High status
married women are slightly more likely to be employed in the informal sector than those
of poverty status. However, there is no consistent effect on participation in the informal
sector for any subsample: both single and married women of medium high status have
negative marginal probabilities but socio-economic status has no impact for women
heads of household.

6.1.8 Nonlabor Income and the Interaction Terms

To see the full effect of nonlabor income we need to examine the net effect of the
nonlabor income variable plus the interaction terms. The results for the whole sample of
women in their decision to participate in the labor force are generally negative, as
expected, indicating that women in general are 3 percent less likely to participate for
every additional dollar of income per month.119 As for the subsamples, similar patterns
are found for single women and women heads of household with negative marginal
probabilities for all periods. Unexpectedly, marginal probabilities are positive for married
women for all periods after 1995.
Turning next to the 3-way choice model, we find conflicting results. The net
marginal probabilities of participation in the formal sector for the whole sample of
women are negative for the survey periods of 1995 and 1997, but become positive and
significantly different from 1995-1 for the two survey periods in 1998. Single women
show the expected negative marginal probabilities for the entire period including a
119

This sounds like a large impact but recall that 92 percent of the sample has no nonlabor income at all.
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particularly strong effect during the first half of 1997. Unexpectedly, married women
exhibit positive strong marginal effects on participation in this sector throughout all
periods. Nonlabor income has, in general, no impact on participation in the formal sector
by women heads of household.
Nonlabor income generally has no impact on participation in the informal sector,
either for the whole sample of women or for the subsamples.

6.1.9 Survey Date

This variable is used to see the effect of time on the labor force participation
decision of women in Venezuela. Results for the two-way choice model show, as
expected, that the marginal probabilities of the dummies for the survey dates are
increasingly positive and significantly different from 1995-1 for the whole sample.
Similar results are found for the three subsamples. Married women show generally
stronger marginal probabilities than those of other subsamples. This behavior might be
explained by wives’ desire to preserve the real income of the family during this period
when the economic crisis deepened due to successive periods of inflation and the
devaluation of the bolívar.
Considering next the 3-way choice model, for the full sample, in both the formal
and informal sectors, the survey date variable generally has positive, significant
increasing marginal effects for all periods, indicating greater participation than in 1995.
The effects which are generally stronger, more significant and monotonically increasing
in the informal sector can be attributed to increases in the unemployment rate in the
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formal sector during those time periods and the increasing inability of the formal sector to
absorb labor.
The regressions for the subsamples yield mixed and less consistent results.
Married and single women are generally more likely to participate in the formal sector
over time. Women heads of household seem less likely to do so, but only one of the
marginal probabilities is significant. However, the results for the informal sector
generally resemble those of the whole sample in that the marginal probabilities are
significant and increase over time. These effects are stronger, more significant and
clearly monotonically increasing among married women.

6.2 Limitations
6.2.1 The Presence of Children

Although, the Venezuelan data contains information about children, there is no
means of linking this data to that of individual women. Consequently, this study cannot
shed any light on the impact of children on labor force participation in general or in a
particular sector by those who are mothers.

6.2.2 Socio-economic Status

This variable was selected as an explanatory variable to capture the effect of
socio-economic conditions, generally a proxy for wealth, on women’s labor force
participation. The results reported above show little or no impact of socio-economic
status on participation in the labor market either as a whole or in individual sectors. These
puzzling results may be attributed to a problem in building the index used in this project
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(Parra, J., 2003). Thus this study can add little to knowledge about the impact of wealth
on labor force participation among women in Venezuela.

6.2.3 Nonlabor Income

In many cases we find either unexpectedly large or counter-intuitive effects of
nonlabor income on women’s labor force participation in Venezuela. These results may
be due to the high percentage of women (92 percent) who report none at all. Although the
data set does contain information about spouses, since there are no indicators linking
women to their spouses, spouses’ income is not included in this variable. Consequently,
the present study probably adds little to our knowledge about the impact of nonlabor
income on women’s labor force participation.

6.3 Future Research

Further insight into Venezuelan women’s labor force participation will be
provided by performing Times-Series analysis for a period of 30 years, something else
which has not been done previously. In particular, this analysis will answer these
questions:
•

To what extent is the decision of Venezuelan women affected by the business
cycle? In other words, what is the relationship between women’s labor force
participation and macroeconomic fluctuations?

•

Among Venezuelan women, does the added-worker effect dominate the
discouraged-worker effect in times of recessions?
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables

A.1 The Formal Sector versus the Informal Sector

Technically, whether a market sector is classified as informal or formal depends
on whether labor activities are subject to taxation and other regulations. For the purpose
of this project, the informal sector includes self-employed workers,120 owners of micro
enterprises, helpers. The formal sector includes all other workers.

A.2 Urban Area

This variable includes women living in the metropolitan area of Caracas, in the
main cities of Venezuela, and in cities with 25,000 residents or less if they are close to a
metropolitan area. Rural areas include residents of cities with less than 25,000 residents
not belonging to the metropolitan areas of Venezuela.

A.3 Administrative Regions of Venezuela

The nine political-administrative regions are described below.

A.3.1 Andean Region

The Andean region includes the states of Táchira, Mérida, Trujillo, Barinas and
the Paez municipality in the state of Apure. The region has a long agricultural tradition of
producing coffee, vegetables, flowers, peaches, plantains and Yuca. Cattle raising is
120
This dissertation uses the methodology used by the Office of Statistics and Information (OCEI) to define the
informal sector and the formal sector. For instance, the self-employed worker category does not include professionals
or technicians.
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predominant in the south of the Lake of Maracaibo, in Barinas and in the Paez district
where about 30 percent of the cattle in Venezuela are located, as well as the principal
milk powder producing plants. However, residents have been leaving the region because
of a lack of land for the expansion of agriculture. There are also other activities such as
tourism, mining, craftwork, fish farming, and small and medium sized industries.

A.3.2 Capital Region

The capital region is composed of the federal capital (Caracas), and the states of
Vargas and Miranda. It is the center of political power as well as of commercial,
industrial and financial activities in the country. There are also other traditional activities,
such as agriculture, in this region. However, agricultural activity has progressively
decreased and exists only in the periphery of the district, in the Barlovento sub region,
and in the Miranda slopes. The growth of cacao, flowers and vegetables and the raising of
pigs, represents the survival of agricultural activities which have been able to take
advantage of the proximity of large markets.
Traditionally, the capital region also operated as a reception center for inmigrants
which contributed to serious urban planning problems characterized by water shortages,
air and noise pollution, a shortage of services and a lack of recreational areas.

A.3.3 Central Region

The central region is composed of the Carabobo, Cojedes and Aragua states. The
main characteristic of this region is its industrial activity, although it is less developed in
the Cojedes state. It was historically the basis of the most prosperous agricultural
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activities in the country. However, with the emergence of the oil economy, most of the
agricultural land was taken over for urban and industrial use. The agricultural activity that
still exists is linked to the production of food, drinks, textiles and tobacco. In the state of
Cojedes, cattle-raising is important, as well as the cultivation of rice, sorghum and
ajonjolí seed. The presence of Puerto Cabello as the main national port linked the region
to the other more industrialized areas.

A.3.4 Central-Western Region

This region is composed of the states of Lara, Falcón, Yaracuy and Portuguesa. It
has great geographical diversity that allows for a variety of economic activities, including
agriculture, oil and mining.
Barquisimeto an important urban-industrial center is found in this region. Oil and
petrochemical activities are found in Falcón and Punto Fijo whereas mining activities are
concentrated in Lara. An important agricultural area in Portuguesa produces sorghum,
rice and cotton. Onions, potatoes, sugar cane, maize and poultry are produced in the
valleys of Quibor.

A.3.5 Guyana Region

The Guyana region includes the states of Bolívar, Amazonas, and Delta Amacuro.
It represents the greatest forest reservoir and water recourses of the country. It is
identified as a mining region, producer of hydroelectric energy and forestal resources.
The region contains almost 50 percent of the land in Venezuela but has less than 6
percent of the total population of the country. More than 60 percent of the regional
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population lives between Ordaz Port and Ciudad Bolivar. One-third of the country’s
indigenous people live in this region. Mining is developed around the basic industries of
iron and aluminum. There is also agricultural industries, cattle raising, logging, fishing
and tourism industries. Guayana was dropped from the analysis because it has the newest
cities of Venezuela for the residents of which socio-economic status codes have not been
established.

A.3.6 Insular Region

The insular territories that compose the region are the state of Nueva Esparta
(Margarita Island), the islands located in the Caribbean Sea, the islands located in the
Gulf of Paria.
The state of Nueva Esparta is at the heart of the Insular region that has
traditionally specialized in fishing, commercial activities and especially tourism due to
the tax free zone on Margarita Island. Moreover, the many people moving to Margarita
Island have caused a boom in the construction activities.

A.3.7 North-Eastern Region

The North-Eastern region is composed of the states of Anzoátegui, Sucre and
Monagas. Historically, the main agricultural activity was the production of cacao and
coffee as well as tobacco and citrus products. The emergence of oil as an activity took
prominence over agricultural activities creating a new axis of development around
hydrocarbons, especially in the south and center of Monagas and Anzoátegui.
Agricultural activities have survived with the inclusion of new crops such as peanuts,
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sorghum, sunflowers, and the growth of pines for paper pulp. Tourism is also important
given the beauty of the beaches in the region.

A.3.8 Plains Region

The Plains region is comprised of the states of Guarico, and Apure except for the
Paéz Municipality. Around 40 percent of the population is concentrated in 5 populated
centers: San Juan de los Morros, Altagracia, Calabozo, Zaraza, and San Fernando. The
rest of the population is dispersed around this extensive region’s area.
This region has a predominantly agricultural character. Sales of beef, rice, corn,
cotton, and tobacco are especially important. Mining is a promising activity due to the
existence of the oil band in the Orinoco River and of the limestone that the construction
industry demands.

A.3.9 Zulian Region

The Zulian region is composed only of the state of Zulia. It is characterized not
only by its great oil potential, but also by other economic activities such as agriculture,
mining, commerce, craftwork, petro-chemical industries, and coal mining. Zulia is also
one of the main producers of agricultural and cattle products including milk, meat,
cheese, sugar cane, and coconut. Trade is also an important activity, especially in the
large cities such as Maracaibo, Cabimas, and Lagunillas. Because it is a border region,
trade with neighboring Colombia is active and growing. However, the region also has
problems with contraband, drug trafficking, and kidnappings, which have increased due
to the effects of the civil war in Colombia.
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A.4 Socio-economic Status

These four variables depict the social stratification of people living in Venezuela.
They are based on an index constructed using the Mendez Castellano-Graffar Method
which categorizes households according to different levels of economic and social wellbeing. The index is derived from four variables: the profession of head of household,
level of education of the spouse or partner of head of household, the main source of
income of the household, and the physical condition of the house.121 Each one of these
variables is composed of five items which have been assigned different weights; the
summation of the items’ weights determines the distribution of the households into five
socio-economic strata. The greater the number of points, the lower the socio-economic
strata. The first three strata (with the fewest points) compose the group of the non-poor.
Stratum IV, “relative poverty”, is the next to poorest. It does not imply absolute
deprivation but contains the unemployed working class with some education. Stratum V
corresponds to critically poor households suffering a very high level of deprivation
(Hernan Méndez Castellano and Maria Cristina de Méndez, 1994). For purposes of this
study, the later two categories are combined as “poverty level.”

121

This categorization includes a combination of the sanitary conditions, the degree of luxury, and the size of the
house.

180

A.5 Nonlabor Income

This variable includes a pension given to the survivor after the death of a family
member, financial assistance of a family member to another member, a pension received
through social security, retirement funds, rental income, and interests or dividends. Labor
income of a spouse or other family members is not included.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table B.1

Binomial Probit Regression Results
Coefficients
Sample: All Women 15-60
Va
aria
able

Coefficients

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.723***
31 to 40
0.938***
41 to 50
0.850***
51 to 60
0.469***
Educationb
Primary
0.399***
Secondary
0.654***
Technical
0.843***
College
0.749***
Marital statusc
Married
0.121***
Cohabitors
0.401***
Widows
-0.090***
Divorced
0.497***
0.085***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.228***
Capital
0.065***
Central
0.189***
Central-Western
0.172***
Insular
0.013
Plains
0.067**
Zulian
0.109***
0.793***
Head of household
Socio-economic Statuse
High
0.053***
Medium High
-0.008
Average
-0.0002
-0.085***
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.006
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.017
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.036
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.067*
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.056***
1997-2nd half
0.152***
1998-1st half
0.225***
1998-2nd half
0.273***
-1.238 ***
Constant
N
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is 1995-1 period.

0.013
0.014
0.017
0.019

56.86
64.99
51.53
24.09

0.021
0.023
0.032
0.025

19.26
28.74
26.63
29.51

0.012
0.048
0.035
0.022
0.015

10.42
8.29
-2.58
22.29
5.75

0.021
0.018
0.020
0.019
0.044
0.032
0.019
0.020

11.07
3.60
9.40
9.26
0.29
2.11
5.87
39.60

0.015
0.016
0.017
0.026

3.51
-0.53
-0.01
-3.23

0.054
0.052
0.053
0.053

0.12
-0.32
0.68
1.27

0.014
0.016
0.016
0.016
0.032
86,199
97,140***
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4.00
9.47
14.14
17.09
-38.63

Table B.2

Binomial Probit Regression Results
Marginal Effects
Sample: All Women 15-60
Variable

Marginal Effects

Standard Deviations

z-values

a

Age groups
21 to 30
0.238***
31 to 40
0.293***
41 to 50
0.261***
51 to 60
0.154***
Educationb
Primary
0.146***
Secondary
0.215***
Technical
0.239***
College
0.228***
Marital statusc
Married
0.044***
Cohabitors
0.131***
Widows
-0.034***
Divorced
0.161***
0.031***
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
0.079***
Capital
0.024***
Central
0.066***
Central-Western
0.061***
Insular
0.005
Plains
0.024**
Zulian
0.039***
0.241***
Head of household
Socio-economic Statuse
High
0.019***
Medium High
-0.003
Average
-0.00007
-0.031***
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
0.002
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
-0.006
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
0.013
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
0.024
Survey datef
1997-1st half
0.020***
1997-2nd half
0.054***
1998-1st half
0.079***
1998-2nd half
0.095***
-2* log likelihood ratio
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is 1995-1 period.
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0.004
0.004
0.004
0.006

63.95
79.47
64.52
27.42

0.008
0.007
0.006
0.006

19.29
32.93
38.75
37.86

0.004
0.014
0.013
0.006
0.006

10.42
9.52
-2.54
25.99
5.68

0.007
0.006
0.007
0.006
0.016
0.011
0.007
0.005

11.62
3.63
9.75
9.51
0.29
2.14
5.97
51.55

0.005
0.006
0.006
0.010

3.51
-0.53
-0.01
-3.23

0.020
0.019
0.019
0.019

0.12
-0.32
0.68
0.68

0.005
0.006
0.005
0.005
97,140***

4.03
9.70
14.71
17.98

Table B.3

Multinomial Probit Regression Results
Formal Sector
Sample: All Women 15-60
Variable
Age groupsa
21 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
51 to 60
Educationb
Primary
Secondary
Technical
College
Marital statusc
Married
Cohabitors
Widows
Divorced
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
Capital
Central
Central-Western
Insular
Plains
Zulian
Head of household
Socio-Economic Statuse
High
Medium High
Average
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
Survey datef
1997-1st half
1997-2nd half
1998-1st half
1998-2nd half
Constant

Coefficients

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.992***
1.205***
1.048***
0.502***

0.018
0.020
0.024
0.028

0.193***
0.197***
0.141***
0.043***

0.005
0.005
0.006
0.008

0.612***
1.090***
1.407***
1.269***

0.031
0.034
0.045
0.037

0.140***
0.272***
0.338***
0.315***

0.008
0.008
0.009
0.008

0.087***
0.561***
-0.150***
0.667***
0.141***

0.017
0.067
0.050
0.031
0.021

-0.011***
0.112***
-0.039***
0.119***
0.038***

0.004
0.017
0.013
0.007
0.006

0.294***
0.154***
0.210***
0.262***
0.094
0.057
-0.005
0.966***

0.029
0.026
0.029
0.027
0.063
0.046
0.027
0.028

0.052***
0.057***
0.024***
0.062***
0.047***
0.0008
-0.049***
0.121***

0.008
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.017
0.012
0.007
0.006

0.053***
0.007
0.009
-0.113***

0.021
0.022
0.024
0.038

0.005
0.008
0.005
-0.023***

0.006
0.006
0.007
0.010

-0.002
0.010
0.103
0.137*

0.076
0.073
0.075
0.073

-0.003
0.014
0.041**
0.046***

0.020
0.019
0.019
0.019

0.059***
0.195***
0.257***
0.281***
-1.995***

0.020
0.023
0.023
0.023
0.047

0.005
0.033***
0.032***
0.020***

0.005
0.006
0.006
0.006

N
86,199
%
of total
-2 * log likelihood
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is 1995-1 period.

39,036
45.3
160,264.84***
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Table B.4

Multinomial Probit Regression Results
Informal Sector
Sample: All Women 15-60
Coefficients
Age groupsa
21 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
51 to 60
Educationb
Primary
Secondary
Technical
College
Marital statusc
Married
Cohabitors
Widows
Divorced
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
Capital
Central
Central-Western
Insular
Plains
Zulian
Head of household
Socio-Economic Statuse
High
Medium High
Average
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
Survey datef
1997-1st half
1997-2nd half
1998-1st half
1998-2nd half
Constant

Standard
Deviations

Marginal Effects

Standard
Deviations

0.830***
1.261***
1.212***
0.785***

0.022
0.024
0.027
0.031

0.048***
0.111***
0.124***
0.112***

0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007

0.407***
0.436***
0.448***
0.427***

0.032
0.036
0.053
0.041

0.014**
-0.046***
-0.088***
-0.074***

0.002
0.006
0.006
0.006

0.321***
0.450***
-0.057
0.622***
0.041*

0.019
0.077
0.053
0.034
0.025

0.056***
0.022
0.005
0.046***
-0.008

0.004
0.014
0.009
0.006
0.005

0.307***
-0.081***
0.320***
0.152***
-0.171**
0.137***
0.377***
1.154***

0.034
0.030
0.033
0.039
0.078
0.052
0.030
0.030

0.029***
-0.034***
0.043***
0.0002
-0.043***
0.023**
0.085***
0.123***

0.007
0.005
0.007
0.006
0.012
0.010
0.006
0.005

0.097***
-0.051**
-0.021
-0.091**

0.024
0.025
0.028
0.043

0.014***
-0.011***
-0.005
-0.006

0.004
0.005
0.005
0.008

0.021
-0.093
-0.084
-0.032

0.085
0.083
0.085
0.081

0.005
-0.020
-0.029**
-0.023*

0.015
0.014
0.015
0.014

0.109***
0.216***
0.377***
0.514***
-2.482***

0.024
0.027
0.026
0.026
0.053

N
86,199
%
100.0
-2 * log likelihood
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is 1995-1.

16,303
18.9
160,264.84***
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0.016***
0.022***
0.050***
0.078***

0.004
0.005
0.005
0.005

Table B.5

Women’s Labor Force Participation by Geographical Areas of Venezuela
FORMAL

INFORMAL
SelfOther
Employed
(%)
(%)

REGION

N

Out of the
Labor
Force
(%)

Andean

9,905

33.92

16.03

30.75

46.78

16.36

2.94

19.30

Capital

20,601

35.06

15.10

35.33

50.43

13.78

0.74

14.52

Central

10,988

35.26

11.20

34.06

45.26

18.47

2.00

20.47

CentralWestern

15,293

35.48

13.48

33.79

47.27

15.75

1.97

17.72

Insular

1,063

41.10

15.20

31.10

46.30

10.90

1.70

12.60

NorthEastern

8,045

41.55

14.72

26.91

41.63

14.74

2.08

16.82

Plains

2,332

39.37

17.24

24.10

41.34

17.15

2.14

19.29

Zulian

17,342

35.50

9.30

29.30

38.60

23.80

2.10

25.90

Public
Sector (%)

Private
Sector (%)

Total
(%)

Source: Household Sample Survey (1995-1998) and the author’s calculations.
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Total
(%)

Table B.6

Venezuelan Women’s Labor Force Participation by Samples

a

Samples

N

Out of Labor
Force
(%)

Labor
Force
(%)

Formal
Sector

Informal
Sector

All Women

86,199

35.8

64.2

45.3

18.9

Married

42,791

33.1

66.9

44.8

22.1

Single

32,906

45.4

54.6

42.2

12.4

Head of
Household

11,365a

12.8

87.2

55.7

31.5

a

Includes women of all categories of marital status.
Source: Household Survey Samples (1995-1998) and the author’s calculations.
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Table B.7

Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Marginal Effects-Formal Sector
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Variable
Age groupsa
21 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
51 to 60
Educationb
Primary
Secondary
Technical
College
Marital statusc
Married
Cohabitors
Widows
Divorced
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
Capital
Central
Central-Western
Insular
Plains
Zulian
Head of household
Socio-economic Statuse
High
Medium High
Average
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
Survey datef
1997-1st half
1997-2nd half
1998-1st half
1998-2nd half

All women
15-60

Married
Women

Single
Women

Women Heads of
Household

0.192
***
0.182
***
0.133
***
0.036

***

(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.007)

0.052
***
0.048
0.001
***
-0.100

***

(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.011)

0.326
***
0.318
***
0.289
***
0.211

***

(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.016)

0.057
0.086
0.081
0.021

0.150
***
0.278
***
0.335
***
0.315

***

(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)

0.098
***
0.270
***
0.363
***
0.388

***

(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.010)

0.325
***
0.381
***
0.389
***
0.319

***

(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.013)
(0.016)

0.140
***
0.263
***
0.262
***
0.296

***

(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.023)
(0.015)

-0.012
***
0.111
***
-0.047
***
0.122
***
0.039

***

(0.005)
(0.017)
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.006)

***

***

(0.010)

-0.075
0.009
***
-0.102
-0.005
***
0.060

(0.016)
(0.027)
(0.016)
(0.012)
(0.016)

0.053
***
0.058
***
0.024
***
0.064
***
0.050
0.003
***
-0.047
***
0.126

***

(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.017)
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.007)

0.005
0.008
0.005
***
-0.028

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.010)

0.002
0.022
***
0.053
***
0.058

(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)

0.148
***
0.127
***
0.139
***
0.143

0.004
***
0.033
***
0.031
***
0.019

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.006)

-0.001
***
0.030
***
0.035
0.026

(0.057)
(0.055)
(0.054)
(0.056)

***

(0.008)

0.040

0.053
***
0.031
0.006
***
0.066
0.082
-0.014
***
-0.086
***
0.114

***

(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.023)
(0.017)
(0.010)
(0.013)

0.096
***
0.106
***
0.073
***
0.082
0.036
***
0.083
***
0.054
***
0.179

***

(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.014)
(0.012)
(0.034)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.012)

0.008
***
0.070
0.019
***
0.051
0.066
-0.040
***
-0.123

(0.021)
(0.018)
(0.021)
(0.019)
(0.050)
(0.032)
(0.020)

-0.003
0.004
0.005
-0.005

(0.008) 0.008
(0.008) 0.006
(0.020) 0.004
(0.020) -0.051***

(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.018)

-0.024
0.0002
-0.025
-0.022

(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.018)
(0.015)

(0.044) -0.135***
(0.041) 0.015
(0.039) 0.065
(0.037) 0.052

(0.042)
(0.038)
(0.040)
(0.041)

-0.052
-0.002
0.038
0.002

*

(0.031)
(0.028)
(0.030)
(0.027)

(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.010)

-0.009
0.016
-0.014
**
-0.037

0.039

***

39,036
N
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is 1995-1 period.
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(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)

19,161

*

0.017
***
0.035
***
0.026
**
0.023

13,882

(0.017)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.018)

6,330

Table B.8

Multinomial Logit Regression Results
Marginal Effects-Informal Sector
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Variable
Age groupsa
21 to 30
31 to 40
41 to 50
51 to 60
Educationb
Primary
Secondary
Technical
College
Marital statusc
Married
Cohabitors
Widows
Divorced
Urban residence
Regionsd
Andean
Capital
Central
Central-Western
Insular
Plains
Zulian
Head of household
Socio-economic Statuse
High
Medium High
Average
Nonlabor income (US$/ month)
Interaction terms
Nonlabor income * 1997-1
Nonlabor income * 1997-2
Nonlabor income * 1998-1
Nonlabor income * 1998-2
Survey datef
1997-1st half
1997-2nd half
1998-1st half
1998-2nd half

All women
15-60

Married
Women

***

(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.008)

0.021
***
0.096
***
0.107
***
0.095

0.011
***
-0.053
***
-0.093
***
-0.081

*

(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.005)

0.012
***
-0.055
***
-0.111
***
-0.101

0.057
*
0.025
0.005
***
0.047
-0.008

***

(0.004)
(0.014)
(0.009)
(0.006)
(0.005)

0.0007

0.029
***
-0.034
***
0.043
-0.0008
***
-0.045
***
0.024
***
0.084
***
0.119

***

(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.012)
(0.010)
(0.006)
(0.006)

0.031
***
-0.040
***
0.061
-0.002
***
-0.052
**
0.032
***
0.092
***
0.068

0.014
***
-0.011
-0.005
-0.003

***

(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.007)

0.006
-0.019
*
-0.027
-0.020

(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.013)

0.047
***
0.110
***
0.122
***
0.113

***

0.017
***
0.022
***
0.050
***
0.078

(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)

16,303
N
*** (**,*) = coefficients significant at 1% (5%, 10%) level.
a=omitted category is women 15 to 20 years old.
b=omitted category is women with no education.
c=omitted category is single women.
d=omitted category is the North-Eastern region.
e=omitted category is poverty.
f=omitted category is 1995-1 period.

***

Single
Women

Women Heads of
Household
0.033
0.065
0.082
0.073

0.065
***
0.110
***
0.122
***
0.113

***

(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.014)

(0.009) 0.040***
(0.009) -0.019***
(0.010) -0.053***
(0.008) -0.039***

(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)

-0.064
***
-0 165
***
-0 172
***
-0 201

***

(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.022)
(0.014)

(0.007) -0.012*

(0.007)

-0.011
-0.008
0.002
0.008
***
-0.058

(0.015)
(0.025)
(0.015)
(0.011)
(0.016)

***

(0.010) 0.018**
(0.008) -0.022***
(0.019) 0.026***
(0.009) 0.002
(0.018) -0.020
(0.015) 0.003
(0.010) 0.069***
(0.012) 0.124***

(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.020)
(0.014)
(0.010)
(0.009)

0.005
***
-0.077
-0.002
**
-0.041
***
-0.104
0.014
***
0.115

(0.020)
(0.017)
(0.020)
(0.018)
(0.043)
(0.014)
(0.020)

0.026
*
-0.011
-0.0005
-0.024

***

(0.007) 0.003
(0.007) -0.011*
(0.007) -0.008
(0.019) -0.011

(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.010)

-0.024
0.0002
-0.025
0.005

(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.018)
(0.015)

0.041
-0.025
-0.023
-0.022

(0.036) -0.013
(0.037) 0.033*
(0.034) -0.009
(0.031) -0.007

(0.021)
(0.019)
(0.021)
(0.019)

0.003
-0.035
***
-0.082
-0.029

(0.030)
(0.028)
(0.029)
(0.026)

(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)

(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)

0.011
0.002
***
0.045
***
0.073

(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.018)

***

0.023
***
0.033
***
0.056
***
0.084

(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.011)

9,474
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0.005
0.0008
***
0.036
***
0.057

4,078

(0.058)
(0.055)
(0.054)
(0.056)

3,579
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